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Abstract 
How do humans learn to discriminate novel objects? The puzzle of novel object recognition 
is particularly pertinent in forensics and security settings where human judgement is the 
primary means of identifying individuals based on unfamiliar photographs, fingerprints, 
footprints, bite marks, or CCTV footage. In this thesis, I use fingerprints as a testbed to 
examine the development of perceptual expertise in novel object recognition. 
 There are four main empirical chapters. In Chapter 2, I probe the effect of context 
and familiarity on fingerprint matching decisions. In Chapter 3, I test fingerprint experts 
and novices on a family resemblance matching task that shifts the level of specificity from 
discriminating fingers to discriminating people more broadly. In Chapter 4, I contrast 
people’s reliance on a general or an instance-based visual skill by looking for expert-novice 
differences across distinct changes in the structure of the task and stimulus class. In Chapter 
5, I follow a group of fingerprint trainees as their perceptual expertise emerges over twelve 
months. I examine whether individual differences across four measures of expertise remain 
stable as trainees gain experience with matching prints. 
 I find that fingerprint discrimination judgments are influenced by the similarity of 
the context and image-level information to specific prior cases. I provide evidence for a 
flexible memory retrieval process for recognising fingerprints across levels of specificity, and 
show that expertise in print discrimination is robust to changes in the structure of the task, 
but not to changes in stimulus class—fingerprint experts are not inverted face experts. I 
also find that fingerprint expertise emerges with domain-specific experience, and that it is 
possible to predict some aspects of performance ahead of time. When the images are briefly 
presented or when matching family resemblances, however, early individual differences are 
diluted with experience. I conclude that novel object recognition is facilitated by domain-
specific experience and that experts rely on their memories for information that is 
distributed across their repository of prior instances. A greater understanding of individual 
differences, and the sorts of experiences that facilitate perceptual expertise will help to 
inform training and recruitment programs in applied visual domains. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Preface 
In the early stages of my PhD candidature, I conducted a few basic experiments aimed at 
identifying ways to speed up the acquisition of expertise in forensic domains. These 
domains typically involve recognising novel objects and identities—whether a pair of 
unfamiliar fingerprints match the same finger (or not) or whether a pair of unfamiliar 
passport photographs depict the same individual (or not). Several scientific and legal 
bodies have highlighted a need to establish improved, empirically validated, and 
standardised training programs for forensic examiners (Campbell, 2011; National Research 
Council, 2009; NIST, 2012), and my initial goal was to address this need. I scoured the 
education and expertise literatures for clues as to the best way to practice. I gave 
undergraduates variants of feedback, deadlined their exposure to images, allowed them to 
learn at their own pace, overlaid case-by-case expert video guidance (vs. novice guidance), 
and designed training protocols to encourage contrastive learning, and the generation of 
semantic knowledge. I had some success, and I’ve appended a manuscript based on this 
earlier work (see Appendix). It became apparent to me, however, that understanding the 
basis of examiners’ expertise would provide a more tractable platform for understanding 
the conditions that are most likely to benefit learners in applied visual domains. 
 Several questions were largely unanswered. What is the role of memory in novel 
object expertise? How generalisable or flexible is novel object expertise? And, what predicts 
novel object expertise? I had a rare opportunity to work with fingerprint examiners with 
many years of experience visually comparing prints, and trainees as they accumulated such 
experience, and so I used fingerprint identification as a testbed for addressing these 
questions—I was able to work on theoretical problems using natural stimuli, and a natural 
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population of learners. Figure 1.1 shows a schematic representation of this thesis 
comprising of four main chapters: moving from left to right, above each chapter is the main 
research question it addresses. Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 are all manuscripts based on 
empirical work. Chapter 2 is published (Searston, Tangen & Eva, 2015), Chapter 3 has been 
submitted for publication and is under a second round of review, Chapter 4 has been 
submitted for publication and is under a first round of review, and Chapter 5 is unpublished 
but will be submitted for publication as a separate manuscript. The appended manuscript—
Training Perceptual Experts: Feedback, Labels, and Contrasts—has also been submitted for 
publication separately and is under a first round of review. 
 
Figure 1.1. Schematic representation of the thesis moving from left to right through each of 
the main chapters, organised by research question. 
1.2 Overview 
Humans learn to recognise familiar objects and categories with remarkable speed and 
precision, often regardless of variation in noise, viewpoint, or context. The slightly blotchy 
looking apples in a still-life painting by Cézanne, as depicted in Figure 1.2, are vastly 
different from van Gogh’s streaky red apples, or the ones wasting away in my fruit bowl, 
though they are all recognisably, apples. Even simple biological systems—such as ants, bees, 
wasps, pigeons, and damselfish—can learn to recognise previously travelled routes 
(Wehner, Boyer, Loertscher, Sommer & Menzi, 2006), specific artistic styles (Wu, Moreno, 
Tangen & Reinhard, 2013), the faces of conspecifics (Sheehan & Tibbetts, 2011; Siebeck, 
Parker, Sprenger, Mäthger, Wallis, 2010), and abnormal mammograms (Levenson, 
Krupinski, Navarro, Wasserman, 2015). We achieve viewpoint or context invariant 
recognition by accumulating experience across a broad range of views and contexts, and 
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drawing on similar, diagnostic information stored in memory to help resolve the identity or 
category of novel cases (Brooks, 1978; Logan, 1988; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 
1986, 1987). We also draw on learned semantic associations to aid recognition (Collins & 
Curby, 2013; Gauthier, James, Curby & Tarr, 2003). This memory retrieval process is the 
basis for many seemingly impressive feats of expertise. Chess masters rely on their 
memories for specific chess board configurations to help judge their next move (Chase & 
Simon, 1973), for example, and clinicians rely on similarity to specific previous cases to 
help classify a current set of symptoms (Brooks, Norman, & Allen, 1991).  
 While this memory retrieval process allows experts to generalise across instances and 
views, it is also notoriously specific to the learned visual structure. Expert recognition is 
disrupted when images are presented in a novel, inverted orientation (e.g., Crump, Logan & 
Kimbrough, 2010; Curby, Glazek, Gauthier, 2009; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Thompson, 
1980), or when presented in a novel configuration (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Young, 
Hellawell & Hay, 1987), and we are generally not as fast, or as accurate, at recognising less 
familiar objects, including novel face identities (Bruce, 1982; Clutterbuck & Johnston, 
2002, 2004, 2005; White, Burton, Jenkins & Kemp, 2014)—we are, of course, novices with 
novel objects. As a novice, recognition is more deliberative and slow (Newell & 
Rosenbloom, 1981), novices can attend to parts of objects (Young et al., 1987), and they 
tend to rely more on verbalisable rules (Allen & Brooks, 1991; Gauthier & Curby, 2005), or 
algorithms (Logan, 1988). When you only have a few instances of Cézanne or van Gogh to 
draw on, informational features such as “slightly blotchy” or “streaky”, serve as a general 
rule for discriminating them (Brooks & Hannah, 2006). There is evidence, however, that 
generalisation to new objects and categories can be facilitated by general experience 
individuating objects within the same subclass—learning to recognise individual fictitious 
beasts (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) or specific bird species (Tanaka, Curran, & Sheinberg, 2005) 
aids transfer to novel individual beasts and bird species. Do we rely on memory retrieval to 
aid generalisation to novel objects as well? Do novel object experts develop a superior set of 
verbalisable rules that aids transfer? In this thesis, I evaluate exemplar theory as an 
explanation for effects of novel object expertise. 
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Figure 1.2. Levels of specificity. These image categories depict fruit, finches, and 
individuals, but they could also be carved up at a finer level: instances of apples, purple 
finches, and fingers. The visual structure that is important for discrimination will likely 
change across these levels of specificity. 
1.3 Novel Object Recognition in Forensic Science 
My program of research is grounded in a particular applied problem. In forensic science, 
human examiners are relied on to judge whether two novel samples of evidence depict the 
same finger, individual, tool, firearm, etc. (Dror, 2015; Found, 2014; Tangen, 2013). It is a 
human examiner who determines whether an ambiguous figure captured on CCTV depicts a 
particular suspect (Burton, Wilson, Cowan, & Bruce, 1999), and who decides whether an 
“Apples” “Apples” “Peaches”
“Purple finch” “Purple finch” “House finch”
“Jones” “Jones” “Smith”
“Apples”
“Purple finch”
“Jones”
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impression that was collected from a crime scene (a fingerprint, bite mark, tool mark, etc.) 
matches a particular candidate image (Saks & Koehler, 2005). For many forensic examiners, 
each new case is a new object, and there is limited opportunity to develop a tacit 
knowledge of what these objects tend to look like in a variety of contexts.  
 Despite the paucity of within-object exemplars at examiners’ disposal, there is 
evidence of genuine expertise in some forensic domains: fingerprint examiners are more 
accurate than novices at discriminating matching and mismatching (but highly similar) 
prints (Tangen, Thompson & McCarthy, 2011; Thompson, Tangen & McCarthy, 2013), and 
particular groups of facial recognition examiners, whose task it is to compare unfamiliar 
faces for identity, also display superior performance compared to novices (White, Phillips, 
Hahn, Hill & O’Toole, 2015; although see White, Kemp, Jenkins, Matheson & Burton, 
2014). These examiners face a formidable recognition task day to day. Similar to the 
examples in Figure 1.3, they often encounter images of the same object or individual that 
are highly dissimilar, and images of different individuals and objects that look strikingly 
similar. Other researchers have discovered much about the many ways in which these 
examiners’ judgments can be swayed by contextual information (e.g., Dror, Charlton & 
Péron, 2005a; Dror, Péron, Hind & Charlton, 2005b; see Kassin et al., 2013 for a review), 
and about the reliability of forensic examinations (Dror et al., 2011; Ulery, Hicklin, 
Buscaglia & Roberts, 2011; Ulery, Hicklin, Buscaglia & Roberts, 2012). We know very little 
about how forensic examiners achieve identification with so few within-object instances at 
their disposal. In this thesis, I probe the basis of examiners’ expertise with novel objects and 
how it develops.  
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Figure 1.3. Within- versus between-object variation in faces and prints. The images on the 
left and in the middle illustrate how the same face and finger can look quite different from 
one time to the next. Images from other people’s faces and fingers can also look very 
similar, as can be seen with the images on the right. Forensic examiners compare images 
like these side-by-side and determine whether they depict the same object. The faces were 
retrieved from a “doppelgänger” website called www.ilooklikeyou.com. Users upload 
photographs of their face and an algorithm matches them to the most similar photograph 
uploaded by other users. The prints are from The Forensic Informatics Biometric Repository. 
National biometric databases use an algorithm that is similar in principle to the 
“ilooklikeyou” website, which matches a passport photograph or latent fingerprint to 
similar images. These algorithms narrow down the list of candidates, but it is up to a 
human to decide whether those images depict the same individual or finger. We rely on 
these examiners to detect passport fraud or to identify individuals who were at the scene of 
a crime.  
Exemplar Match Mismatch
Exemplar Match Mismatch
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1.4 Does Novel Object Expertise Rely on Memory? 
There is evidence that fingerprint examiners make use of configural and non-analytic 
processing when examining prints. Experts show a delay in the N170 EEG component when 
viewing inverted versus upright fingerprint fragments (a measure of configural processing; 
Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005), for example, and these examiners are less affected by artificial 
noise or the spacing of prints in time compared to novices (Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005; 
Thompson & Tangen, 2014). Fingerprint examiners are also more accurate than novices at 
discriminating briefly presented prints, although their performance improves even more 
when given more time (Thompson & Tangen, 2014). Facial recognition experts show a 
similar advantage when matching briefly presented unfamiliar faces (White et al., 2015). 
Taken together, these studies indicate that experts are bringing some knowledge to bear on 
their judgments that novices aren’t—knowledge that extends beyond the raw image-level 
information in the case at hand. Less clear, is whether these experts are leveraging their 
memory for specific prior instances (Brooks, 1978), even when they are not placed under 
speeded and artificially noisy conditions. 
 In Chapter 2 of this thesis—Putting Bias into Context: The Role of Familiarity in 
Identification—I explore whether people make use of specific prior instances in novel object 
recognition. I conduct three experiments to test whether undergraduates’ fingerprint 
matching judgments are dependent on the context, and on similarity to specific prior 
instances. Fingerprint examiners are breadth experts, they see many different fingers, but 
few instances of each. As a result, it is likely that matching novel fingerprints invokes a 
familiarity-based retrieval of similar cases, rather than an explicit process of recollecting a 
particular finger or case. Familiarity-based recognition is characterised by a “feeling of 
knowing” or sense of fluency (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; Young et al., 2011). Unlike the 
explicit experience of recollection, the implicit experience of familiarity cannot be 
pinpointed to its exact source, affording less control over the influence of context and the 
specific information contained within (or across) prior episodes (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). If 
people’s fingerprint matching judgments are swayed by the context, then this result would 
suggest they make use of a familiarity-based retrieval process. Importantly, we also strip 
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away the context in the final experiment, and assess whether the familiarity of the 
fingerprints themselves influences judgments in novel cases. 
1.5 How Flexible is Novel Object Expertise? 
An alternative view to a memory retrieval account, borrowed from the unfamiliar face 
matching literature, is that novel object matching expertise relies primarily on a general 
visual skill, driven by a qualitatively different process to familiar object recognition. 
Undergraduates’ unfamiliar face matching performance is not correlated with their familiar 
face matching performance when the faces are presented upright, but the two conditions 
are correlated when the faces are presented upside-down (Megreya & Burton, 2006). This 
result suggests a shift in processing as people become familiar with a particular identity. 
Expert (unfamiliar) face matchers are also less impaired by inversion than undergraduates 
(although this same effect was not found when comparing expert examiners to professional 
controls; White et al., 2015; see also White et al., 2014), suggesting that they rely less on 
configural information. The difference in fingerprint matching performance between 
experts and novices is also more pronounced when given 60 seconds to view the prints 
versus one second (Thompson & Tangen, 2014), and formal practice guidelines across 
forensic disciplines encourage a slow, analytic process of marking up and comparing 
particular features in each case before arriving at a conclusion (FISWG, 2012; SWGFAST, 
2012). These findings and current practices give further reason to suspect that forensic 
examiners might rely on controlled, effortful, or analytic processes when matching prints 
that are more dependent on general abilities (Ackerman, 1987). 
 Several characteristics of face processing—such as inversion and misalignment 
effects—are observed, albeit to a lesser degree, in other object domains where people have 
developed expertise (e.g., Crump et al., 2010; Curby et al., 2009; Diamond & Carey, 1986; 
Thompson, 1980; Valentine, 1988). These studies suggest that recognition of familiar faces 
and objects of expertise relies on similar cognitive processes (Farah, Wilson, Drain & 
Tanaka, 1998; Gauthier & Bukach, 2007; Tarr & Cheng, 2003; for an opposing 
interpretation, see McKone, Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007; Robbins & McKone, 2007). If 
recognition of novel faces and objects also share the same cognitive processes, previous 
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unfamiliar face studies provide an indication that expertise with matching novel objects 
may be characterised by a more general skill—one that is more resistant to changes in 
orientation, and stimulus class . 1
 In Chapters 3 and 4, I contrast people’s reliance on a general or an instance-based 
visual skill. I do this by pushing the “flexibility” of fingerprint expertise, by placing 
fingerprint experts outside of their usual level of specificity, outside of their usual two-
image, same/different task structure, and outside of their usual stimulus class of 
fingerprints. A general visual ability that does not rely on retrieval of memories within a 
particular domain ought to be robust to such changes. A specific memory retrieval process, 
on the other hand, would not support generalisation to completely new classes of stimuli 
that share few visual regularities with stored information (Bukach, Phillips & Gauthier, 
2010). Shifting the level of specificity and changing the task structure—unlike the specific 
similarity built into the experiments in Chapter 2—allows me test whether experts can rely 
on information that is distributed across prior instances. Generalisation across levels of 
specificity (but not across classes of stimuli) would indicate a flexible memory retrieval 
process, where experts are able to reinterpret information stored in memory depending on 
the demands of the task (Nosofsky, 1986, 1987). Returning to the apples example, I might 
learn that “streaky” is particularly diagnostic of van Gogh’s apples and rely heavily on this 
dimension when distinguishing apples in art, but rely less on “streaky”, and more on other 
shared visual regularities, such as “smoothness”, when collapsing across apples and 
discriminating fruit more generally (see Figure 1.2). The more that prior instances differ 
from a stimulus, the less useful these instances are for identifying new instances of that 
category. For example, a large repository of fruit instances is not particularly useful for 
distinguishing bird species or fingerprints. 
 The familiar/novel distinction I make here and throughout the thesis, refers to a difference in the 1
tasks typically carried out in a perceptual expertise experiment and those performed in forensic 
domains. As a participant in a perceptual expertise experiment, you generally have an opportunity 
to accumulate multiple instances of a particular set of objects before being tested on your ability to 
classify or discriminate those objects. That is, even if the broader stimulus class was entirely new to 
you beforehand (e.g., Greebles), the specific objects become familiar during the course of the 
experiment. In passports or fingerprints, however, each case is an entirely new object altogether—
aside from viewing the two images in front of them, forensic examiners have no prior exposure to 
the visual structure of a particular finger or identity.
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 In Chapter 3—The Style of a Stranger: Identification Expertise Generalises to Coarser 
Level Categories—I test whether fingerprint experts can generalise their finger 
discrimination expertise to people more broadly—are experts more accurate than novices at 
recognising prints from Jones’s right thumb and prints from Jones’s right index finger as 
instances of the same “Jones” category? I also see how fingerprint trainees’ accuracy 
changes on this same person matching task with on-the-job fingerprint experience. The 
visual regularities that are diagnostic of particular fingers and the verbal labels we use to 
describe these regularities, are not likely to be as useful when collapsing across fingers and 
discriminating people (as can be seen in Figure 1.2, there is substantial variation among 
Jones’s prints; Brooks & Hannah, 2006). If experts are better at recognising the style of a 
stranger than novices, then this result would suggest that experts are relying on a flexible 
memory retrieval process (Nosofsky, 1986, 1987). 
 In Chapter 4—Novel Object Expertise is Flexible to Changes in Task but not Changes in 
Class—I test whether fingerprint expertise holds in a visual search paradigm. Fingerprint 
experts and undergraduate novices are asked to locate a loop fingerprint pattern in an array 
of 39 whorl patterns (or vice versa). I further test whether fingerprint experts maintain a 
performance advantage when searching for inverted face categories in the same paradigm 
(i.e., locating an inverted male face in an array of inverted female faces, or vice versa). I 
then replicate this methodology using a speeded discrimination task to probe whether 
fingerprint expertise generalises to matching prints, versus inverted face identities, when 
the images are presented very briefly. Fingerprint examiners have years of experience with 
matching prints, but have limited experience with matching inverted faces (Young, 
Hellawell & Hay, 1987). Prints and inverted faces are also not likely to share any of the 
same visual regularities. If experts outperform novices at locating and discriminating 
inverted faces as well as prints, then this result would suggest a general visual skill. If 
experts outperform novices for prints but not inverted faces, however, then this result 
would suggest a form of expertise that is constrained by prior instances, consistent with a 
memory retrieval account.   
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1.6 What Predicts Novel Object Expertise? 
People vary in their ability to recognise objects. Developmental prosopagnosics perform 
significantly below average at recognising faces (Kress & Daum, 2003) and others, who 
have been labelled super recognisers, perform significantly above average across face 
memory and face matching tasks (Bobak, Hancock & Bate, 2015; Russell, Duchaine, & 
Nakayama, 2009). Other examples of expert-novice differences in object recognition 
abound (Tarr & Cheng, 2003). In forensics, the pursuit of identifying “super recognisers” to 
aid police has featured on several occasions in The New York Times, National Geographic, 
and the BBC. We know very little, however, about the relative contribution of pre-existing 
individual differences to perceptual expertise, independent of domain-specific experience. 
Are some people better suited to become super recognisers? 
 The prevailing view in cognitive psychology is that exceptional performance is 
largely a result of extensive engagement in effortful practice (Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson, 
Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993; Ericsson, 2014). Indeed, for object recognition, experience 
identifying and discriminating bird species (Tanaka et al., 2005), other-race faces (Bukach, 
Cottle, Ubiwa & Miller, 2012), and fictitious beasts (Wong, Palmeri & Gauthier, 2009; 
Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) has been shown to facilitate generalisation, and the development of 
configural processing. Domain-specific experience is also naturally accounted for by 
exemplar models (Brooks, 1978; Logan, 1988; Medin & Schaffer, 1978). While deliberative 
practice is undoubtedly important for developing perceptual expertise, some commentators 
have called for research examining whether effects of expertise could also be underpinned 
by pre-existing abilities (e.g., McNamara, Hambrick, & Oswald, 2014).  
 Prior work integrating dual-process and individual differences theories has found 
that early variation among naïve performers remains stable over a period of learning when 
the task demands remain effortful, and are inconsistent (e.g., randomly intermixed targets 
and distractors on a verbal category search task), but decline on tasks that become more 
automated with experience (e.g., colour naming, symbol sorting; see Ackerman, 1987). 
While this work is based on relatively artificial cognitive tasks, I think it provides a useful 
theoretical framework for assessing individual differences in perceptual expertise. Early 
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variation among learners’ ability to classify and discriminate prints might remain stable for 
tasks that allow slow, effortful, analytic processing, but not for tasks that force fast, 
intuitive, non-analytic processing.  
 In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this thesis, I focus on the basis of novel object expertise at 
the group level. In Chapter 5—The Emergence of Expertise with Novel Objects—I turn my 
attention to the basis of novel object expertise at the level of the individual. There are 
surprisingly few longitudinal studies mapping the development of expertise over time. I 
provided such data, evaluating dual process theory as an explanation for individual 
differences in perceptual expertise. I track a group of fingerprint trainees—spanning six 
cohorts and four police agencies—as they accumulate experience with matching prints over 
the course of a year. I test these trainees on four measures of fingerprint expertise every 
three months and index their performance. A significant and stable correlation between 
trainees’ performance over the 12 months would indicate a role for pre-existing differences 
in later perceptual expertise. 
1.7 Approach 
Previous studies investigating perceptual expertise have typically used artificial stimuli with 
a limited number of defined dimensions (e.g., Greebles, Ziggerins, YUFOs, gabor patches; 
see Richler & Palmeri, 2014 for examples). This approach is important because it affords a 
great deal of control over the moving parts of recognition, however, it comes at a cost of 
fidelity—we cannot know from these studies alone whether the effects hold for fuzzier, 
more variable natural categories and objects (Shen, Mack & Palmeri, 2014). Studies that 
have used natural stimuli have focused on familiar objects and categories (e.g., faces, birds, 
paintings, dogs, and cars; see Tarr & Cheng, 2003 for examples), where experts have an 
opportunity to accumulate within-object or within-category experience, and where most 
people have some general experience to begin with. 
 In this thesis, my approach is to test whether exemplar theory can explain effects of 
novel object recognition in an applied visual domain. In the context of fingerprint 
identification, I examine whether recognition of novel objects depends on a process of 
memory retrieval, whether expertise with novel objects is flexible to changes in the level of 
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specificity, task, and stimulus class, and whether some individuals are generally better than 
others at recognising novel objects, independent of experience. I forgo a degree of control 
to probe how effects of novel object expertise bubble to the surface in a natural, high 
fidelity learning environment—testing fingerprint novices, fingerprint experts, and 
fingerprint trainees as they accumulate experience. I hope to better understand the 
underlying mechanisms of novel object expertise, and the respective roles of domain-
specific experience and general visual skill. I further hope to establish an empirical 
foundation for training and recruitment in applied visual domains.  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Chapter 2 
Putting Bias into Context: The Role of 
Familiarity in Identification 
2.1 Preface 
This chapter is reproduced from a published article in Law and Human Behavior (for 
consistency, I’ve adjusted the format of the manuscript for the thesis and the spelling to 
Australian). This work formed the foundation for the remaining research program 
presented in this thesis, and as can be seen in Figure 2.1, it comprises the first of four 
empirical chapters. The full reference to the article: 
Searston, R. A., Tangen, J. M., & Eva, K. W. (2015). Putting bias into context: The role of 
familiarity in identification. Law and Human Behavior. Advance online publication. doi: 
10.1037/lhb0000154 
 
Figure 2.1. Schematic representation of Chapter 2 in the context of the thesis as a whole. 
 I originally designed the three experiments with Jason Tangen to assess the effect of 
context on fingerprint matching judgments—cognitive bias is a particularly hot issue in 
forensic science because there is a concern that it may be the root cause of some false 
identifications and wrongful convictions (see Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013 for a review). 
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However, the first major insight of my PhD came through reinterpreting these data from the 
perspective of visual object recognition. We found that people’s judgments in a matching 
task were influenced by the similarity of the context and the prints to previous cases. I 
interpret this result as a first piece of evidence that matching images of novel objects—novel 
fingers in this case—relies on memory. I began to view fingerprint matching as an object 
recognition task, where the object is a particular finger, and the various instances are 
different impressions left by that finger. Do these two prints depict Jones’s right thumb? Or, 
do they belong to two different fingers? Identifying fingers—like recognising faces, birds, 
dogs, cars, and fictitious beasts—likely recruits a memory retrieval process. Because our 
results have implications for the pursuit of controlling for bias in forensic science, I tailored 
the manuscript for forensic scientists and lawyers. 
2.2 Abstract 
Previous demonstrations of context effects in the forensic comparison sciences have shown 
that the number of “match” responses a person makes can be swayed by case information. 
Less clear is whether these effects are a result of changes in accuracy (e.g., discrimination 
ability), a shift in response bias (e.g., tendency to say “match” or “no match”) or a mix of 
the two. We present a series of experiments where we use a signal detection framework to 
examine the effects of case information (separately) on forensic comparison accuracy and 
response bias. We also explore the role of familiarity as one potential mechanism for case 
information to sway accuracy. In Experiment 1, case information about crimes perceived to 
be more severe swayed people to say “match” more, but had little bearing on their ability to 
discriminate matching and non-matching fingerprint pairs. In Experiment 2, case 
information did affect accuracy when it was familiar (i.e., if a previous similar case was 
associated with a “match” then people were more likely to also rate the current case as a 
“match,” even though it was not). Even when we blinded people to all extrinsic case 
information in Experiment 3, accuracy was significantly affected by the familiarity of the 
fingerprints. These results demonstrate that contextual factors can have different (and 
independent) influences on accuracy and response bias and that even subtle information 
can affect accuracy if it is sufficiently similar to the case or trace at hand.  
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2.3 Introduction 
Forensic science practices have been under review, and heavily criticised by several 
prominent scientific bodies. In 2009, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences issued a 
comprehensive report about the state of practices in forensic science, suggesting that 
sources of bias and human error are likely to contribute to wrongful arrests of innocent 
people (National Research Council, 2009; see also Garrett & Neufeld, 2009). Similar 
concerns regarding human error and lack of a research culture within the forensic science 
community have since been raised in reports issued by the Scottish Public Judicial Inquiry 
into fingerprinting (Campbell, 2011) and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis (2012). The 
National Academy of Sciences report specifically included a recommendation for the 
establishment of “. . . research programs on human observer bias and sources of human 
error in forensic examinations,” along with the recommendation that such programs would 
benefit from drawing on established findings in diagnostic medicine and cognitive 
psychology (National Research Council, 2009, S-18).  
 Here, we critically review the existing research on context effects in the forensic 
sciences. We then draw on research in cognitive psychology to offer an instance-based 
account of these contextual influences. Finally, we present three experiments to better 
understand the extent to which specific contextual factors affect human performance 
(response bias and accuracy) in forensic comparison tasks.  
2.4 Context Effects in Forensic Science  
The question of how much case information an examiner ought to have at her disposal is a 
hot topic in forensic science (Champod, 2014). Some commentators insist that knowledge 
of the case could potentially influence an examiner’s judgment (e.g., overweighting the 
degree of similarity between a pair of fingerprints in light of a confession) and that they 
should not have access to particular aspects of a case (e.g., see Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 
2013, for review and recommendations). Others suggest that examiners require access to 
certain bits of information about the case to make an informed decision (e.g., Butt, 2013; 
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Champod, 2014) and that blinding procedures, if strictly adhered to, create the risk of 
dedicating finite resources that could be better spent elsewhere.  
 Across academic forums, ideas and strategies about how best to minimise and 
control for context effects are also at the forefront of discussions. A recent review of the 
forensic confirmation bias literature by Kassin et al. (2013) sparked commentary from 
forensic practitioners and academics on the recommendations made by the authors to 
remove extraneous case information in forensic laboratories. Kassin et al. (2013) made 
several recommendations for reforming practices in forensic science. For example, 
examiners should complete and document their analyses of the trace evidence in isolation 
prior to making a comparison to known targets; blind and double-blind procedures ought 
to be implemented and strictly adhered to throughout the identification process (i.e., 
restricting communication with the investigator or removing details about the case, 
including conclusions drawn by previous examiners); cross laboratory verification should 
be used wherever possible; candidate lists should be presented randomly to examiners; and 
certification and training in forensic science ought to include requirements for a basic 
understanding of the experimental method, perception, and decision-making.  
 In response, others highlighted concerns regarding the fiscal (Charlton, 2013) and 
practical (Butt, 2013) costs of full-scale implementation of the proposed recommendations 
in forensic laboratories that are already stretched for time, staff, and resources. Other 
commentators, including Dror, Kassin, and Kukucka (2013) in their reply, argued that many 
of the recommendations are relatively low cost (Cole, 2013) and may even improve the 
efficiency of examiners’ workflow (e.g., by eliminating the time taken on irrelevant tasks 
such as reading extraneous case information). Several commentators emphasised the need 
for academic and professional stakeholders to work collaboratively in developing new and 
applied research programs and to seek mutually agreeable solutions to managing sources of 
bias (Charlton, 2013; Haber & Haber, 2013; Heyer & Semmler, 2013).  
 Overall, there appears to be a consensus that the potential for contextual 
information to influence forensic analyses is a concern, and that instituting strategies to 
safeguard against these influences would improve the quality and reliability of forensic 
evidence (Cole, 2013; Dror et al., 2013; Wells, Wilford, & Smarlarz, 2013). Less is known, 
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however, about the nature of the problem: Does the context of a case influence accuracy? 
Does it influence a person’s tendency to make a false alarm over a miss error? And what are 
the cognitive mechanisms driving these effects? We aim to address some of this uncertainty 
in the present series of experiments.  
2.5 The Research Base  
The research base on contextual influences and human error in the forensic sciences has 
grown recently, but is still in the early stages. For more than a century, fingerprint evidence 
has been considered irrefutable in forensic science (Cole, 2004). Until very recently, there 
has been no good measurement of the accuracy of human fingerprint examiners at all. The 
data are now clear, however, that human fingerprint examiners are incredibly accurate 
compared to novices at comparing fingerprints (e.g., Tangen, Thompson, & McCarthy, 
2011; Thompson, Tangen, & McCarthy, 2014). We have also learned that examiners are 
fallible, and tend to err on the side of caution by preferring to make errors of the sort that 
would fail to identify a criminal (misses) rather than provide evidence to the court that 
would incorrectly convict an innocent person (false alarms; Tangen et al., 2011; Thompson 
et al., 2014; Ulery, Hicklin, Buscaglia, & Roberts, 2011).  
 A few experiments, mainly by Itiel Dror and his colleagues, have examined the 
influence of contextual information on human interpretation of forensic evidence (e.g., 
Dror, Charlton, & Péron, 2006; Dror, Péron, Hind, & Charlton, 2005; see Kassin et al., 2013, 
for a review). These studies provide evidence that expert examiners make decisions that are 
not always reliable over time, and that people’s judgments can be swayed by details beyond 
the physical evidence being examined (e.g., the emotional context of case information) in 
cases that are ambiguous (e.g., an impression that is distorted, degraded, or highly similar 
to a non-matching candidate impression; but see Hall & Player, 2008, and Schiffer & 
Champod, 2007, for studies finding no effects).  
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2.6 Separating Accuracy and Response Bias  
There has been some published criticism of the methodology used in previous work on 
contextual influences (e.g., Saks, 2009, on Hall & Player, 2008). Specifically, the issues 
raised concern the use of performance measures that allow inconclusive judgments to be 
made, and the associated difficulty in capturing legitimate differences in discrimination 
ability. There has also been no work to date directly examining the influence of case 
information on examiners’ performance accuracy (i.e., the ability to distinguish between 
print pairs that “match” from those that do not) versus their response bias (i.e., the extent 
to which participants say “match” or say “no match” regardless of the correct response).  
 Performance in previous studies has been measured by comparing the average 
number of details or “minutiae” in the fingerprint regarded as important by novice (e.g., 
Schiffer & Champod, 2007) and expert examiners (e.g., Langenburg, Champod, & 
Wertheim, 2009), comparing the mean percentage of total “match” responses made by 
novices (irrespective of whether the “match” decision was correct or not; e.g., Dror et al., 
2005), or measuring intra-examiner reliability (i.e., the consistency of an examiner’s 
judgments on the same case at different times; Dror et al., 2011; Dror & Charlton, 2006; 
Ulery, Hicklin, Buscaglia, & Roberts, 2012). Measures such as the total number or 
percentage of “match” responses, however, only tell a part of the story (i.e., frequency of 
correct identifications and false alarms), and fail to take into account the other half of 
possible performance outcomes: misses, and correct exclusions.  
 Here, we build on previous work by examining the impact of contextual information 
on people’s forensic comparison decisions using separate measures of accuracy and 
response bias. By distinguishing between these two performance indicators, we can see 
precisely how—and by how much— contextual information influences human performance 
(see Thompson, Tangen, & McCarthy, 2013, for further discussion).  
2.7 Fidelity, Generalisability, and Control  
Besides measurement, another challenge in designing experiments on context effects is 
balancing fidelity (i.e., the degree of similarity between experimental conditions and the 
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reference domain; Brunswik, 1956; Rasmussen, Pejtersen, & Goodstein, 1994; Thompson et 
al., 2013), generalisability (i.e., the extent to which the results are theoretically applicable 
to situations beyond those examined in the study; Thompson et al., 2013), and control (i.e., 
the extent to which experimenters are able to isolate and manipulate variables to detect 
genuine differences). The ideal experiment would have all three of these design 
characteristics, but often, one comes at the cost of the other (Sanderson & Grundgeiger, 
2015; Thompson et al., 2013).  
 It is tempting to think that the gold standard would be an experiment that tests 
expert examiners (unbeknownst to them), and one that perfectly recreates specific work 
situations (e.g., covertly introducing contextual information into examiners’ workflow). 
Indeed, there are some questions that can only be answered with this arrangement (e.g., 
gauging the performance of individual examiners). However, these high fidelity conditions 
come at a cost of reduced generalisability and reduced control. There is a great deal of 
variation in work conditions and practices across forensic laboratories, for example, making 
it difficult to apply the results of high fidelity experiments to other laboratories (with 
different tools, workloads, workflows, etc.) or to the domain in general. Control wanes as 
well in these sorts of experiments as isolating variables and measuring performance can be 
difficult if examiners still have access to all their usual networks and tools (e.g., allowing 
inconclusive judgments; Saks, 2009; see also Thompson et al., 2013, on Separate Accuracy 
and Response Bias).  
 Likewise, experiments that opt for high control and generalisability, often suffer 
reduced fidelity—they are (by design) artificial and less like “real life” (Mook, 1983). 
Experiments of this nature are also important as they help to answer different questions 
(e.g., are context effects a result of changes in accuracy or the decision strategy 
employed?). The ultimate goal is to strike a balance between fidelity, generalisability, and 
control that best addresses the research question (Brinberg & McGrath, 1985; Mook, 1983). 
Eventually, with a large enough bank of studies, we can begin to examine the patterns that 
emerge from the converging evidence.  
 Our goal in the present series of experiments is to get an idea of whether the 
accuracy of people (in general) on a forensic comparison task can be influenced by case 
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information and the prior experience of similar cases. In designing the experiments, we did 
not set out to imitate the day to day operations of a fingerprint unit. Instead, our goal was 
to achieve a high degree of control in manipulating the saliency and familiarity of case 
information and measuring their effect on both accuracy and response bias.  
2.8 Through the Lens of Prior Experience  
Forensic examiners, like the rest of us, tend to be attracted to a sense of naïve realism, 
believing that our raw perceptions are accurate and unbiased reflections of the world, 
uncontaminated by our preferences, preconceptions, prior experiences, and interpretations 
(Segall, Campbell, & Herskovits, 1966). Most of us also believe that human perception and 
memory work like a video camera, where we perceive the world through our senses, as a 
literal representation, and that the world always appears the same way to everyone. As 
plausible and inescapable as this “video camera” perspective might seem, it has some 
serious problems. People experience the same objects and events very differently depending 
on our sensory organs (e.g., as many as one in 12 men are red/green colour blind and will 
confuse blue and purple; Kaiser & Boynton, 1996), the context (e.g., the misleading 
information paradigm, Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; the Deese-Roediger-McDermott task, 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995), and the experiences we have accumulated (e.g., our 
experiences with a top-lit world, three-dimensional shapes, light, and shading give rise to 
many compelling visual illusions; see Adelson, 1995; Shepard, 1990, 1992, and Thomas, 
Nardini, & Mareschal, 2010, for some examples).  
 Naïve realism is also the basis for bias blindness or the not me fallacy (Pronin, Lin, & 
Ross, 2002). When we are not aware of having made an interpretation we are blind to the 
fact that our judgments and decisions are easily swayed by the information available to us 
and by our prior experiences. The problem of bias blindness is nicely illustrated by the 
Chair of the Fingerprint Society in the United Kingdom, Martin Leadbetter. He provided the 
following response to findings by Itiel Dror and colleagues (e.g., Dror et al., 2005; Dror et 
al., 2006; Dror & Charlton, 2006) that contextual information (e.g., “the suspect confessed 
to the crime” or emotion-evoking case information) can sway the judgments made by 
experienced fingerprint examiners (Leadbetter, 2007):  
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Any fingerprint examiner who comes to a decision on identification and is 
swayed either way in that decision making process under the influence of 
stories and gory images is either totally incapable of performing the noble 
tasks expected of him/her or is so immature he/she should seek employment 
at Disneyland.  
 In this case, Leadbetter fails to realise that the influence of contextual information is 
not deliberate and cannot be controlled (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) any more than you can 
will away the effects of a visual illusion. Heuristics and cognitive biases are adaptive 
strategies that are based on our memory for prior instances, and allow us to arrive at 
rational conclusions, most of the time (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 
1973, 1974). Forensic experts, like the rest of us, cannot simply will away their previous 
experiences and expectations, nor is this necessarily desirable (Tangen, 2013). We draw on 
this instance-based view of bias to investigate contextual influences across three 
experiments. 
2.9 The Experiments  
In the following series of experiments, we test groups of novices on their ability to 
discriminate between matching and non-matching fingerprint pairs, measuring response 
bias and accuracy. In Experiment 1, novices are provided with case information rated as 
severe (vs. not severe) and are then asked to compare pairs of fingerprints. Our goal in this 
first experiment was to simply gauge whether case information, previously demonstrated to 
influence a person to say “match” at a higher rate (e.g., Dror et al., 2005) could also sway 
her accuracy. In Experiments 2 and 3, we go on to investigate one aspect of context that has 
been shown to influence accuracy in other domains of expertise (e.g., diagnostic medicine)
—the familiarity of a case (Graber, Franklin, & Gordon, 2005; Norman, Young, & Brooks, 
2007; Young, Brooks, & Norman, 2007). We test, first, how the familiarity of case 
information influences response bias and accuracy (Experiment 2), and then, in Experiment 
3, go on to test how the familiarity of the target stimuli—the fingerprints themselves—
influence response bias and accuracy after all other sources of case information have been 
removed.  
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2.10 Experiment 1  
In Experiment 1, we manipulate crime “severity” (similar to Dror et al., 2005, which was 
referred to as “emotional context” in previous work) by presenting novices with pairs of 
fingerprints alongside case reports and images that are rated as either “severe” or “not 
severe” and measure their performance on a fingerprint comparison task. The question we 
wish to address in Experiment 1 is not about crime severity per se, but about measurement: 
whether a contextual factor previously demonstrated to sway people’s decisions, such as the 
severity of the crime, will influence participants’ response bias (i.e., their tendency to say 
“match”) or whether it will affect their overall accuracy (i.e., sway an otherwise correct 
judgment to be incorrect or vice versa). Previous work has shown that novices tend to 
overcall matches in situations where the base rates for matching and non-matching prints 
are 50/50 (e.g., Tangen et al., 2011). Given the same base rates in this experiment, if the 
crime severity has an effect on accuracy, then we might expect that participants will be less 
accurate on trials in which they are presented with case information and images of crimes 
that are more severe (compared to less severe). If, however, the results of Dror et al. (2005) 
were due to a shift in participants’ response bias, we might expect that participants will 
simply respond more liberally (i.e., tend to say “match” regardless of whether the prints 
actually match or not) in the severe condition than in the less severe condition.  
2.11 Method  
2.11.1 Participants 
Participants were 48 undergraduate psychology students from The University of 
Queensland participating in exchange for course credit. There were 32 females and 16 
males with a mean age of 23 years. We used novice participants in each of our experiments 
to control for any prior experience with fingerprints as well as familiarity with the case 
information. 
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2.11.2 Design and Performance Measures  
We employed a within-subjects design to manipulate the severity of the contextual 
information across two conditions (cases that have been rated as “severe” vs. cases rated as 
“not severe”). In order to measure response bias and accuracy, we used a forced choice 
confidence scale ranging from 1 (sure different) to 12 (sure same); ratings of 1 through 6 
were counted as a “no match” response and ratings of 7 through 12 as a “match” (see 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Inconclusive judgments were not permitted using this design, 
allowing us to distinguish between accuracy and response bias (Green & Swets, 1996; for a 
more comprehensive breakdown of signal detection as a method used to measure 
performance, see Phillips, Saks, & Peterson, 2001, and Thompson et al., 2013).  
2.11.3 Fingerprints  
The fingerprints were the same as those used by Tangen et al. (2011) and sourced from the 
Forensic Informatics Biometric Repository. Tangen et al. (2011) lifted the crime scene or 
“latent” fingerprints (left by undergraduate students participating for course credit) from 
multiple surfaces (i.e., plastic, glass, wood, metal), documenting the source of each latent 
print (e.g., the person who deposited the print) to ensure that the ground truth was known. 
Matching prints were created by collecting fully rolled fingerprint exemplars from the same 
participants who deposited the latent fingerprints on a separate occasion. Highly similar but 
non-matching pairs were created by Tangen et al. (2011) by entering each latent fingerprint 
into the Queensland Police Service fingerprint database, and using the most highly ranked 
non-matching exemplar from the search. Overall, the set consisted of a total 36 fingerprint 
trios: a latent print, a corresponding matching print, and a highly similar but non-matching 
print. Each of the 36 latent prints were randomly paired with the corresponding match or 
the corresponding non-match and each participant received 18 matching and 18 non-
matching pairs in a different random order. In each set of 18, nine pairs were accompanied 
by a severe case report and nine were accompanied by a less severe case report (selected at 
random). The experiment was, therefore, a 2 (Match, Non-match) × ︎ 2 (Severe, Less 
Severe) within-subjects design, where we combine the hit and false alarm rates into 
separate measures of discriminability and response bias. A pair of non-matching 
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fingerprints is depicted in Figure 2.2 alongside a severe case report and a pair of matching 
prints is depicted in Figure 2.3 alongside a less severe case report. 
 
Figure 2.2. A screenshot from Experiments 1 and 2 of a pair of matching fingerprints 
alongside a severe case report. 
Figure 2.3. A screenshot from Experiments 1 and 2 of a pair of matching fingerprints 
alongside a less severe case report. 
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CRIME SCENE PRINT SUSPECT’S PRINT
INCIDENT/INVESTIGATION REPORT
Mahmood v the State of Western Australia
[no 2] [2008] WASCA 259
Please rate the extent to which you think the crime scene print
is the same or different from the suspect’s print.
Sure
Different
Guess
Different
Guess
Same
Sure
Same
Crime Incident(s)
Murder
Summary
In the present case, the victim was the co-owner 
of a cafe along with the offender. A female 
person attended the cafe and found the victim’s 
body in the outside corridor at the side of the 
cafe premises. After finding the body she con-
tacted the police. The victim’s body was found 
with her throat cut. Police than attended the 
cafe and carried out a search for fingerprints. 
Several fingerprints were found on a number of 
items in the cafe. Four fingerprints had been 
found on the inside surface of the side door. 
Similarly, fingerprints had been found on a 
electricity metre box in the corridor, on the 
interior surface of the store room door, on the 
cement wall between a window and a fire escape 
in the corridor, on the cement wall between the 
door to the toilets and a window in the corri-
dor, on the external edge of the window frame 
above an adjacent window handle in the corridor 
between the kitchen and the toilets, on the left 
hand side of the fire escape in the corridor to 
the left of the window, and on a door handle to 
one of the toilets.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Severe Image
CRIME SCENE PRINT SUSPECT’S PRINT
INCIDENT/INVESTIGATION REPORT
Halmi v R [2008] NSWCCA 259
Please rate the extent to which you think the crime scene print
is the same or different from the suspect’s print.
Sure
Different
Guess
Different
Guess
Same
Sure
Same
Crime Incident(s)
Drug related offence
Summary
In the present case, a person informed police 
that he had arranged to receive heroin from two 
persons at a hotel. Police video and listening 
surveillance devices had been placed inside the 
room by police who could see and hear what was 
occurring inside that room throughout the after-
noon and evening. Two offenders arrived and 
checked into a room at a Motor Inn east of the 
hotel. A meeting was arranged at a nearby McDon-
ald’s and the offenders and an undercover police 
officer returned to the room at the hotel. Once 
inside the undercover police officer showed the 
offenders $280,000 in cash. The offenders than 
produced five blocks of heroin in exchange. 
Police subsequently seized the five blocks of 
heroin. Fingerprints were found on two pieces of 
the plastic used to wrap the heroin. One was 
found on the outer plastic wrapping of one of 
the blocks. Three further fingerprints were 
found on the inner plastic wrapping of another 
of the blocks of heroin.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Less Severe Image
2.11.4 Incident Reports and Photographic Stimuli  
The case reports were sourced from case law databases such as LexisNexis and CaseBase. 
Thirty-six recent criminal cases from across Australia involving fingerprint evidence were 
selected. Eighteen of these cases related to crimes of murder, aggravated sexual assault, 
terrorism, assault, and armed robbery, and they were classified as “severe” (on the basis 
that they involved direct-physical harm to others). The remaining 18 cases related to crimes 
such as break and enter, drug related offences, and theft and were classified as “less 
severe.” Cases were summarised and presented as an incident/investigation report in a 
single paragraph format as depicted in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.  
 The photographs were sourced from the Google Images database. Each image was 
carefully selected to closely reflect the specific details of each of the 36 individual cases and 
depict a high level of realism. The images in the severe condition contained graphic visual 
material similar to Dror et al. (2005), and the less severe cases were also presented along 
with images (both sets are available by contacting the authors). The images selected for the 
severe condition were selected to resemble the injuries that might be received by a victim in 
the corresponding case. The images chosen in the less severe condition typically depicted 
photographs of items related to the corresponding crime (e.g., drugs, money, police dusting 
for fingerprints at a break and enter scene).  
2.11.5 Pilot: Manipulation Check for Case Severity  
To confirm that the case reports and images accurately reflected novices’ perceptions of 
case severity, we tested a separate group of 13 novices in a pilot study. Participants were 
presented with each of the incident/investigation reports and related photographs as 
detailed above alongside an image of a latent fingerprint in random order. Participants were 
instructed to rate the severity of each case on a scale from 1 (not severe at all) to 9 (very 
severe). As anticipated, participants rated the severe cases as more severe (M =︎ 7.04) than 
the less severe cases (M =︎ 2.90), t(12) ︎ = 11.99, p <︎ .001, dav ︎= 4.12, 95% confidence 
interval (CI) [3.90, 4.47]. These pilot results indicate that our classification of severe and 
less severe cases were in line with participants’ perceptions of case severity.  
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2.11.6 Procedure   
After reading an information sheet about the experiment, participants were instructed to 
read the incident/investigation reports on the computer screen. To ensure that they were 
reading each case carefully, they were told that they would be asked about details of the 
cases later on in the experiment (i.e., we asked them how many cases involved weapons at 
the end of the experiment). Participants were also instructed to imagine they were expert 
fingerprint examiners who had the task of deciding whether the latent print found at a 
crime scene and a fully rolled suspect print were from the same person. They were then 
presented with the incident/investigation report and related image before completing the 
fingerprint-matching task for all 36 cases as described above. To further ensure that 
participants read the investigation reports, the fingerprints were masked by a 
semitransparent grey mask until the participant indicated they had read the passage and 
were ready to compare the prints.  
2.12 Results   
To derive scores of response bias and accuracy separately, hit and false alarm rates were 
calculated for all participants in each condition. For example, confidence ratings of 7 or 
more (i.e., “match” responses) were coded as hits for the match trials and false alarms for 
the non-match trials (the raw confidence ratings for the three experiments are available by 
contacting the first author). Participants correctly declared matching fingerprints as a 
“match” for 83% of the severe cases, compared to 80% for the less severe cases. For non-
matching fingerprints, participants correctly declared them as a “non-match” for 45% of the 
severe cases, and 50% of the time for less severe cases. This pattern of results is similar to 
novice performers in Tangen et al. (2011) who were 75% correct for matching pairs and 
45% correct for non-matching pairs.  
 Participants’ mean discrimination index (A′), or performance accuracy, was derived 
from their hit and false alarm rates in each condition (see Vokey et al., 2009, for a similar 
analysis and discussion). A′ is a nonparametric measure that reflects the proportion of hits 
relative to false alarms, where an A′ of 1 indicates perfect discrimination and an A′ of 0.5 
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indicates chance discrimination (Donaldson, 1992). Participants’ ability to discriminate 
between prints did not differ statistically between severe cases (Mean A′ ︎= .72) and less 
severe cases (Mean A′ ︎= .70), t(47) ︎= .77, p =︎ .446, dav ︎= .14, 95% CI [0.10, 0.17].  
 To assess response bias, B′′D was derived for each participant in each condition. A B′′D 
score of ︎-1 reflects a strong liberal response bias (i.e., a tendency to say “match” more), a 
score of 1 reflects a strong conservative response bias (i.e., a tendency to say “no match” 
more), and a B′′D score of 0 reflects no bias (Donaldson, 1992). We found that participants 
had a strong liberal response bias and tended to say “match” overall, which is consistent 
with novice data in previous studies (e.g., Tangen et al., 2011). Moreover, as has been 
found previously, participants were biased to say “match” more often when the prints were 
accompanied by severe case information (Mean B′′D ︎= -︎.56; an average of 12.42 out of 18 
severe cases were rated as a match), compared to the less severe case information (Mean B′
′D ︎= ︎-.44; an average of 11.71 out of 18 less severe cases were rated as a match), which was 
demonstrated using a two-tailed paired t test revealing a significant difference between 
these conditions, t(47) ︎= 2.05, p ︎= .046, dav ︎= .24, 95% CI [0.10, 0.38].  
2.12.1 Cross-Experiment Comparison in Signal Detection Space 
We then plotted our results in a signal detection diagram (see Figure 2.4) in order to 
compare performance on the severe versus less severe trials and to compare results across 
experiments (see Thompson et al., 2013). This diagram is an illustration of participants’ 
mean performance for the severe versus less severe trials, plotted in signal detection space 
(i.e., the space of all possible responses): where discrimination accuracy is represented by 
the vertical axis (the top indicates perfect discrimination and the bottom chance 
discrimination) and response bias is represented along the horizontal axis (the far left of 
the diagram indicates a tendency to say “match” on all trials, the far right indicates a 
tendency to say “no match” on all trials, and the middle of the axis indicates a response bias 
that perfectly reflects actual base rates of matching and non-matching trials), which is 
50/50 here. The closer the data points are to the top of the diagram, the more accurate 
participants performed in that condition (i.e., the data points for both conditions are in 
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roughly similar positions along the vertical axis, reflecting the similar discrimination scores 
for severe and less severe trials). Their position on the left or right of the diagram indicates 
their response bias (e.g., the data point for the severe trials is further to the left than the 
less severe trials, reflecting participants’ more liberal response in this condition). The 
contingency scores used to plot our results were derived by computing the mean hits, false 
alarms, correct rejections and misses for both conditions, and by converting these to 
percentages (see Thompson et al., 2013). We refer to this diagram again in Experiments 2 
and 3 to provide a broader context to each set of results.  
2.13 Discussion  
When participants in Experiment 1 were asked to compare pairs of fingerprints, which were 
presented alongside severe or less severe case reports, their ability to discriminate between 
the matching and non-matching prints was unaffected by the graphic nature of the report. 
Their response bias, or their tendency to say “match,” however, was affected. That is, 
participants were slightly more likely to say “match” (a liberal response bias) when 
presented with the severe case information.  
 Our present design did not permit us to examine the cognitive or motivational 
factors responsible for the effect. However, the results from Experiment 1 demonstrate that 
in order to gauge whether case information increases or decreases people’s accuracy, 
measures of performance need to account for both ways of being right (i.e., hits and correct 
rejections) and both ways of being wrong (i.e., false alarms and misses). While perceived 
case severity may sway people to say “match” more, it is misleading to conclude from these 
results that removing this case information will reduce the likelihood of error across the 
board. More accurately, removing information about the type of crime may reduce the 
number of false identification errors in severe cases, but in doing so, the amount of miss 
errors may increase. As a result, we should be cautious about drawing conclusions about 
the influence of case information on error rates from studies without separate measures of 
response bias and discrimination ability.  
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2.14 Experiment 2   
In Experiments 2 and 3, we build on the findings of Experiment 1 by investigating a source 
of contextual information that we predict will have a significant impact on accuracy—
namely, the familiarity of the information. Previous research in diagnostic medicine has 
shown that familiar non-diagnostic information (e.g., patient demographic details similar to 
previously encountered cases) can sway the judgments of novice diagnosticians. That is, 
more weight is given to diagnoses that are cued by the familiar case information (compared 
to an equally plausible alternative diagnosis; Young, Brooks, & Norman, 2011). This 
research suggests that diagnosticians store information about previous cases in memory and 
use these memories to aid current decision-making (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; Young et al., 
2011).  
 Like diagnosticians, forensic examiners are often exposed to a range of materials that 
are related to the case at hand when making an identification. Given the similarity between 
the classification tasks performed in diagnostic medicine and the comparison tasks 
performed by fingerprint examiners, it is possible that the accuracy of fingerprint 
examiners’ decisions may also be influenced by the familiarity of the case information. Can 
knowing the details about a case influence someone’s decision about a completely different 
case if the two cases are similar? Specifically, can the link between the details of a case 
(e.g., events leading up to the crime, the nature of an injury, the location of the victim’s 
home) and the outcome of the case (e.g., the crime scene print matched the suspect) 
influence someone’s judgment about a completely different case that is similar, but with the 
opposite outcome (e.g., the crime scene print does not match the suspect)?  
 In Experiment 2, we test this claim by first presenting participants with a series of 
cases and fingerprint pairs as we did in Experiment 1. Half of the prints match and half do 
not, and participants are told whether they made the correct decision or not. In the second 
half of the experiment, we present a series of new cases that are very similar to those they 
have just seen. Nearly every detail about the case is altered slightly. For example, “The 
intruder then snatched an iPad out of the victim’s hand and threw it to the floor” is changed 
to “The intruder then snatched a book out of the victim’s hand and threw it to the other 
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side of the bed” in the similar case. The fingerprints that are presented alongside the case 
report are completely new, but if the case was presented alongside a pair of matching prints 
in the first half, then the similar case was presented alongside a non-matching pair in the 
second half. Similarly, if the case was presented with non-matching prints in the first half, 
then the similar case was presented with matching prints in the second half. Participants 
were not told during the second phase whether they were correct or not, as we are 
interested in whether they change their decision from the first to the second half. If their 
accuracy drops significantly, then this is a clear indication that they are sensitive to the 
familiarity of the case. Specifically, we expect familiar case information to sway people’s 
judgments in the direction of previous similar cases (e.g., if a previous case was a “match,” 
then people should be more likely to rate the novel similar case as a “match” as well— even 
if it is not). In Experiment 2, we simply manipulate the extrinsic familiarity of cases (i.e., 
similarity of information in the case reports to previously encountered cases). We go on to 
manipulate the intrinsic familiarity of cases (e.g., similarity of the fingerprints in the case to 
previously encountered cases) in Experiment 3. 
2.15 Method  
2.15.1 Participants 
Participants were 35 undergraduate psychology students from The University of 
Queensland who participated in exchange for course credit. There were 26 females and 
nine males with a mean age of 25 years.  
2.15.2 Design and Performance Measures  
Experiment 2 is split into two halves: a learning phase (18 trials) and a test phase (18 
trials). In the first half—the learning phase—participants are presented with case reports 
and fingerprint pairs as in Experiment 1. Half of the fingerprints match, and half do not. 
Participants are told whether their decision was correct or not during the learning phase. In 
the second half—the test phase—participants are presented with the same 18 case reports 
as the learning phase (in a different random order for each participant), but each sentence 
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in the report has been modified slightly so the two reports are very similar. None of the 18 
fingerprint pairs in the test phase were presented in the learning phase and participants 
were not provided with feed back on their decision during the test phase. However, if the 
prints that accompanied a particular case in the learning phase matched, then the new set 
of prints that accompanied the similar case in the test phase did not match, and vice versa. 
If participants learn the association between the information in the report and the outcome 
(i.e., match or no match), and if they retrieve this association during the test phase when 
prompted with a very similar case, then we expect that they will say “no match” to the 
matching prints and “match” to the non-matching prints during the test phase. That is, if 
participants are sensitive to the similarity between the two cases, then we should see a 
significant decrease in their accuracy during the test phase. The experiment was, therefore, 
a 2 (Phase 1, Phase 2) × ︎ 2 (Match, No Match) within-subjects design, where we combine 
the hit and false alarm rates into separate measures of discriminability and response bias as 
we did in Experiment 1. 
2.15.3 Incident/Investigation Reports  
There were 36 written investigation reports presented in random order to each person. Half 
of the reports were the same as those in Experiment 1, with nine from the pool of severe 
cases and nine from the pool of less severe cases. These 18 cases were used in the learning 
phase as they were written in Experiment 1. Similar to Young et al. (2011), the other 18 
cases in the test phase were carefully designed to be highly similar to the learning cases, 
but not identical. We achieved this by slightly altering each aspect of each case report for 
the test trials. 
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Figure 2.4. The space represents all possible performance results from a discrimination task. 
Each of the tables that comprise the figure is a 2 × ︎2 contingency table depicting the four 
possible outcomes where two prints match or not and someone labels them a “match” or 
“no match.” The numbers align with hits, false alarms, misses, and correct rejections. The 
large number in bold at the centre of each table depicts the sum of the two diagonal cells 
ranging from 50 (chance discrimination) at the bottom of the figure to 100 (perfect 
discrimination) at the top. The column totals at the bottom of each table depict response 
bias with a liberal bias (a tendency to say “match”) depicted on the left of the figure and a 
conservative bias (a tendency to say “no match”) depicted on the right of the figure. The 
data points in the space are the locations of the actual results for each of the three 
experiments, where each filled circle represents the centre of the 2 ︎× 2 contingency table 
based on the data from each. See the online article for the colour version of this figure.  
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2.15.4 Procedure  
Participants were given the same instructions as in Experiment 1, which were presented on 
the computer screen. When participants clicked begin, they were presented with the 
learning phase, where they were presented with the 18 original written investigation 
reports described earlier and completed the fingerprint comparison task on all 18 trials. 
Similar to Young et al. (2011), in the learning phase, participants were provided with 
immediate feedback following each trial on their performance (i.e., presented with a 
response of either “Correct” or “Incorrect,” plus correct/incorrect audio cues)—this was to 
ensure that all participants were provided with the same information about the correct 
responses during learning for the familiarity manipulation. Participants then immediately 
completed the test phase in which they were presented with the 18 highly similar 
investigation reports, and again completed the fingerprint comparison task for each trial. 
No feedback was provided during the test phase, again similar to Young et al., (2011). 
Participants were also asked to report the relevant case information that informed their 
decision as an added measure to ensure that they read the reports.  
2.16 Results   
We used the same method as Experiment 1 to derive A′ and B′′D as measures of 
discrimination accuracy and response bias respectively, and plotted our results in Figure 
2.4. As predicted, the mean discrimination in the learning phase (Mean A′ ︎= 0.7; 47.29% of 
match cases were rated as “match” and 76.43% of non-match cases were rated as a “no 
match”) was greater than the test phase (Mean A′ = ︎ .62; 46.43% of match cases were rated 
as “match” and 67.86% of non-match cases were rated as a “no match”). As can be seen in 
Figure 2.4, the data point for the test phase is lower on the vertical axis than the data point 
for the learning phase trials, reflecting the observed decrease in discriminability. A two-
tailed paired t test confirmed this difference to be significant, t(34) =︎ 2.57, p = ︎ .015, dav 
︎= .59, 95% CI [0.55, 0.65].  
 In contrast to Experiment 1, participants had a conservative response bias and 
tended to say “no match” more than “match” in both phases of the experiment (see Figure 
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2.4, where the data points from Experiment 2 are located much further to the right than 
Experiment 1). Participants also adopted a more conservative response bias on the trials 
during the learning phase (Mean B′′D ︎ = .40; an average of 6.09 out of 18 learning phase 
cases were rated as a “match”) compared to the test phase (Mean B′′D ︎ = .25; an average of 
6.86 out of 18 test phase cases were rated as a “match”), as illustrated in Figure 2.4 where 
the data point in the learning phase is located further to the left than the test phase. A two-
tailed paired t test also revealed this difference to be significant, t(34) ︎= 2.65, p = ︎.013, dav 
︎= .24, 95% CI [0.05, 0.47].  
2.17 Discussion    
The aim of Experiment 2 was to determine whether an association between the details and 
the outcome of the case can influence someone’s judgment about a different case that is 
similar. Our results demonstrate that participants were sensitive to the similarity of the case 
information contained in the reports between the two phases of the experiment. That is, 
during the first phase, participants must have learned the associations between the 
information in the case reports and the outcome (i.e., match/no-match), as evidenced by 
those associations influencing outcome decisions during the test phase. While objectively 
irrelevant, the presentation of similar information altered participants’ decisions about 
novel pairs of prints. Participants tended to say “no-match” to the matching pairs and 
“match” to the non-matching pairs, resulting in a significant drop in accuracy. They also 
demonstrated a significant shift in response bias between the two phases, where they 
tended to say “match” less often during the learning phase compared to the test phase.  
 These results indicate that participants made fingerprint comparison decisions in line 
with the correct response that was associated with the similar previously encountered case. 
These findings are similar to observations in the diagnostic medicine literature, which 
support the idea that people use the knowledge gained from previous experiences (previous 
similar case reports in this case) to aid in current decision-making on a forensic comparison 
task. To further understand these findings, we explore two possible explanations for the 
results.  
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2.17.1 Instance-Based Retrieval Hypothesis   
One explanation is that the similarity of each case report in the test phase acted as a cue for 
the rapid recall of the similar prior instances in the learning phase, creating a “feeling of 
knowing” or sense of fluency and familiarity (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; Young et al., 2011). 
Unlike the experience of recollection (an analytic or explicit recognition process), the 
experience of familiarity (a non-analytic or implicit recognition process) cannot be 
pinpointed to its exact source and thus affords less control over the influence of a particular 
prior experience (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). It is this lack of control that may have increased 
people’s reliance on extrinsic but familiar cues when comparing the fingerprints. Our results 
provide evidence that at least some information from the cases encountered in the learning 
phase is implicitly (or perhaps explicitly) leaking over to participants’ decisions in the test 
phase.  
2.17.2 Feedback Hypothesis  
In order to ensure that each participant was aware of the correct response for later retrieval 
on familiar trials, it was necessary to provide them with feedback during the learning phase 
just as Young et al. (2011) did in their experiment. Presenting feedback, however, 
introduces another possible explanation for the decrease in performance during the test 
phase in that removing feedback during the second half of the experiment may account for 
the reduction in performance (as well as the more liberal response bias). Recent 
experiments on the effects of feedback on fingerprint comparison decisions (Searston & 
Tangen, in preparation) have consistently shown improvements—not decrements—in 
performance where feedback was presented during practice but removed during a test of 
transfer. If the same was true in Experiment 2, then it would suggest that the effect of 
similarity was even greater than we observed because this effect of feedback during practice 
would have counteracted the influence of similarity in this design.  
 The finding that the learning benefits of feedback remain steady once trial-by-trial 
feedback is removed, is quite robust—having been demonstrated in learning studies across 
several domains (e.g., Wulf & Schmidt, 1989; see also Salmoni, Schmidt, & Walter, 1984, 
for a review of similar effects in motor learning). Indeed, experiments in a very similar 
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visual discrimination domain— unfamiliar face matching—have demonstrated that the 
benefit of feedback remains after training, even when participants are tested on a 
completely different, more variable, set of images (e.g., White, Kemp, Jenkins, & Burton, 
2014). Even visual discrimination studies involving significantly more trials than 
Experiment 2 (e.g., 12 blocks of 80 trials vs. our 36 trials), where factors such as fatigue 
would be more likely, have shown that removing feedback after as many as eight blocks of 
training does not result in a deterioration in performance (e.g., Herzog & Fahle, 1997). If 
tested immediately, as in this experiment, it is likely that participants still have access to the 
mental representations developed during the initial phase, resulting in the stickiness of the 
feedback effect observed in the literature.  
 This phenomenon is also consistent with current theories of learning, including the 
work around “desirable difficulties” showing that retrieval practice or testing, similar to our 
test phase, can be a powerful learning event in and of itself—even when corrective 
feedback is not provided (Bjork, 1975; Bjork & Bjork, 2011; Landauer & Bjork, 1978). 
Participants’ accuracy over the last 18 trials in Experiment 1 (Mean A′  ︎= 0.73) did not 
decline from the first 18 trials (Mean A′ ︎= 0.71) suggesting that fatigue was not decreasing 
performance over the same number of trials in Experiment 1. Taken together, this previous 
body of work, and the results from Experiment 1, suggest that fatigue, or the removal of 
feedback, are not convincing explanations for the observed decrement in accuracy in 
Experiment 2.  
2.17.3 Accounting for Response Bias Effects  
We suspect that the feedback we provided might account for the conservative response bias 
that participants adopted in Experiment 2 (compared to the liberal bias of those in 
Experiment 1). That is, participants are likely unaware of how highly similar a pair of 
fingerprints can be from two different people until they see examples of these materials 
with feedback. This suspicion is supported by Thompson et al. (2013) who demonstrated 
that trainee fingerprint examiners tend to become more conservative with training, which 
presumably involves experience with highly similar exemplars and feedback from senior 
examiners.  
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 The presence of feedback during learning might also have resulted in participants 
overcorrecting more during learning than on the test, where no feedback was provided. 
Another possibility for participants saying “match” more often for familiar cases is that the 
matching pairs encountered during learning were more memorable than the non-matching 
pairs (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). In other words, this finding could be related to the 
confirmation bias (i.e., the tendency to search for and interpret information in terms of 
positive rather than negative instances) such that a “match” is more likely to be 
remembered (and more likely to influence current decision making) because it is a positive 
event. In other words, the improved memory for matching relative to non-matching pairs 
might be equivalent to the belief, held by many, that arthritis pain is influenced by the 
weather because those individuals notice their pain more during an extreme weather event 
(a positive event) but pay less attention when the weather is fine (Redelmeier & Tversky, 
1996).  
2.18 Experiment 3  
In Experiments 1 and 2, we examined two ways that extrinsic case information (e.g., case 
reports that provide a description of the crime) could influence people’s performance on a 
forensic comparison task. In Experiment 3, we examine the influence of intrinsic familiarity 
by testing whether familiar fingerprints can sway people’s decision making—a source of 
information that cannot be removed from examiners’ workflow. Specifically, we replicate 
the procedure from Experiment 2, but we replace similar case information with similar 
fingerprint pairs and examine whether people are swayed by this familiar information. If 
people are blinded to all extrinsic case information, can their performance still be swayed 
by the similarity of the fingerprints to previously encountered fingerprints?  
 Previous research in diagnostic medicine suggests that people may indeed be swayed 
by intrinsic familiarity. For example, the presence of diagnosis-relevant information that is 
similar to specific prior experiences can strongly influence diagnostic reasoning in both 
doctors and students (Allen, Norman, & Brooks, 1992; Brooks, Norman & Allen, 1991; 
Hatala, Norman, & Brooks, 1999). In these experiments, the similarity of visual stimuli 
(e.g., skin lesions) was manipulated and the overall similarity of stimuli to previously 
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encountered cases was found to influence clinical reasoning among novices and experts. 
Participants in these studies assigned more weight to a familiar symptom description, and 
they were more likely to diagnose a fictional patient with the diagnosis supported by a 
symptom description that they previously encountered. Research in other medical fields has 
further demonstrated this effect with written case materials suggesting that a reliance on 
past experiences in clinical reasoning is not limited to visual stimuli (e.g., Young et al., 
2007). On the basis of this prior research, we predict that the visual similarity of the 
fingerprints to previously encountered cases will influence people’s fingerprint comparison 
decisions in a similar fashion.  
2.19 Method  
2.19.1 Participants 
Participants were 38 undergraduate psychology students from The University of 
Queensland, participating for course credit. There were 24 females and 14 males with a 
mean age of 27 years. 
2.19.2 Design and Performance Measures  
Experiment 3 employed the same within-subjects design, measures, methodology, and 
fingerprints as Experiment 2, except that participants were not provided with case reports 
about the crimes or any other information about the cases. We presented the full 36 pairs of 
fingerprints in a learning phase, and presented the 36 latent prints again during the test 
phase, but with the opposite outcome. That is, if the latent prints were paired with a 
matching print during the first half of the experiment, they were paired with a non-
matching print in the second half, and if they were paired with a non-matching print during 
the first half, they were paired with a matching print in the second half. This methodology 
ensured that the latent prints remained the same during the learning and test phase, but 
that the comparison prints differed between the conditions— creating pairs of prints that 
were similar, but not identical. The experiment was, therefore, a 2 (Phase 1, Phase 2) × ︎2 
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(Match, No Match) within-subjects design, where we combine the hit and false alarm rates 
into separate measures of discriminability and response bias.  
2.19.3 Procedure  
In Experiment 3, participants were simply instructed to imagine they were expert 
fingerprint examiners who had the task of deciding whether the latent print found at a 
crime scene and the fully rolled suspect print were from the same person. They compared 
the 36 novel pairs of prints during the learning phase (i.e., a random presentation of 18 
matching and 18 non-matching pairs) and were provided with feedback on their decisions 
before comparing the 36 “familiar” pairs of prints during the test phase in random order 
without feedback.  
2.20 Results  
We calculated A′ and B′′D using the same method as Experiments 1 and 2 and plotted our 
results in the signal detection diagram in Figure 2.4. Consistent with findings of Experiment 
2, the mean discrimination in the learning phase (Mean A′ ︎= 0.69; 50.62% of match cases 
were rated as “match” and 71.20% of non-match cases were rated as a “no match”) was 
greater than the test phase (Mean A′ ︎= 0.62; 52.91% of match cases were rated as “match” 
and 63.99% of non-match cases were rated as a “no match”), t(37) ︎= 2.58, p = ︎ .014, dav 
︎= .54, 95% CI [0.50, 0.59]. Participants also demonstrated a more conservative response 
bias (i.e., they tended to say “no match” more than “match”) in the learning phase (Mean B′
′D ︎= .29; an average of 14.03 out of 36 learning phase cases were rated as a “match”) 
compared to the test phase (Mean B′′D ︎ = .16; an average of 15.36 out of 36 test phase cases 
were rated as a match) of the experiment. A two-tailed paired t test revealed this difference 
to be significant as well, t(37) ︎= 2.13, p ︎= .039, dav ︎= .22, 95% CI [0.03, 0.42].  
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2.21 Discussion  
Just as in Experiment 2, participants were clearly sensitive to the similarity of the 
fingerprint pairs as reflected in the drop in accuracy between the two phases of the 
experiment. This result is consistent with previous studies in diagnostic medicine that 
demonstrate a similar effect regarding the familiarity of medical imaging stimuli (e.g., Allen 
et al., 1992; Brooks et al., 1991).  
 Given that the latent fingerprints were the same in the learning and test phases of 
the experiment, it is possible that participants were relying somewhat on explicit 
recollection of the exact prior instances of the latent prints, as opposed to relying solely on 
an implicit feeling of familiarity. Theories of recognition memory, however, suggest that it 
may be easier to recall specific details when experiencing recollection, resulting in more 
control over the influence of that prior experience (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). If participants 
were relying more on explicit recollection, recalling details about the previous pair, then we 
might expect them to be less easily swayed by their prior experience on the test trials, 
which would dampen the resulting effect of decreased accuracy at test. Participants in 
Experiment 2 and 3 still showed a significant decrease in accuracy from the learning phase 
to the test phase, suggesting that a reliance on the familiarity of the cases is more likely to 
be responsible for the effect. It also seems unlikely that participants were able to remember 
specific details of the prints across 72 trials, particularly given previous demonstrations of 
their poor explicit memory for similar fingerprint pairs (Thompson & Tangen, 2014).  
 In any case, whether participants are relying on a feeling of familiarity or explicit 
recognition of previous cases, the results of Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate how 
something as subtle as the similarity of a case—even the similarity of a fingerprint pair—to 
a previous encounter can have a marked influence on current decision-making. 
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2.22 Implications  
The role of familiarity in forensic comparison decisions is well worth examining further. As 
computerised databases of finger prints grow, the chance of finding a highly similar print 
from different individuals must necessarily increase (Dror & Mnookin, 2010). The same 
applies to examiners’ experience; the more experience they gain with instances of 
fingerprint pairs, the more likely it is that they will encounter novel fingerprint pairs that 
are highly similar but not identical to previously encountered fingerprint pairs. Unlike 
extrinsic case information, examiners cannot be blinded to the familiarity of a fingerprint. 
Simply removing all extrinsic case information will not necessarily result in judgments that 
are completely objective or free from bias, nor is this a bad thing in every case (e.g., cases 
where the similar prior experience is consistent).  
 It remains to be seen if the influence of similar prior cases grows or decays with 
experience. Perhaps after seeing thousands of cases, they all begin to blend together 
resulting in a smaller effect. Alternatively, drawing on many similar prior cases could result 
in a larger effect. It is important to note that even though similarity decreased accuracy in 
Experiments 2 and 3, this drop in performance is part of the experimental design that was 
necessary to test our hypotheses. In many natural situations, similarity is a valid cue that 
could improve decision-making. That is, without switching the correct response from 
learning to test, we would expect the familiarity of the cases to result in an increase in 
accuracy. Identifying when familiarity is likely to help and when it is likely to hurt could 
inform the design of workplace systems that lead to examiners making more correct 
judgments.  
2.23 General Discussion   
In the present paper, we have outlined some of the problems with the “Disneyland” 
perspective of bias in forensic science (e.g., Leadbetter, 2007). Forensic examiners, like the 
rest of us, tend to believe that their raw perceptions are accurate and unbiased reflections 
of the world, uncontaminated by their preferences, preconceptions, and interpretations 
(Segall et al., 1966). Several experiments have now demonstrated otherwise: contextual 
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information can sway the judgments made by even the most diligent examiners (see Kassin 
et al., 2013 for review). After the threat of contextual bias featured heavily in the U.S. 
National Academy of Sciences Report on the state of forensic science (National Research 
Council, 2009), the literature on the topic has grown, and many forensic laboratories are 
beginning to introduce blinding procedures (Risinger et al., 2014).  
 Such demonstrations of contextual influences in forensic science are certainly a good 
start, but they do not go far enough. These studies have demonstrated that a person’s 
judgments can be swayed by contextual information (e.g., Dror et al., 2005) or that 
examiners might not be consistent in their judgments from one time to the next (e.g., Dror 
et al., 2006; Dror & Charlton, 2006), but these demonstrations have relied on contextual 
information in the most obvious sense (i.e., information about the case or the trace 
evidence designed to explicitly sway examiners’ judgments, such as a confession). Instead, 
we have offered an instance-based conception of contextual influences where seemingly 
irrelevant and subtle information can sway people’s judgments if it is sufficiently similar to 
the case or trace at hand.  
 Across three experiments, we demonstrated that case information can sway people’s 
judgments by shifting their response criterion, but this shift does not always reduce their 
accuracy. For example, case information that is perceived to be more severe led people to 
respond more liberally, but their accuracy remained unchanged (Experiment 1). The 
familiarity of the case, on the other hand, did affect their accuracy, in the direction of 
previous similar cases (i.e., if a previous similar case was a “match,” then people were more 
likely to also rate a novel case as a “match”— even though it was not—as demonstrated in 
Experiments 2 and 3). Most interestingly, the influence of familiarity on performance 
remained in Experiment 3, even when we removed all extrinsic case information. Our 
results add to the previous literature on context effects by demonstrating that the context 
does not have to be explicit or obvious in any sense to significantly affect performance. 
Crime severity or surface similarity does not explicitly implicate a particular suspect or 
judgment and it is this subtlety that makes these context effects compelling.  
 The context effects observed in our experiments may be even greater for examiners 
bearing the weight of genuine casework decisions. Others may wish to examine whether 
 44
conditions that more closely resemble actual casework would increase the strength of the 
effects that we have shown here. Very little is known about the factors that affect expert 
performance in other areas of forensic science (fire investigation, blood pattern analysis, 
firearm and tool mark comparison, shoe print examination etc.). Another line of research 
might investigate whether effects of familiarity generalise to areas dealing with different 
and more variable trace evidence.  
 The approach that we adopted in the current set of experiments was to strip back the 
situation and introduce one difference at a time in the information presented (e.g., severe 
vs. less severe, familiar vs. unfamiliar), under laboratory conditions. This allows us to move 
closer toward isolating potential mechanisms that drive contextual influences. We have also 
presented a novel methodological approach to measuring the impact of sources of 
contextual information in forensic science, which may be useful to other researchers 
investigating this issue across applied domains. We need more studies like those we present 
here and others on this topic to get a better handle on the role that contextual influences 
play in forensic decisions—across situations, people, and cases. By adopting a narrow view 
of the contamination or threat of cognitive bias, the well intentioned pursuit of controlling 
for bias may have the unintended effect of stifling legitimate discussion about how to 
harness human expertise and improve the system in which forensic examiners work 
(Institute of Medicine, 2000).  
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Chapter 3 
The Style of a Stranger: Identification 
Expertise Generalises to Coarser Level 
Categories 
3.1 Preface 
This chapter is reproduced from an unpublished manuscript under a second round of 
review at Psychological Science (as in Chapter 2, I’ve adjusted the format and spelling of 
manuscript for the thesis). The full reference to the article: 
Searston, R. A., & Tangen, J. M. (under review). The style of a stranger: Identification 
expertise generalizes to coarser level categories. Manuscript under review. [revision 
submitted to Psychological Science] 
 
Figure 3.1. Schematic representation of Chapter 3 in the context of the thesis as a whole. 
 The experiments from Chapter 2 provide evidence that we rely on similar 
information stored in memory to identify visual objects—even in a simultaneous matching 
task. This memory retrieval process can also occasionally lead us astray: we showed that 
the familiarity of the context (e.g., details about the crime) and the familiarity of the image-
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pairs negatively impacted novices’ fingerprint matching accuracy when the correct response 
was switched. Our manipulation of similarity in these experiments involved repeating one 
print from a previous case and pairing it with a new print that either matched the same 
finger if the previous case was a non-match, or belonged to a different individual if the 
previous case was a match. This method of building in similarity allowed us to test whether 
prior information leaks over into the current case, but fingerprints are not likely to be 
repeated in practice, and it is unclear whether our results generalise to experts—who have 
a much larger repository of instances to draw on.  
 In Chapter 3, I probe whether fingerprint experts reference information stored in 
memory in a novel object matching task where no instances are repeated. As can be seen in 
Figure 3.1, I aim to probe the flexibility of novel object expertise by pushing experts outside 
of their usual level of specificity. From three experiments, we find that fingerprint experts 
are better able to identify mismatching prints that are from the same person (i.e., 
recognising Jones’s right thumb, index, middle, ring and little fingerprint as instances of 
Jones) compared to novices, and that fingerprint trainees develop a similar skill within 
three months. These results are surprising because fingerprint examiners typically 
discriminate prints at the more subordinate level of the finger (i.e., matching multiple 
instances of Jones’s right thumb) suggesting their expertise can be flexible to upward shifts 
in the level of specificity. We interpret these findings as evidence that expertise with novel 
objects relies on a memory for information that is distributed across experts’ repository of 
prior instances. I submitted our findings to Psychological Science, because I think they 
illustrate a flexibility in the way perceptual experts are able to retrieve and use their prior 
knowledge—a process previously thought to be static and highly specific to learned task 
demands. 
3.2 Abstract 
Experience identifying visual objects and categories improves generalisation within the 
same class (e.g., discriminating bird species improves transfer to new bird species), but 
does such perceptual expertise transfer to coarser category judgments? We tested whether 
fingerprint experts can generalise their finger discrimination expertise to people more 
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broadly. That is, can these experts identify prints from Jones’s right thumb and prints from 
Jones’s right index finger as instances of the same “Jones” category? Novices and experts 
were both sensitive to the style of a stranger’s prints, and despite lower levels of confidence, 
experts outperformed novices. This expert advantage persisted even when we reduced the 
number of exemplars provided. New trainees developed a similar capacity to discriminate 
impressions across levels of specificity with three to six months experience. Our results 
demonstrate that identification expertise relies on a memory for visual structure that is 
flexible to the demands of the task. 
3.3 Introduction 
Both common experience and laboratory research alike demonstrate that we are highly 
sensitive to the structure of visual categories. We see an unknown thing, and draw on our 
previous experience to decide what category it belongs to (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 
1956). As we begin to learn about the visual structure of a new category, each piece of 
information is equally informative so its boundaries and “typical” instances are all 
unknown. Over time, we develop a tacit knowledge about how they tend to look and vary, 
and rely on this knowledge to identify them in new encounters (Brooks, 1978; Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978). As we accumulate more examples and verbal descriptions, the information 
that we once relied upon to distinguish between, say, a sweet or dry wine, a songbird or 
wading bird, and a Monet and Picasso painting, is sharpened, which allows us to eventually 
distinguish between a German or Australian Riesling, house finches or purple finches, and a 
Blue or Rose period Picasso (Richler & Palmeri, 2014). This sharpening process is 
accompanied by an increase in the speed and accuracy of classification, and better transfer 
to novel exemplars from the same category level (Tanaka, Curran, & Sheinberg, 2005; 
Tanaka & Taylor, 2005; Wong, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2009). 
 By virtue of being an expert in a particular field, one can easily work within the 
constraints of that domain. For example, experience with identifying specific bird species 
transfers to the identification of novel bird species (Tanaka et al, 2005). Many experiments, 
however, have demonstrated the abrupt limits or inflexibility of expert performance when 
venturing too far afield: expertise with modern cars does not transfer to antique cars 
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(Bukach, Phillips, & Gauthier, 2010), expertise with Tetris shapes does not transfer to non-
Tetris shapes (Sims & Mayer, 2002), chess masters’ memory for chess board configurations 
resembles a beginner’s when the configurations are scrambled (Chase & Simon, 1973), and 
expert recognition is disrupted when images are presented in a novel orientation (Diamond 
& Carey, 1986). Altering the appearance of the subject matter even slightly from what an 
expert is used to, is enough to produce a significant drop in performance. But there has 
been relatively little investigation of how experts judge the very same materials that they 
have been trained on, but from an unfamiliar perspective. 
 Here, we turn to fingerprint identification as a testbed for measuring expertise in a 
novel context. We used the domain of fingerprints because it affords a rare sample of 
experts with extensive identification experience compared to a genuine novice control 
group. Fingerprint examiners spend their days visually comparing pairs of impressions side-
by-side and judging whether they were left by the same or different fingers. These 
professionals also display hallmarks of genuine perceptual expertise. They are impressively 
accurate compared to novices (Tangen, Thompson, & McCarthy, 2011; Ulery, Hicklin, 
Buscaglia, & Roberts, 2011; but see Ulery, Hicklin, Buscaglia, & Roberts, 2012, Dror & 
Rosenthal, 2008 and Dror & Cole, 2010, for issues of reliability and context effects in 
fingerprint examinations), and there is evidence to suggest that they rely on configural, 
holistic, or non-analytic processes when matching fingerprints (Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005; 
Thompson & Tangen, 2014). 
 In the following experiment, instead of judging whether two prints belong to the 
same or different fingers, our participants judge whether a series of five prints presented in 
a lineup belong to the same or different person (Figure 3.2a). Can people identify prints 
from Jones’s right thumb, index, middle, ring, and little finger as instances of the same 
“Jones” category? Our expert participants have years of experience with matching prints 
from the same finger or difference fingers, but no experience with explicitly matching prints 
from the same person or different people. Novices, of course, have no experience with 
either task. If matching fingerprints is purely an image-matching skill, involving a 
deliberative process of aligning and comparing image-level detail in the particular case 
without relying on a memory for general category information, then we would expect 
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fingerprint experts to perform at the same level as novices when detecting the style of 
“Jones.” On the other hand, if experts outperform novices, this would suggest a process that 
is more akin to family resemblance categorisation, where experts are not simply relying on 
the specific similarity and articulable features among the exemplars in front of them, but 
are instead drawing on their memory for how prints tend to vary, not just within and 
between fingers, but within and between people (e.g., Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 
1987; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1953). 
3.4 Experiment 1 
3.4.1 Method 
 3.4.1.1 Participants. Twenty-three qualified practicing fingerprint experts from 
four police agencies in Australia (The Australian Federal, New South Wales, Queensland, 
and Victoria Police) with an average of nine years of experience in matching fingerprints 
participated in the experiment, and 23 undergraduates from The University of Queensland
—our novices—also participated for course credit. We recruited as many experts as 
possible, and an equal number of novices. 
 3.4.1.2 Stimuli. The stimuli were 10 fully-rolled fingerprints collected from each 
of 60 individuals (600 fingerprints in total) and sourced from the Forensic Informatics 
Biometric Repository (Tangen & Thompson, n.d.). The prints were cropped to 600×600 
pixels and we applied a Gaussian mask to each blurring the edges to isolate the structure of 
the prints. Sixty lineups (30 matching and 30 mismatching) were generated for each 
participant, with each lineup always consisting of an impression from each of the five digits 
from the same hand type (see Figure 3.2a for an example of a matching and mismatching 
lineup). The lineups were sampled equally from the left and right hand and further 
partitioned equally as targets and distractors. 
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Figure 3.2. Examples of matching and mismatching lineups (a). The results of Experiment 1 
(b) depict the mean percentage of correct responses for each individual along the y-axis 
and their mean confidence along the x-axis (novices are represented as green circles on the 
left and experts as blue crosses on the right). The cross-hairs in each graph indicate the 
mean percentage of correct responses for each group (the horizontal line) relative to the 
mean confidence for the group (the vertical line). 
 Specifically, for each participant, a random half of the identities in our image set 
were reserved for left-hand trials (i.e., the five prints for the left hand were used in the 
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experiment and the right-hand prints were left out) and the other half of the identities were 
reserved for right-hand trials (i.e., the five prints from the right-hand were used and the 
left-hand prints were left out). Additionally, for each participant, a random half of the 
identities in each of the left- and right-hand trials were allocated for target lineups, and the 
remaining half for distractor lineups. The digits in each lineup were also presented in 
random order on the screen, meaning that each digit type had a 1/5 chance of being a 
target on each of the match trials or a 1/5 chance of being replaced by a distractor on each 
of the mismatch trials. The distractor was always from the same hand and digit type, but 
from another random individual. Targets and distractors were presented in a different 
random order for each participant. 
 3.4.1.3 Procedure. After reading an information sheet about the experiment and 
watching an instructional video, we presented 60 fingerprint lineups, one at a time. 
Participants were instructed to judge whether the fingerprint on the far right of each lineup 
(e.g., the little fingers in Figure 3.2a) belonged to the same person or a different person 
from the first four. Participants were instructed about the nature of the lineups during the 
instructional video. That is, they were told that each lineup would consist of a thumb, 
index, middle, ring, and little fingerprint (in random order), and that the first four prints in 
each lineup were from the same person in each case. 
3.4.2 Results 
For each participant, we calculated the percentage of lineups responded to correctly over 
the 60 trials. We also calculated each participant’s absolute confidence scores over the 60 
trials by converting each rating to a score out of 6 (e.g., ratings of 1 or 12 on the 12-point 
scale would each correspond to a confidence score of 6/6, and ratings of 6 or 7 would 
correspond to a confidence score of 1/6). See Figure 3.2b, for the mean percentage of 
correct responses for each of the 23 novices and 23 experts relative to their mean 
confidence. 
 3.4.2.1 Accuracy. Both novices and experts performed quite well on this task. On 
average, novices correctly classified 68.70% of the lineups compared to experts who 
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correctly classified 75.51% of the lineups. We computed the average discrimination (Aʹ) 
and response bias (BʺD) for novices and experts (see Vokey et al., 2009, for a similar 
analysis and discussion; see also Donaldson, 1992 for a discussion of Aʹ and BʺD as 
nonparametric measures of accuracy and response bias). Analyses of these measures 
allowed us to see whether the performance differences observed between novices and 
experts were due to genuine differences in discrimination ability, or whether they were due 
to differing response thresholds (i.e., a tendency to say “match” or “no match” more often). 
A t-test using novices’ and experts’ Aʹ scores revealed that experts (Mean Aʹ = .83) were 
indeed significantly more accurate than novices (Mean Aʹ = .76), t(44) = 3.24, p = .002, d 
= .91 (the same analysis using dʹ, a parametric measure of discrimination ability, revealed 
the same pattern of results). There was no significant difference in response bias between 
experts (Mean BʺD = -.02) and novices (Mean BʺD = -.01), t(44) = .03, p = .764, with 
neither group exhibiting a strong bias to overcall a particular outcome. 
 3.4.2.2 Confidence. Experts’ superior performance is particularly interesting in 
the context of their confidence ratings. Even though experts were significantly more 
accurate on this four-to-one matching task, they were also less confident in their judgments 
(Mean Confidence = 2.40/6) compared to novices (Mean Confidence = 3.06/6), t(44) = 
2.42, p = .020, d = .72. Novices also displayed a significant (albeit weak) positive 
relationship between their confidence and percentage of correct responses, r(21) = .47, p 
= .025, but there was no significant relationship between confidence and accuracy for 
experts, r(21) = .20, p = .351. 
3.4.3 Discussion 
Each participant was asked to make a novel judgement about the style of a set of 
fingerprints: given a lineup of four prints, did the fifth come from the same person or did it 
come from a different person? Half the participants—our novices—had no experience with 
fingerprints whatsoever. The other half—our experts—had several years of experience with 
fingerprints, but in a different context. That is, experts compare fingerprints side-by-side 
and judge whether they were left by the same or different fingers; they have no experience 
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with matching people. Both groups generally performed the task well, but our experts were 
more accurate, though less confident, than our novices (see also the Supplemental Material 
available below for a replication and extension of this experiment where we reduced the 
number of impressions in each case from five to two).  
  Anecdotally, when we asked experts about the basis for their decisions, some 
referred to vague similarities in the thickness of the ridges, or a similar ridge “flow” across 
the five prints, but the majority indicated they did not know for sure, expecting their 
performance to be quite poor. These results are consistent with models of automaticity that 
propose a shift from explicit, rule-based processing to more implicit, memory-retrieval 
processing with expertise (Logan, 1988). We revisited the confidence data from Tangen et 
al. (2011), where experts were much more confident in their decisions when matching 
prints from the same or different fingers (Mean Confidence = 5.09/6 compared to 2.40/6 in 
the current task), and their confidence was strongly and positively correlated with their 
average percentage of correct responses [r(35) = .65, p < .001]. 
 Our primary interest, however, lies in the difference between experts and novices in 
how well they can distinguish between the same or different people. Experts outperformed 
novices in Experiment 1, which suggests that their identification expertise is useful when 
making coarser categorisation judgments. But it is possible that our experts were simply 
more motivated than novices to perform well. Or, perhaps, experts enter the profession 
because they have an inherent visual ability to match prints. To address these possibilities, 
in Experiment 2, we tested fingerprint trainees on the same, person matching task when 
they first started their new positions and again after they gained some experience with 
matching fingerprints. 
3.5 Experiment 2 
3.5.1 Method 
 3.5.1.1 Participants. The participants were 24 trainee fingerprint examiners from 
four police agencies in Australia (The Australian Federal, New South Wales, Queensland, 
and Victoria Police). Twelve of the participants were recruited with less than two weeks of 
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formal training as fingerprint examiners. Ten of these trainees had less than five days 
experience in the workplace. We refer to this group as Trainee Group A. The remaining 12 
participants were between one and three months into their training programs (Mean 
Experience = 1.7 months). We refer to this group as Trainee Group B. These trainees were 
spread across six cohorts given the small number of trainees per intake at each 
organisation, and completed the experiments between May 2013 and July 2015. Two of the 
trainees in Trainee Group B did not complete the second testing session due to leave 
arrangements. 
 3.5.1.2 Stimuli. The stimuli for the person matching task were the same as 
Experiment 1. For the finger matching task, the stimuli were based on the prints used in 
Tangen et al. (2011), which contained 36 images of simulated crime-scene prints (each 
cropped to 600×600 pixels) that were paired with a fully rolled print from the same 
individual (target trials) and a highly similar fully rolled print from a different individual 
(distractor trials; see Tangen et al., 2011 for further information on the collection of prints 
and sourcing highly similar distractors). Thirty-six pairs were generated by randomly 
sampling 18 of the simulated prints, and pairing them with a corresponding match, and 
pairing the remaining 18 simulated prints with a corresponding non-match (see Figure 3.3a 
for an example of a matching and mismatching pair). 
 3.5.1.3 Procedure. All trainees completed two testing sessions that were three 
months apart. In the first session, participants read an information sheet about the 
experiments before completing the person matching task from Experiment 1, the finger 
matching task, and other 20-30 minute computer-based tasks as part of a larger, ongoing 
longitudinal project. Participants took 1.5 to 2 hours to complete all of the tasks in a single 
session, which were completed in a different random order. The procedure for the person 
matching task was the same as in Experiment 1. The finger matching task followed the 
same procedure as Tangen et al. (2011). On each trial, participants were instructed to judge 
whether a pair of fingerprints presented side-by-side, were left by the same finger or were 
left by two different fingers using the same rating scale as Experiment 1. 
 56
  
Figure 3.3. Mean percent correct in Experiment 2 from two groups of trainees who were 
given a finger matching task (a) and a person matching task (b). Participants in Trainee 
Group A (in the light blue) had a range of experience from none at all to two weeks, and 
were tested again after 1-3 months of training. Participants in Trainee Group B (in dark 
blue) were tested after 1-3 months of training and again after 4-6 months. Error bars 
represent the standard error. 
3.5.2 Results 
 3.5.2.1 Finger Matching Accuracy. As illustrated in Figure 3.3a, Trainee 
Group A with zero to three months experience improved significantly in matching fingers 
from the beginning of their training (75.23%) compared to three months later (87.73%). 
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Trainee Group B also showed an improvement from 1-3 months (88.43%) to 4-6 months of 
experience (91.67%). We computed the average discrimination (Aʹ) and response bias (BʺD) 
indices for each trainee in both groups, and conducted a paired t-test using the Aʹ scores for 
Trainee Group A from their first (Mean Aʹ = .80) and second testing sessions (Mean Aʹ = .
92). Indeed, their performance improved significantly over three months, t(11) = 2.96, p = 
.013, d = 1.10. There was also no discernible difference in their response bias from the first 
(Mean BʺD = .17) to the second session (Mean BʺD = .01), t(11) = .72, p = .487. We ran an 
independent samples t-test comparing the Aʹ scores of the two groups across the two 
sessions, which revealed a significant difference, t(22) = 2.71, p = .013, d = 1.14. No such 
difference was present in their response bias data (Mean BʺD = -.16), t(22) = 1.80, p = .
086. The slight improvement in discriminability that Trainee Group B showed from the first 
to the second session was also not significant, t(9) = .1.07, p = .312, or response bias, t(9) 
= .77, p = .461. 
 3.5.2.2 Person Matching Accuracy. Trainee Group A also improved 
significantly after three months of training on the person matching task (illustrated in 
Figure 3.3b), correctly classifying 65.14% of lineups at the beginning of their training 
compared to 72.22% three months later. Trainee Group B once again outperformed the new 
trainees after one to three months experience (75.56%), but showed very little 
improvement three months later (75.83%). 
 We observed the same pattern of results for the person matching task as the finger 
matching task. A paired t-test showed a significant improvement for Trainee Group A from 
the beginning of their training (Mean Aʹ = .71) compared to their performance three 
months later (Mean Aʹ = .80), t(11) = 2.32, p = .041, d = .80. There was also no 
significant difference in their response bias from the first (Mean BʺD = -.15) to the second 
session (Mean BʺD = -.50), t(11) = 1.88, p = .087.  
 Trainee Group B, with one to three months of experience (Mean Aʹ = .83), also 
performed better than the new trainees in their first session, t(22) = 2.34, p = .029, d = .
80, and there was no discernible difference in response bias between the two groups, t(22) 
= 1.66, p = .112. There was also no significant improvement in accuracy for Training 
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Group B between the two sessions (Mean Aʹ = .83 on both sessions), t(9) = .443, p = .662, 
and their response bias did not differ significantly, t(9) = .77, p = .461. 
 3.5.2.3 Relationship Between Matching Prints and People. By 
examining the relationship between the trainees’ performance on the finger matching and 
person matching tasks, we can gain some insight into whether the two tasks are referencing 
the same underlying information. We compared the Aʹ scores for Trainee Group A, and 
found no significant correlation between their accuracy when matching prints or matching 
people at the beginning of their training, r(10) = .15, p = .642, or three months later, 
r(10) = .40, p = .198. In Training Group B, we found no significant correlation between 
their accuracy when matching fingers or matching people after 1-3 months, r(10) = .55, p 
= .064, but after four to six months of experience, they showed a significant and strong 
correlation between the two tasks, r(8) = .84, p = .001. 
3.5.3 Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 suggest that experts, with years of experience matching pairs 
of fingerprints, can transfer this identification skill to categorising prints from the same or 
different people, more broadly. We compared the performance of these experts to novice 
undergraduates, who possibly lacked the same level of motivation or inherent visual ability. 
To address these possibilities, we tested a dozen new trainees in Experiment 2 as they 
started their positions as fingerprint examiners, and again three months later as they 
progressed through their training. These “experts in progress” essentially served as their 
own controls, allowing us to focus on their relative improvement across the two tasks. 
 Our novices in Experiment 1 were 68.70% correct, on average, in matching people 
compared to our experts who were 75.50% correct. In Experiment 2, our trainees, who just 
started their new positions were 65.14% correct on the same task, but improved 
significantly to 72.22% correct, on average, after three months of training. The results from 
Experiment 2 rule out the possibility that motivation or inherent visual ability are driving 
the performance differences between novices and experts in Experiment 1. 
 59
3.6 General Discussion 
We have shown that people are sensitive to the style of a stranger: given a set of four 
fingerprints, they can infer whether the fifth came from the same person or whether it came 
from a different person. We have also shown that despite being less confident, fingerprint 
experts are more sensitive to this style than undergraduate novices (Experiment 1; see also 
Supplemental Material for a replication and extension), and fingerprint trainees develop a 
similar sensitivity to such categorical information with three to six months on-the-job 
experience (Experiment 2). These data provide evidence that subordinate level 
identification expertise can generalise to coarser level categorisation judgments. Moreover, 
the improvement seen among trainees over three to six months suggests that extensive 
experience with identifying objects specifically—and not motivation or a pre-existing visual 
ability—helps to resolve novel instances across these levels of specificity.  
 Fingerprint examiners have no experience with explicitly classifying impressions of 
different fingers from the same person. However, it is likely that as they accumulate 
experience with generalising from impression to impression, these experts become sensitive 
to how these prints tend to vary in general. In a sense, fingerprint experts are breadth 
experts, they see many different finger categories but few exemplars of each. Previous work 
has demonstrated that fingerprint comparison judgments are influenced by similar past 
cases (Searston et al., 2015), which supports the idea that people are storing exemplars in 
memory, even in a simultaneous image comparison task (Brooks, 1978; Medin & Schaffer, 
1978). From this perspective, the effects we have observed could be explained by experts 
accessing information that is distributed across their repository of prior instances. Indeed, 
the strengthening of the relationship between finger and person matching performance as 
trainees gain experience is compelling evidence that subordinate identification judgments 
are based on the same underlying information as more superordinate categorisation 
judgments. This interpretation is consistent with exemplar models of categorisation, which 
assume that identification and categorisation draw on the same underlying dimensions or 
visual structure that is most optimal for performance on the task at hand (Nosofsky, 1986, 
1987). 
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 Our goal was not to make specific inferences about the particular information that 
experts might rely on to produce the observed effects. Such information would certainly be 
useful in understanding the dimensions that are diagnostic of fingerprint matching, and 
others are making headway in this space (Busey & Parada, 2010; Busey, Yu, Wyatte, 
Vanderkolk, Parada & Akavipat, 2011). Our point in using “style” here is to emphasise the 
information that remains latent in memory, so we have focussed less on fingerprint 
matching per se, and more on the flexibility of perceptual representations: given extensive 
experience discriminating visual objects at a granular level, how far does this experience 
allow people to stretch across tasks? In contrast to findings that expertise is static, 
inflexible, and highly task specific (see Lewandowsky & Thomas, 2009, for a review of 
some of these findings), our results provide an example of perceptual expertise that is more 
dynamic in nature. 
3.6 Supplemental Material: Replication and Extension of 
Experiment 1 
In this replication and extension, we compared the performance of fingerprint experts and 
novices in their ability to discriminate fingerprints left by the same person or two different 
people when viewing two prints side-by-side instead of five (see Figure 3.4).  
3.6.1 Method 
 3.6.1.1 Participants. The participants were 23 practicing fingerprint experts 
from three police organisations in Australia (The Australian Federal, New South Wales and 
Victoria Police) with an average of 13.7 years of experience. Twenty-three undergraduates 
from The University of Queensland also participated for course credit as our novice 
comparison group. We recruited the same number of experts as Experiment 1, and an equal 
number of novices. 
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 Figure 3.4. An example of a matching and mismatching pair (a). Figure 3.4b depicts a plot 
of the mean percentage of correct responses for each individual along the y-axis and their 
mean confidence along the x-axis (novices are represented in green on the left and experts 
in blue on the right). The cross-hairs in each graph indicate the mean percentage of correct 
responses for the group (the horizontal line) and the mean confidence for the group (the 
vertical line). 
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 3.6.1.2 Stimuli. We used the same 600 Gaussian masked fingerprints as in 
Experiment 1. We also used the same technique as Experiment 1 to generate the 30 match 
and 30 mismatch fingerprint pairs for each participant. Each pair consisted of either two 
prints from different fingers of the same person (for matches) or two prints from different 
fingers of different individuals (for mismatches; see Figure 3.4a for an example of a 
matching and mismatching pair). As in Experiment 1, finger-type (i.e., thumb, index, 
middle, ring or little) was random for each trial and the pairs were sampled equally from 
the left and right hands. 
 3.6.1.3 Procedure. The procedure—including the rating scale, method of 
advancing to the next trial, and number and sequencing of trials—were the same as 
Experiment 1. The only difference in Experiment 1b was that the lineups consisted of two 
fingerprints presented side-by-side instead of five. Participants were instructed to judge 
whether the two prints on the screen belonged to the same person or two different people. 
The information sheet and instructional video were changed to reflect this difference. 
3.6.2 Results 
 3.6.2.1 Accuracy. As depicted in Figure 3.4b, both novices and experts performed 
well above chance, even when the number of exemplars provided—the amount of category 
information—was reduced from five prints to two. We used the same method to calculate 
the percentage of fingerprint pairs classified correctly and the mean confidence over the 60 
trials as in Experiment 1. Experts, who classified 74.86% of pairs correctly on average, 
again showed an advantage over novices, who correctly classified 65.87% of pairs. Looking 
at the percentage of correct responses for matches (i.e., the two prints were from different 
fingers of the same person) and mismatches (i.e., the two prints were from two different 
fingers of different people) separately revealed a slightly different pattern of results than 
Experiment 1. This time, novices were better at classifying the mismatches (68.70% correct 
rejection rate) than the matches (63.04% hit rate). Experts on the other hand, performed 
about the same on the matches (74.93%) and mismatches (74.78% correct rejection rate or 
26.02% false alarm rate).  
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 Our analyses of participants’ discrimination (Aʹ) and response bias (BʺD) revealed 
similar results to Experiment 1. Experts were again, significantly more accurate (Mean Aʹ 
= .83) than novices (Mean Aʹ = .73), t(44) = 3.98, p < .001, d = 1.15, and the average 
response bias for experts (Mean BʺD = .02) and novices (Mean BʺD = .11) was comparable, 
t(44) = .72, p = .473. 
 3.6.2.2 Confidence. The mean confidence of both novices (Mean Confidence = 
2.97/6) and experts (Mean Confidence = 2.46/6) was similar to the confidence data in 
Experiment 1. Experts were again significantly less confident in their decisions than novices 
despite their superior performance, t(44) = 2.07, p = .044, d = .62. Interestingly, there 
was a significant negative correlation for novices between their confidence and percentage 
of correct responses in this experiment, r(21) = -.44, p = .034, in contrast to the positive 
correlation observed in Experiment 1. Consistent with the results from Experiment 1, there 
was again, no discernible relationship between confidence and percent correct for experts, 
r(21) = .04, p < .849.  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Chapter 4 
Novel Object Expertise is Flexible to 
Changes in Task but not Changes in Class 
4.1 Preface 
This chapter is extracted from a manuscript that has been submitted for publication and  is 
currently under a first round of review (once again, I’ve changed the spelling and 
reformatted the manuscript for the thesis). The full reference to the article: 
Searston, R. A., & Tangen, J. M. (under review). Novel object expertise is flexible to 
changes in task but not changes in class. Manuscript under review. [manuscript submitted to 
the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition] 
 
Figure 4.1. Schematic representation of Chapter 4 in the context of the thesis as a whole. 
 In Chapters 2 and 3, I have established that expertise with novel objects relies on 
memory, and that it can be flexible to upward shifts in the level of specificity—fingerprint 
experts maintain a performance advantage over novices (despite lower confidence) when 
discriminating people instead of fingers. I interpret these findings as evidence that novel 
object recognition relies on distributive or dimensional information stored in memory. A 
consequence of relying on memory, however, is that it is likely to be highly constrained by 
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our experience. As indicated in Chapter 3, expertise with modern cars does not transfer to 
antique cars (Bukach, Phillips & Gauthier, 2010), expertise with Tetris shapes does not 
transfer to non-Tetris shapes (Sims & Mayer, 2002), and even placing familiar objects—
guitar chords, cars, dogs, faces—in an unfamiliar orientation disrupts expertise (Crump, 
Logan & Kimbrough, 2010; Curby et al., 2009; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Valentine, 1988). 
An alternative view, is that novel object expertise is primarily underpinned by a general, 
part-based, analytic visual skill, in which case experts should be relatively unaffected by 
changes in orientation or stimulus class. 
 In Chapter 4, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, I test this alternative explanation by further 
probing the flexibility of novel object expertise in the context of fingerprint identification 
over two experiments. I show that fingerprint experts outperform novices at identifying 
categorical outliers (i.e., locating the loop fingerprint pattern in an array of whorls) and at 
discriminating briefly presented fingerprints, but their expertise falls apart when identifying 
inverted face categories (i.e., locating an inverted male face in an array of inverted female 
faces) and discriminating briefly presented inverted face identities. In other words, their 
expertise is flexible to distinct changes in the structure of the task, but it is specific to the 
learned stimulus class. These findings provide further evidence that, at the group level, 
expertise with novel objects is predominately underpinned by a memory retrieval process, 
and not a general visual skill. 
4.2 Abstract 
Is expertise with novel images, such as an unknown fingerprint or face in forensic settings, 
specific or general? We test the ability of fingerprint experts and novices to categorise and 
distinguish prints and inverted faces. In Experiment 1, fingerprint experts outperformed 
novices in locating categorical outliers (i.e., a loop pattern in an array of whorls), but they 
performed no better than novices at locating inverted face outliers (i.e., an inverted male 
face in an array of inverted female faces). In Experiment 2, fingerprint experts were more 
accurate than novices at discriminating matching and mismatching prints that were 
presented very briefly, but not so for inverted faces. Our findings show that perceptual 
expertise can be flexible to changing task demands, but there are abrupt limits: fingerprint 
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experts are not inverted face experts. We conclude that perceptual expertise with novel 
images is highly constrained by one’s experience. 
4.3 Introduction 
Identifying an object in a new context, view, and orientation is one of the most formidable 
visual tasks that we face. There is often a great deal of within-object variation (e.g., flowers 
wilt, fruit rots, people age, and appearances change with position, lighting, and scale) and 
between-object similarity (e.g., dandelions are often confused with hawkweed, peaches are 
essentially fuzzy nectarines, and siblings tend to look alike; Medin, Wattenmaker & 
Hampson, 1987; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1953). We rely on our memories for 
prior instances to help resolve a lot of this complexity (Brooks, 1978; Medin & Schaffer, 
1978). As a result, our ability to distinguish objects is highly constrained by our experience 
(Bukach, Phillips & Gauthier, 2010; Hayward & Williams, 2000; Tarr, Williams, Hayward, & 
Gauthier, 1998). A well documented illustration of this problem is the cost we incur when 
attempting to recognise familiar faces and objects when they are presented in an unfamiliar, 
inverted orientation (Crump, Logan & Kimbrough, 2010; Curby, Glazek, Gauthier, 2009; 
Diamond & Carey, 1986; Thompson, 1980; Valentine, 1988). Recognition is made even 
more difficult when the object itself is novel or less familiar to us. Most notably, unfamiliar 
faces are difficult to recognise across changes in view, compared to familiar faces (Bruce, 
1982; Clutterbuck & Johnston, 2002, 2004, 2005). 
 Despite the difficulty in identifying objects under new viewing conditions, there are 
experts in forensic and security settings that learn to distinguish between novel images—
such as an unknown fingerprint or face—without any opportunity to accumulate 
experiences with these objects, so they have no idea about how they typically look and vary 
(Tangen, Thompson & McCarthy, 2011; White, Phillips, Hahn, Hill & O’Toole, 2015). 
Forensic examiners spend their days visually comparing pairs of unfamiliar images side-by-
side, to determine whether, for example, a print or photograph originated from the same 
source or different sources. For the fingerprint or face expert, each case is unfamiliar, and 
the only specific instances at their disposal are in front of them (rather than in memory). 
We rely on these examiners to detect passport fraud or to identify individuals who were at 
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the scene of a crime, but what is the basis for their expertise when each object they 
encounter is novel? 
4.4 A General Visual Skill 
From one perspective, expertise with matching novel objects relies on a general visual skill. 
The extent to which undergraduates can match unfamiliar faces bears no relationship to 
how well they can match familiar faces when the faces are presented upright. If the faces 
are flipped upside-down, however, then their matching performance of unfamiliar and 
familiar faces converges (Megreya & Burton, 2006). The authors interpret this finding as 
evidence that unfamiliar faces are not processed like faces, suggesting a qualitative shift in 
processing as people become familiar with a particular identity. Expert (unfamiliar) face 
matchers are also less impaired by inversion than undergraduates (although this same 
effect was not found when comparing expert examiners to professional controls; White et 
al., 2015; see also White, Kemp, Jenkins, Matheson & Burton, 2014), suggesting that 
experts rely less on configural information.  
 Several characteristics of familiar face processing—such as inversion and 
misalignment effects—are observed, albeit to a lesser degree, in other object domains 
where people have developed expertise (e.g., Crump et al., 2010; Curby et al., 2009; 
Diamond & Carey, 1986; Thompson, 1980; Valentine, 1988). These studies suggest that 
recognition of familiar faces and objects of expertise relies on a similar cognitive process 
(Farah, Wilson, Drain & Tanaka, 1998; Gauthier & Bukach, 2007; Tarr & Cheng, 2003; for 
an opposing interpretation, see McKone, Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007; Robbins & McKone, 
2007). If recognition of novel faces and objects also share the same cognitive process, 
previous unfamiliar face studies provide an indication that expertise with matching novel 
objects may be characterised by a more general skill—one that is more resistant to changes 
in orientation, and stimulus class. 
4.5 An Instance-Based Skill 
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An alternative perspective to acquiring a general visual skill is that expert examiners are 
relying on their general memory for instances of prints and faces—and how they tend to 
vary across fingers, individuals, and contexts—to help resolve novel cases. A memory 
retrieval process is characteristically fast, intuitive, and automatic, but limited by stored 
information (Brooks, 1978; Logan, 1988). Despite the paucity of within-object exemplars at 
their disposal, expert examiners display some characteristic traits of memory-based 
expertise. Fingerprint examiners are more accurate than novices at distinguishing briefly 
presented prints (Thompson & Tangen, 2014). These examiners also show a delay in the 
N170 EEG component when viewing inverted versus upright fingerprint fragments (a 
measure of configural processing; Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005), and are less impaired when 
matching prints in artificial noise or when prints are spaced briefly in time than novices 
(Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005; Thompson & Tangen, 2014). Face matching experts also 
maintain their advantage under speeded conditions (White et al., 2015). Unfamiliar face 
matching performance, in general, suffers when the images are inverted (Megreya & 
Burton, 2006), and novice fingerprint matching decisions are influenced by similarity to 
prior cases (Searston, Tangen & Eva, 2015). Taken together, these studies indicate that 
expert examiners make use of non-analytic, holistic, or configural processing when 
discriminating novel objects, which suggests some reliance on stored information in 
memory.   
4.6 Present Study 
In the present study, we contrast people’s reliance on a general or an instance-based visual 
skill by probing whether fingerprint experts outperform novices across changes in task, and 
classes of stimuli. In Experiment 1, fingerprint experts and novices locate categorical 
outliers among arrays of 40 fingerprints as quickly and as accurately as possible (i.e., 
locating a loop pattern in an array of whorls, or vice versa). We further test whether 
fingerprint experts maintain a performance advantage when classifying inverted face 
outliers using the same paradigm (i.e., locating an inverted male face in an array of 
inverted female faces, or vice versa). In Experiment 2, we use a speeded matching task to 
 69
probe how fingerprint expertise facilitates the discrimination of prints versus inverted face 
identities.  
 Fingerprint examiners have years of experience with matching prints, but have 
limited experience with inverted faces (Young, Hellawell & Hay, 1987). Most people have 
no experience with fingerprint impressions, thereby allowing us to contrast examiners’ 
expertise with genuine novice controls. Importantly, prints and inverted faces are not likely 
to share any of the same visual regularities. So if experts outperform novices in locating and 
discriminating inverted faces as well as prints, then this result would suggest a more 
general visual skill that is robust to changes in stimulus class. On the other hand, if experts 
outperform novices for prints, but not inverted faces, then this result would suggest a form 
of expertise that is constrained by a memory for prior instances. 
4.7 Experiment 1 
4.7.1 Participants and Stimuli 
 4.7.1.1 Participants. We tested 16 practicing fingerprint experts (Mean Age = 
39.25) from four police organisations in Australia (Queensland, The Australian Federal, 
New South Wales, and Victoria Police) with an average of 12.5 years of experience. Sixteen 
undergraduates (Mean Age = 19.63) from The University of Queensland also participated 
for course credit as a novice comparison group. 
 4.7.1.2 Fingerprints. The prints were 200 fully-rolled impressions, 100 loops and 
100 whorls, collected from different fingers of 30 individuals and sourced from the Forensic 
Informatics Biometric repository (Tangen & Thompson, n.d.). Loops and whorls are two 
common classifications used by fingerprint examiners to describe the general pattern of 
fingerprint impressions. The prints in the current set were classified by a qualified 
fingerprint expert in Australia with 15 years of experience. Each print was cropped to 
180×180 pixels and we applied a circular mask, consistent with the face stimuli.  
 Forty arrays (20 containing a loop target singleton among whorl distractors and 20 
containing a whorl target singleton among loop distractors) each consisting of forty prints, 
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were generated for each participant (see Figure 4.2a for an example of an array with a loop 
target singleton). A random sample of 20 whorls and 20 loops were set aside as targets for 
each participant, so no target was repeated in the experiment. For the distractors, 39 prints 
were randomly sampled from the remaining pool of loops on the whorl target trials and 
from the remaining pool of whorls on the loop target trials. The position of the target in 
each array was also randomised. 
 4.7.1.3 Faces. The stimuli for the face search task were 200 photographs of 200 
individuals (100 female and 100 male), sourced from the Face Recognition Grand 
Challenge database (Philips et al., 2005). The photographs selected were full-frontal, eye-
aligned images matched for information such as illumination and expression. We converted 
these photographs to greyscale, cropped them to 180×180 pixels, inverted them, and 
applied an oval mask to each, removing hair as an obvious gender cue (Brown et al., 1997).  
 Forty arrays (20 with a female target singleton among male distractors and 20 with a 
male target singleton among female distractors) each consisting of 40 photographs, were 
generated for each participant (see Figure 4.2a for an example of an array with a female 
target singleton). We used the same method of sampling targets and distractors in each 
array as in the fingerprint search task, substituting loop and whorl impressions with 
inverted female and inverted male faces. 
4.7.2 Procedure 
Participants first read an information sheet about the experiment and then completed the 
two search tasks, one after the other. A random half of our expert and novice participants 
completed the fingerprint task first, with the remaining half completing the face task first. 
For the fingerprint task, participants watched an instructional video and were shown 
examples of a loop target array and a whorl target array. Participants were then presented 
with 40 arrays of 40 prints one at a time on the computer screen, and were instructed to 
click on the whorl or loop target as quickly and as accurately as possible. Participants also 
watched an instructional video about the inverted face task before viewing 40 arrays of 40 
inverted faces. In the face task, participants were instructed to click on the inverted female 
or inverted male target as quickly and as accurately as possible in both tasks. 
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4.7.3 Results 
For each participant, and each task, we calculated the mean percentage of trials where the 
target was correctly identified (i.e., clicking on the target image was recorded as a correct 
response and clicking on a distractor image was recorded as an incorrect response). We also 
calculated each participant’s average response time over the 40 trials. See Figure 4.2, for 
novices’ and experts’ mean percentage of correct responses and mean response times on the 
fingerprint (Figure 4.2c) and face task (Figure 4.2d). 
Figure 4.2. An example fingerprint array with a loop target (a), and an inverted face array 
with a female target (b). The mean percent correct and mean response time for novices 
(green) and experts (blue) on the fingerprint (c) and face (d) search tasks are depicted 
beneath each example array. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
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 4.7.3.1 Accuracy. Experts outperformed novices at correctly selecting the print 
and face targets. On average, novices correctly selected the target print 32.19% of the time 
compared to 92.03% for experts, and novices correctly selected the target face 60.94% of 
the time compared to 73.59% for experts. We subjected the mean percentage of correct 
responses to a 2 (Expertise: experts, novices) × 2 (Stimulus Type: fingerprints, faces) 
mixed analysis of variance. The results revealed a significant main effect of Expertise, F(1, 
30) = 51.99, MSE = .04, p<.001, η²G = 0.54 (see Bakeman, 2005 on Generalised Eta-
Squared as a measure of effect size), but not for Stimulus Type, F(1, 30) = 2.15, MSE = .
02, p = .153. The interaction between Expertise and Stimulus Type was also significant, 
F(1, 30) = 45.05, MSE = .02, p <.001, η²G = 0.33. To clarify this interaction, we performed 
Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons, comparing the mean percent correct for experts 
versus novices on the print and inverted face tasks separately. These analyses showed that 
experts were significantly more accurate than novices at selecting the print targets, t(30) = 
11.05, p < .001, d = 4.03, but not the face targets, t(30) = 1.87, p = .075, d = .70. 
Further analyses also revealed that novices were significantly more accurate at selecting the 
inverted face targets compared to prints, t(15) = 5.22, p < .001, d = 1.33, but experts 
were significantly more accurate at selecting the print targets compared to inverted faces, 
t(15) = 4.73, p < .001, d = 1.87. 
 4.7.3.2 Speed. The mean response time for experts (11.42 seconds) and novices 
(11.31 seconds) was similar on the fingerprint task. On the inverted face task, however, 
novices were much faster (11.12 seconds) than experts (21.65 seconds). We performed a 
second 2 (Expertise: experts, novices) × 2 (Stimulus Type: fingerprints, faces) mixed 
analysis of variance on the response time data. We found a significant main effect of 
Expertise, F(1, 30) = 19.34, MSE = 23.40, p < .001, η²G = 0.33, and for Stimulus Type, 
F(1, 30) = 56.51, MSE = 7.14, p < .001, η²G = 0.31, but we also found a significant 
interaction between Expertise and Stimulus Type, F(1, 30) = 60.80, MSE = 7.14, p < .001, 
η²G = 0.32. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons showed that novices were 
significantly faster than experts to respond on the inverted face arrays, t(30) = 6.69, p < .
001, d = 2.44, but not the fingerprint arrays, t(30) = 0.09, p = .926, d = .03. While 
novices showed no discernible difference in their response times across the two tasks, t(15) 
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= .23, p = .926, experts were significantly faster at selecting prints compared to inverted 
faces, t(15) = 9.77, p < .001, d = 2.59. 
 4.7.3.3 Speed-Accuracy Correlations. A look at the correlations between the 
percent correct and response time data for experts compared to novices helps to clarify 
some of these results. Even though novices were just as fast as experts at selecting prints, 
their speed was positively correlated with their accuracy, r(14) = .51, p = .045. No such 
relationship emerged for novices with inverted faces, although the correlation was of a 
similar magnitude and in the same direction, r(14) = .49, p = .054. For experts, the 
relationship between response times and percentage of correct responses was close to zero 
in both the fingerprint, r(14) = .01, p = .977, and inverted face versions of the task, r(14) 
= -.17, p = .537. 
4.7.4 Discussion 
Without any experience with fingerprints whatsoever, locating print outliers was more 
difficult for novices than locating inverted face outliers. Yet, fingerprint experts were able to 
overcome this asymmetry, showing an advantage in speed and accuracy for locating 
fingerprint outliers compared to inverted face outliers. Experts were also significantly more 
accurate with prints compared to novices, despite showing no advantage for inverted faces
—a class of stimuli for which they have limited experience. We also found that experts were 
much slower with the inverted faces than novices, even though their response times were 
comparable with prints. Taken together, these data suggest that expert examiners are 
recruiting different processes (or are using the same process much more efficiently) when 
viewing prints compared to inverted faces—as marked by a boost in accuracy and speed in 
locating prints. The expert-novice differences for prints and not faces, also indicate that 
examiners’ expertise is primarily underpinned by their prior knowledge about prints, and 
not a general visual skill.  
 It is possible that novices were prioritising speed over accuracy and that slowing 
them down might dilute the expert accuracy advantage we observed for prints (Wickelgren, 
1977). There was evidence of a speed-accuracy relationship for novices: the faster they 
responded, the less accurate they were. At the same time, experts’ accuracy was completely 
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independent of their speed on both tasks, and encouraging novices to focus on accuracy 
across the board is likely to reveal an expert speed advantage for prints. Most telling is the 
absence of an expertise effect for inverted faces. Novices’ apparent preference for speed 
over accuracy sets a low bar for experts on both versions of the task, yet experts still 
displayed no advantage for inverted faces. 
 In Experiment 2, we further probe the generalisability of fingerprint expertise when 
matching images that are presented briefly on the screen. Fingerprint experts and 
undergraduate novices view pairs of prints and inverted faces for 400 milliseconds, then 
judge whether the prints belong to the same finger or different fingers, and whether the 
faces depict the same identity or different identities. Keeping exposure time constant 
restricts the use of speed-accuracy strategies, and the forced choice design allows us to 
isolate discriminability and response bias (i.e., a tendency to choose one response over 
another). Presenting two images side-by-side also closely resembles the task that fingerprint 
examiners encounter day to day, while forcing a decision on a deadline encourages fast, 
non-analytic or gist processing of the images as a whole (Joubert, Rousselet, Fize & Fabre-
Thorpe, 2007). This task structure is vastly different from the visual search task in 
Experiment 1, where deliberative processing was encouraged by switching target and 
distractor categories (Ackerman, 1987). If fingerprint examiners maintain an accuracy 
advantage for prints, but not inverted faces, with just a 400 millisecond presentation, then 
this result would provide further evidence that they are relying on their memory for prints, 
and not a general visual skill. 
4.8 Experiment 2 
4.8.1 Participants and Stimuli 
 4.8.1.1 Participants. In Experiment 2, we tested 16 practicing fingerprint experts 
(Mean Age = 40.31) from four police organisations in Australia (Queensland, The 
Australian Federal, New South Wales, and Victoria Police) with an average of 11.18 years of 
experience. Sixteen undergraduates (Mean Age = 18.87) from The University of 
Queensland also participated for course credit as a novice comparison group. 
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 4.8.1.2 Stimuli. The prints were the same set used in Experiment 1, except we did 
not apply a circular mask. One-hundred target prints were randomly paired with either a 
matching impression recorded on a separate occasion, or a mismatching impression from a 
random other individual in the set. The images were cropped to 675×675 pixels with the 
fingerprints isolated in the centre of the frame. The faces were also the same as those used 
in Experiment 1 without the ovoid mask, so their hair was visible. The photographs were 
converted to greyscale, cropped to 675×900 pixels, and inverted. Similar to the 
fingerprints, 100 target identities were randomly paired with either a photograph of the 
same individual taken on a separate occasion, or a photograph of a different individual. No 
image was repeated in either task. 
4.8.2 Procedure 
Each participant read an information sheet about the study and watched an instructional 
video before completing the fingerprint and inverted face discrimination tasks. As in 
Experiment 1, we counterbalanced the order in which participants completed the two tasks. 
For the fingerprint task, experts and novices viewed 100 pairs of prints (50 matching and 
50 mismatching) for 400 milliseconds—just enough time for two voluntary eye movements
—followed by a 50 millisecond visual mask, and then judged whether prints were left by 
the same finger or two different fingers. After making a judgment in each case, there was a 
three-second interval where three short tones were presented to count participants into the 
next trial. The same procedure was followed for the face discrimination task, except 
participants judged 100 inverted face pairs (50 matching and 50 mismatching). See Figure 
4.3 for an illustration of a matching trial on the fingerprint discrimination task (Figure 
4.3a), and inverted face discrimination task (Figure 4.3b).  
 In both tasks, participants indicated their judgments on the same 12 point, forced-
choice confidence rating scale (see Tangen et al., 2011; Searston & Tangen, 2015). This 
scale ranged from 1 (sure different) to 12 (sure same), where ratings of 1 to 6 indicated a 
“no match” decision and ratings 7 to 12 indicated a “match” decision. The image masks 
were scrambled versions of the preceding pair of images (see Figure 4.3a for an example), 
and the order of matching and mismatching trials was randomised for each participant. 
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4.8.3 Results 
We computed the average discrimination ability (Aʹ) and response bias (BʺD ) for novices 
and experts on the fingerprint and inverted face discrimination tasks (Donaldson, 1992). 
These measures allowed us to isolate differences in discrimination ability between novice 
and experts, independent of their response threshold. See Figure 4.3, for mean Aʹ and BʺD 
scores on the fingerprint (Figure 4.3c) and inverted face task (Figure 4.3d). 
 The inverted face identities (Mean Aʹ = .58) were more difficult to distinguish than 
the prints (Mean Aʹ = .75). We first subjected participants’ Aʹ scores to a 2 (Expertise: 
experts, novices) × 2 (Stimulus Type: fingerprints, faces) mixed analysis of variance. We 
observed a main effect of Stimulus Type, F(1, 30) = 84.84, MSE = .01, p<.001, η²G = 0.44, 
but no main effect of Expertise, F(1, 30) = 1.75, MSE = .02, p = .195, and the interaction 
was not significant, F(1, 30) = 1.30, MSE = .01, p = .264. While no effects of expertise 
were discernible using an omnibus test, we performed two Bonferroni adjusted 
comparisons comparing the mean Aʹ scores for experts and novices on the fingerprint and 
inverted face tasks separately. These analyses showed that experts (Mean Aʹ = .78) were 
significantly more accurate than novices (Mean Aʹ = .72) at discriminating prints, t(30) = 
2.4, p < .023, d = .87, but expert (Mean Aʹ = .59) and novice (Mean Aʹ = .57) 
discrimination of inverted faces was comparable, t(30) = .433, p = .668, d = .16. 
 Participants were also more conservative with inverted faces (Mean BʺD = .17) than 
with prints (Mean BʺD < .01). A 2 (Expertise: experts, novices) × 2 (Stimulus Type: 
fingerprints, faces) mixed analysis of variance using participants’ BʺD scores revealed a 
significant main effect of Stimulus Type, F(1, 30) = 5.11 MSE = .09, p =.031, η²G = .04, 
but no main effect of Expertise, F(1, 30) = .06, MSE = .28, p = .810, and no interaction, 
F(1, 30) = .20, MSE = .09, p = .661. Follow up Bonferroni adjusted comparisons showed 
no significant difference between novices’ (Mean BʺD < .01) and experts’ (Mean BʺD = -.00) 
BʺD scores on the fingerprint task, t(30) = .00, p = .997, or between novices (Mean BʺD = .
14) and experts (Mean BʺD = .20) on the inverted face task, t(30) = .47, p = .642. 
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Figure 4.3. A representation of the fingerprint discrimination task sequence (a), and the 
inverted face discrimination task sequence (b). The mean accuracy (Aʹ) or discrimination 
ability for novices (green) and experts (blue) on the fingerprint (c), and face (d) tasks are 
depicted beneath each sequence. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
4.8.4 Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 suggest that fingerprint examiners’ expertise is constrained 
by their experience with prints. We compared these experts’ accuracy and speed at locating 
categorical outliers to novices who had no prior experience with prints whatsoever, and 
they demonstrated superior performance with prints, but not inverted faces. Our novices 
were possibly responding quickly at the expense of their accuracy, whereas experts 
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displayed no signs of making such a tradeoff.  In this second experiment, we compared 
experts to novices in their ability to discriminate between matching and mismatching 
fingerprints to their ability to discriminate between matching and mismatching inverted 
face identities. We presented the images very briefly, preventing the use of idiosyncratic 
speed-accuracy strategies. As in Experiment 1, participants did not seem to rely on general 
or analytic processes under these speeded conditions. Even with just 400 milliseconds to 
view the prints, experts were more accurate than novices. With the inverted faces, however, 
experts’ accuracy resembled that of a novice. 
4.9 General Discussion 
We examined whether expertise with matching novel objects, such as a fingerprint or photo 
of an unknown individual in forensic settings, relies on a general or specific visual skill, and 
tested the extent to which fingerprint expertise generalises to novel contexts and classes of 
stimuli. We have shown that fingerprint experts are more accurate than novices at locating 
fingerprint outliers (i.e., loops and whorls), but not inverted face outliers (i.e., males and 
females) in a novel visual search task (Experiment 1). Fingerprint experts were also more 
accurate than novices at distinguishing pairs of prints (but not pairs of inverted faces) at a 
glance (Experiment 2). These experts display a surprising amount of flexibility in their 
ability to classify and distinguish prints across very different tasks, but this expertise has 
abrupt limits: fingerprint experts are not inverted face experts. 
 It is clear from our results that expert examiners are bringing some knowledge to 
bear when viewing prints that novices are not, and that this knowledge is of little use when 
viewing images that are too far afield. Experts’ ability to generalise is constrained by their 
specific set of prior instances (Searston et al., 2015). This specificity is consummate with 
exemplar models that emphasise a greater reliance on stored information in memory with 
expertise (Brooks, 1978; Logan, 1988; Medin & Schaffer, 1978). From this perspective, 
objects and categories that are similar to previous encounters are identified effortlessly, 
whereas those that are atypical, unusual, or more distinct from learned dimensions—such 
as our inverted faces—are more likely to produce novice-like performance (Bukach et al., 
2010).  
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 Our results also indicate that a process of comparing information on the screen in 
front of them to information stored in memory can operate across paradigms. Experts 
outperformed novices at locating fingerprint outliers in arrays of similar images, and were 
also more accurate at distinguishing prints that were presented briefly on the screen. These 
findings are at odds with prior work suggesting that experts are poor at adapting to even 
seemingly trivial changes within their domain (see Lewandowsky & Thomas, 2009 for a 
review). Though, our results can be reconciled with some exemplar models that suggest a 
process of selectively attending to diagnostic dimensions depending on the task at hand 
(Nosofsky, 1986, 1987). It seems that examiners are able to flexibly retrieve information 
that is stored in memory in order to navigate completely different levels of specificity and 
task environments. Further studies are needed to clarify the boundaries of this flexibility 
and how it develops. 
 Our point of departure from previous work is in demonstrating that people can 
develop perceptual expertise that is similar in nature to familiar domains, even when 
within-object information is sparse. Prior work on perceptual expertise has focused on 
domains where there is an opportunity to accumulate specific experience with the object or 
category in question. A bird watcher or dog enthusiast can view multiple instances of the 
same species or breed (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Tanaka & Curran, 2001), a car enthusiast 
can view multiple variants of the same make and model (Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore & 
Anderson, 2000), and medical doctors learn more about a particular disease the more times 
patients present with symptoms of that disease (Brooks, Norman & Allen, 1991). Forensic 
examiners don’t have an opportunity to develop a tacit knowledge of what a specific 
person’s thumb print typically looks like before determining whether another thumb print 
belongs to that same, individual thumb. Yet, these experts display expertise with prints that 
is flexible to distinct changes in the structure of the task, but specific to the learned 
stimulus class. Although our conclusion does not extend widely beyond the domain of 
fingerprints, we show that it is possible to make use of more general information stored in 
memory to aid recognition of novel objects across distinctly different paradigms. 
Understanding more about the flexibility of prior knowledge across domains will help to 
inform general theories of perceptual expertise.  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Chapter 5 
The Emergence of Expertise with Novel 
Objects 
5.1 Preface 
This chapter is reproduced from an unpublished manuscript that will eventually be 
submitted to a basic psychology journal. Jason Tangen contributed equally to the design of 
the experiments and provided comments on the written work. I collected all of the data 
throughout my candidature working closely with police agencies across Australia. I visited 
each agency every three months to administer the experiments, recruiting new trainees as 
they began working in fingerprints. Experiment 2 in Chapter 3 was based on preliminary 
data from this longitudinal experiment. 
 
Figure 5.1. Schematic representation of Chapter 5 in the context of the thesis as a whole. 
 In the previous chapters of this thesis, I have focused my efforts on understanding 
the nature of novel object expertise at the group level—comparing novices from one time to 
the next, or novices to experts, across a variety of visual tasks. I’ve provided demonstrations 
of when novel object expertise is likely to generalise, and when it is not (e.g., fingerprint 
expertise generalises to novel levels of specificity and novel paradigms, but not to novel 
classes of stimuli), and I argue on the basis of these demonstrations that novel object 
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expertise relies largely on a process of referencing diagnostic information stored in memory. 
We know very little, however, about the nature of object recognition at the individual level. 
It could be that some individuals are relying on a pre-existing general visual skill that lends 
itself well to object recognition, but such effects may disappear at the group level.  
 In Chapter 5, as depicted in Figure 5.1, I explore predictors of novel object expertise. 
In particular, I test whether early individual differences in fingerprint matching 
performance are related to individual differences a year later, after a period of working in a 
fingerprint unit. The few studies that have examined the role of individual differences in 
expertise have generally used prospective methods and examine relationships between 
domain-specific measures of performance and measures of more general abilities (e.g., IQ 
and visual memory), or survey the diary records and interview recordings of experts for 
common characteristics. My approach was to track two groups of fingerprint trainees—
spanning six cohorts and four police agencies—as they accumulate experience with 
matching fingerprints over the course of a year. This approach allowed me to probe 
whether there are stable individual differences in perceptual expertise, regardless of 
experience. 
 I test trainees on four established measures of fingerprint expertise every three 
months and index their performance by averaging across their percent correct scores on all 
four measures. I found that trainees’ accuracy on the overall performance index (and on 
each measure individually) significantly improved with just three months experience, but 
their learning plateaued after this time. Trainees’ early accuracy was also a reliable 
predictor of their performance on two of the measures combined—a fingerprint search and 
fingerprint matching task—three, six, nine, and 12 months later. When matching briefly 
presented prints or when matching family resemblances among a person’s prints (e.g., 
identifying Jones’s thumb, index, middle, ring, and little fingerprints as instances of Jones), 
however, early individual differences were diluted with experience, suggesting that pre-
existing differences are not always diagnostic of differences between experts. 
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5.2 Abstract 
Do early individual differences in performance predict later perceptual expertise? We 
tracked 24 fingerprint trainees over the course of a year as they accumulated experience 
with matching fingerprints. We tested their accuracy every three months on four measures 
of fingerprint expertise: visual search, speeded matching, person matching, and fingerprint 
matching. Their accuracy improved on all four measures, with the majority of learning 
occurring within the first three months. The trainees’ early performance was also 
significantly related to their later performance on some tasks—when taking the average of 
trainees’ accuracy with locating categorical outliers (i.e., identifying a loop fingerprint 
pattern in an array of whorls) and with discriminating fingerprints without a deadline, the 
same people tended to remain among the top performers even after 12 months of working 
in the domain. When matching briefly presented prints or when matching family 
resemblances among a person’s prints (e.g., identifying Jones’s thumb, index, middle, ring, 
and little fingerprints as instances of “Jones”), however, early individual differences were 
diluted with experience. These findings indicate that individual differences in performance 
remain stable under conditions that imply the use of slow, effortful, analytic processing, but 
not under conditions that force fast, intuitive, non-analytic processing. 
5.3 Introduction 
People vary in their ability to recognise objects. Developmental prosopagnosics perform 
significantly below average at recognising faces (Kress & Daum, 2003) and others—termed 
super recognisers—perform significantly above average across face memory and face 
matching tasks (Bobak, Hancock & Bate, 2015; Russell, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2009). 
Other examples of expert-novice differences in visual domains abound (Tarr & Cheng, 
2003). The prevailing view in cognitive psychology is that variation in performance is 
largely a result of variation in the amount of deliberate practice an individual engages in 
(Charness, Tuffiash, Krampe, Reingold, & Vasyukova, 2005; Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson, 
Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993; Ericsson, 2014). Indeed, experience identifying and 
discriminating bird species (Tanaka, Curran & Sheinberg, 2005), other-race faces (Bukach, 
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Cottle, Ubiwa & Miller, 2012), and fictitious beasts (Wong, Palmeri & Gauthier, 2009; 
Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) has been shown to facilitate the development of perceptual 
expertise. While deliberate practice is undoubtedly important, some commentators have 
called for research examining whether effects of expertise could also be underpinned by 
pre-existing general abilities (e.g., McNamara, Hambrick, & Oswald, 2014). In the present 
study, we address the question of whether individual differences in performance on 
measures of perceptual expertise remain stable, regardless of experience. 
5.3.1 Dissecting Existing Expertise 
A common approach to assessing individual differences in expertise has been to 
retrospectively examine the relationship between domain-specific measures of performance 
and measures of more general abilities, such as IQ and visual memory. Other studies have 
made use of retrospective twin designs to determine whether there is a genetic component 
to expertise. In face recognition, there is evidence of a higher correlation between identical 
twins compared to fraternal twins in their ability to recognise faces (Wilmer et al., 2010), 
but no correlation between face recognition ability and general intelligence (IQ), or general 
visual memory (Davis et al., 2011). Further afield, others have reported a genetic 
component to reading skill using a retrospective twin design (Plomin, Shakeshaft, McMillan 
& Trzaskowski, 2014), and a significant relationship between several measures of general 
cognitive ability (e.g., IQ and visual memory) and chess skill among children (Bilalić, 
McLeod & Gobet, 2007; Horgan, & Morgan,1990), and adults (Grabner, Stern & Neubauer, 
2007; but for conflicting results, see Waters, Gobet & Leyden, 2002). While these findings 
offer insights about a possible source of variation among individuals, it is impossible to 
tease apart the relative contribution of experience using retrospective methods. With twins, 
for instance, fraternal pairs may vary more than identical pairs in their sets of experiences, 
resulting in more varied performance. 
5.3.2 Predicting Future Expertise 
A second approach to assessing individual differences in expertise is to predict future 
achievement based on current performance. One particular domain that has an established 
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literature on predicting future achievement, is medicine. Admission to postgraduate 
medical science programs is highly competitive, the candidates are all highly qualified, and 
attrition rates are typically very low (Eva, Rosenfeld, Rieter & Norman, 2004; Salvatori, 
2001). The traditional personal interview approach to selecting candidates is also prone to 
context specificity effects (Eva et al., 2004). To overcome some of these issues, medical 
education researchers developed the multiple mini-interview, a selection tool that involves 
averaging across scores from multiple samples of short, structured interviews with 
candidates (Eva et al., 2004). Increasing the number of interviews (and interviewers) 
dilutes the chances of candidates being selected on the basis of compatibility with a 
particular interview panel, or a once off favourable performance on the day. We borrow 
aspects of this multiple samples method in our current study. Predicting future behaviour, 
however, also has limits. There is no way to assess the future performance of selected 
candidates relative to the future performance of rejected candidates had they been selected 
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Because the range of people to test down the track is restricted, 
it can be difficult to know whether a selection tool actually discriminates top future 
performers from bottom future performers. 
5.3.3 Tracking the Emergence of Expertise 
A third approach to testing whether individual differences in general ability underlie 
expertise, is to collect longitudinal data. Although, there are surprisingly few longitudinal 
studies mapping the development of expertise over time. Prior work integrating dual-
process and individual differences theories has found that early individual differences 
among naïve performers remain stable over a period of learning (in a single session) when 
the task demands vary (e.g., randomly intermixing targets and distractors on a verbal 
category search task), but they diminish when the task demands remain consistent (e.g., 
colour naming, symbol sorting; see Ackerman, 1987). Tasks with inconsistent components 
are thought to imply the use of more controlled or effortful processes, whereas tasks with 
consistent components are thought to become more automated with experience. From this 
perspective, individual differences in general ability are equated with differences in 
cognitive capacity or amount of attentional resources, and the transition from controlled to 
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more automatic processing with expertise is synonymous with becoming less sensitive to 
general resource limitations (Ackerman, 1987). While this work is based on relatively 
artificial cognitive tasks, it offers a theoretical framework for assessing individual 
differences in perceptual expertise. Early individual differences in learners’ ability to classify 
and discriminate objects or categories might remain stable for tasks that are inconsistent, 
novel, or that allow controlled, effortful, analytic processing, but not for tasks that come to 
rely on fast, intuitive, non-analytic processing with experience. 
5.3.4 Present Study 
In this study, we address whether stable individual differences underlie perceptual expertise 
in the context of fingerprint matching. Specifically, we test whether variation in 
performance among a group of fingerprint novices predicts variation in their performance 
as they accumulate experience with matching prints over 12 months in a natural setting. 
We measure their performance every three months on a suite of visual tasks: two that allow 
slow, controlled, analytic processing (i.e., a self-paced visual search and fingerprint 
matching task), and two that force fast, intuitive, or non-analytic processing (i.e., a 
matching task where the images are presented very briefly, and a matching task where we 
shift the level of specificity). 
 There is reason to believe that fingerprint examiners rely somewhat on controlled, 
effortful, or analytic processes when matching prints. The difference in fingerprint 
matching performance between experts and novices is greater when given 60 seconds of 
viewing time versus one second (Thompson & Tangen, 2014), and formal practice 
guidelines encourage a slow, analytic process of marking up and comparing particular 
features in each case before arriving at a conclusion (SWGFAST, 2012). Fingerprint 
examiners also spend their days matching novel objects. Their task is to determine whether 
two unfamiliar prints presented side-by-side belong to the same, unfamiliar finger (e.g., 
Smith’s right thumb), or two different fingers. The novelty of each case could be regarded 
as a form of inconsistency (Ackerman, 1987), and performance under these conditions may 
require effortful processing that is dependent on more general cognitive abilities. From this 
perspective, we would expect individual differences in performance on measures of 
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fingerprint expertise that allow controlled, effortful processing to remain stable over time, 
irrespective of experience. 
 There is also evidence that fingerprint examiners make use of more non-analytic or 
automatic processes with expertise. Experts are more accurate than novices with matching 
prints that are spaced briefly in time or presented briefly on the screen (Thompson & 
Tangen, 2014), and they display characteristics of configural processing (Busey, & 
Vanderkolk, 2005). Fingerprint matching decisions are also influenced by similarity to prior 
cases (Searston, Tangen & Eva, 2015), suggesting a reliance on memory and a feeling of 
familiarity, even when matching images. Based on this evidence, we would expect early 
individual differences in performance on measures of expertise that imply the use of mostly 
fast, intuitive, or non-analytic processing to diminish as examiners gain experience with 
matching prints. Such a result would be consistent with exemplar models that emphasise a 
greater on reliance on automated memory retrieval as people develop expertise (Brooks, 
1978; Logan, 1988; Medin & Schaffer, 1978). 
5.4 Method 
5.4.1 Participants 
Participants were 24 fingerprint trainees from four police organisations in Australia 
(Queensland, The Australian Federal, New South Wales, and Victoria Police). Twelve 
trainees—Trainee Group A—had less than two weeks of formal experience with 
discriminating prints on the first day of testing. The remaining 12 trainees—Trainee Group 
B—had between one and three months experience with matching fingerprints on the first 
day of testing (Mean Experience = 1.7 months), and served as a cross-sectional comparison 
group. Trainees were spread over six cohorts. Five of the 24 trainees were not able to 
complete all five sessions: two (one from Trainee Group A, and one from Trainee Group B) 
were not available at nine or 12 months, one from Trainee Group A was not available at 
nine months, one from Trainee Group B was not available at six months, and another from 
Trainee Group B was only available to complete the tasks once, on the first visit. Some 
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missing data due to leave arrangements was unavoidable, and we have included the data 
we obtained from these trainees in our analyses where possible. 
5.4.2 Visual Search 
As one measure of fingerprint expertise, trainees viewed 40 arrays of 40 prints one at a 
time on the computer screen, and were asked to find and select the whorl among the loops 
or the loop among the whorls as quickly and as accurately as possible. Prior work has 
shown that fingerprint experts are significantly more accurate than novices at locating 
categorical outliers in these arrays (Searston & Tangen, under review). Trainees also 
completed an inverted face version of the same task—where trainees viewed 40 arrays of 
40 inverted faces, selecting the inverted male face among the inverted female faces or vice 
versa. Our expertise with faces is disrupted when the images are inverted (Young, Hellawell 
& Hay, 1987), and we expected trainees to become more accurate on the fingerprint task 
(but not the inverted face task) as they gained experience with matching prints. 
 The prints were 200 fingerprint patterns (100 loop and 100 whorls), collected from 
different fingers of 30 individuals. Each print was cropped to 180×180 pixels and we 
applied a circular mask. Forty arrays were generated for each trainee: 20 with a loop 
pattern among whorl distractors, and 20 with a whorl pattern among loop distractors. The 
39 distractors in each array were randomly sampled from the remaining pool of prints. No 
target was repeated, the position of the target was random in each array, and the sequence 
of trials (i.e., loop or whorl target) was random for each trainee each time the task was 
completed. We used the same method to generate 40 arrays of 40 inverted face images with 
inverted male or inverted female target images. The faces were a subset of 100 male and 
100 female photographs from the Face Recognition Grand Challenge database (Phillips et 
al., 2005), cropped to 180×180 pixels, inverted, and masked so that the hair could not be 
seen. 
5.4.3 Speeded Matching 
Prior work has shown also that fingerprint experts are more accurate than novices when 
matching prints presented for one second (Thompson & Tangen, 2014), and just 400 
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milliseconds (Searston & Tangen, under review). As a second measure of fingerprint 
expertise, trainees viewed pairs of prints for 400 milliseconds followed by a 50 millisecond 
visual mask (i.e., scrambled images of the fingerprints), and were asked to judge whether 
the prints were left by the same finger or two different fingers. There were 100 pairs (50 
matching and 50 mismatching), and trainees indicated their judgments on a 12 point, 
forced-choice confidence rating scale (Tangen, Thompson & McCarthy, 2011). We also 
included an inverted face version of this task where trainees viewed pairs of photographs 
for 400 milliseconds followed by a 50 millisecond visual mask, and were asked to judge 
whether the photographs depicted the same individual or two different individuals. Again - 
we expected trainees to become more accurate at discriminating fingerprints (but not 
inverted faces) as they gained experience working in fingerprints. 
 The prints were the same set used in the visual search task without the circular 
mask. One-hundred target prints were randomly paired with either a matching print 
recorded on a separate occasion (creating 50 matching pairs), or a mismatching print from 
a random other individual in the set (creating 50 mismatching pairs). The images were 
cropped to 675×675 pixels with the prints isolated in the centre. The order of matching 
and mismatching trials was random for each trainee on each occasion they completed the 
task. The faces were also the same as those used in the visual search task, only the hair was 
not masked and the images were cropped to 675×900 pixels. 
5.4.4 Person Matching 
Another facet of fingerprint expertise is an ability to detect stylistic, relational or  family 
resemblance information among a person’s prints. Fingerprint experts are more accurate 
than novices at judging whether a series of prints were left by the same person, even when 
they were left by completely different fingers (e.g., Jones’s right thumb, index, middle, ring 
and little fingerprints are all instances of Jones; Searston & Tangen, under review). As a 
third measure of fingerprint expertise, trainees judged whether lineups of five prints, each 
from different fingers (i.e., index, middle, ring, little, and thumb), were left by the same 
person or whether one of the prints was left by another individual. Trainees indicated their 
judgments on a 12-point forced choice confidence rating scale. This scale ranged from 1 
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(sure different) to 12 (sure same), where ratings of 1 to 6 indicated a “no match” decision 
(i.e., they thought one of the prints belonged to another individual) and ratings 7 to 12 
indicated a “match” decision (i.e., they thought all five impressions belonged to the same 
individual).    
 The image set used in this task consisted of 10 fully-rolled prints from 60 individuals 
that were cropped to 600×600 pixels, and masked to isolate the structure of the prints 
(Searston & Tangen, under review). Sixty lineups of five prints were generated for each 
trainee on each testing occasion. The lineups were sampled equally from the left and right 
hand and further partitioned equally as matching and or mismatching trials. The distractors 
were sampled from a random other individual in the set while still ensuring that all lineups 
included a print of each of the five digit types. The sequence of matching and mismatching 
trials was also random for each trainee on each testing occasion. 
5.4.5 Fingerprint Matching 
The final measure of expertise was a latent fingerprint matching task that has also been 
shown to discriminate between experts and novices (Tangen et al., 2011). Trainees viewed 
36 pairs of prints (18 matching and 18 mismatching) and judged them as belonging to the 
same finger or two different fingers—the fingerprint pairs remained on the computer screen 
until trainees indicated their judgment. The prints were a subset of those used in Tangen et 
al. (we did not include a random non-match condition; 2011). The 36 fingerprint pairs 
were generated by randomly sampling 18 simulated crime-scene prints, pairing them with a 
corresponding fully rolled print left by the same finger, and pairing the remaining 18 with a 
corresponding highly similar but mismatching print. 
5.4.6 Procedure 
All trainees read an information sheet about the study before participating, and watched an 
instructional video about each task. The suite of measures were presented in a different 
randomised order on five separate occasions, spaced three months apart. They were 
presented on a Macbook Air in a room separate from trainee’s workspaces, and each testing 
session took approximately 2 hours to complete with short breaks between the tasks. On 
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some occasions, the trainees completed the tasks over two separate days, depending on 
their work demands. 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Effects of Experience 
Trainees improved on all four measures of fingerprint expertise as they gained experience 
with matching prints. We indexed each trainee’s performance by averaging over their 
percent correct scores on the four fingerprint tasks (excluding the two inverted faces tasks). 
See Figure 5.2, for an illustration of each trainee’s indexed performance over the 12 months 
(the light and dark turquoise lines indicate the average percent correct for Trainee Group A 
and Trainee Group B). On the first day of testing, Trainee Group A averaged 66.4% (SD = 
11.5%) correct on the index, improving to 78.6% (SD = 6.4%) with just three months 
experience with matching prints. This improvement remained steady with six (78.7% 
correct; SD = 6.9%), nine (79.5%; SD = 7.7%), and 12 months experience (80.3%; SD = 
6.3%). Trainee Group B showed a similar pattern of results, averaging 79.1%  (SD = 5.1%) 
correct on the index with one to three months experience, increasing to 80.7% (SD = 
4.9%), 83.5% (SD = 4.8%), and then 84.2% (SD = 2.6%) three, six, and nine months later. 
 We subjected Trainee Group A’s index scores to a within-subjects one-way analysis of 
variance (Experience: none, three months, six months, nine months, and 12 months), 
finding a significant overall effect of Experience on trainees’ average percent correct scores 
across the four fingerprint tasks, F(1, 9) = 26.85, p <.001, η²G = .75. Follow up paired 
comparisons revealed that these trainees significantly improved with three months 
experience matching prints, t(11) = 5.763, p < .001, d = 1.37, and this improvement 
plateaued from three to six, t(11) = .11, p = .913, three to nine, t(9) = 1.02, p = .333, 
and three to 12 months, t(9) = 1.91, p = .089. We then ran a second one-way analysis of 
variance between-subjects, substituting Trainee Group A’s index scores at three, six, nine, 
and 12 months with Trainee Group B’s scores at those equivalent times. Again, we found a 
significant effect of Experience, F(1, 52 = 34.12, p <.001, η²G = .40. With one to three 
months experience, Trainee Group B outperformed Trainee Group A who were at the 
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beginning of their training, t(46) = 3.49, p < .003, d = 1.49. There was no discernible 
improvement in Trainee Group B’s performance on the index from three to six months, 
t(44) = .74, p = .462, or from three to nine months, t(44) = 2.09, p = .050, though they 
did show a significant improvement from three to 12 months, t(44) = 3.06, p = .007, d = 
1.16. See Supplemental Material for detailed analyses of the trainees’ performance on each 
of the four measures separately. 
  
Figure 5.2. To the left is the mean percent correct for each individual trainee (light grey), 
for Trainee Group A (dark turquoise), and for Trainee Group B (light turquoise) on the 
fingerprint index (average percent correct scores collapsed across the four fingerprint tasks) 
over 12 months. To the right of the index is the mean proportion correct for each 
individual, Trainee Group A, and Trainee Group B on the fingerprint search task (top left), 
inverted face search task (top right), speeded fingerprint matching task (middle left), 
speeded inverted face matching task (middle right), person matching task (bottom left), 
and fingerprint matching task (bottom right). 
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5.5.2 Individual Differences With Experience 
Collapsing across all four fingerprint tasks, early individual differences remained stable 
over the 12 months. The percent correct scores for Trainee Group A on the fingerprint index 
at the beginning of their training were significantly correlated with their performance on 
the index three, r(12) = .82, p =.001, six, r(12) = .77, p = .003, nine, r(10) = .79, p = .
007, and 12 months later, r(11) = .72, p = .012 (see Figure 5.3a for scatterplots of these 
results).  
 Early individual differences in performance also remained stable over the 12 months 
when we removed the speeded and person matching tasks from the index. We calculated 
the average percent correct for each trainee collapsed across the fingerprint visual search 
and fingerprint matching tasks (see the scatterplots in Figure 5.3b). The average scores for 
Trainee Group A across these measures when they had no experience with matching 
fingerprints were significantly correlated with their performance on the same measures 
three, r(12) = .64, p =.025, six, r(12) = .62, p = .033, nine, r(10) = .73, p = .016, and 12 
months later, r(11) = .75, p = .008. When we ran these analyses using data from the 
fingerprint matching task only, however, we found no significant correlation between 
trainees’ fingerprint matching accuracy at the beginning of their training and their 
fingerprint matching accuracy three, r(12) = .51, p =.093, or six months later, r(12) = .40, 
p = .193. Their earliest performance on the fingerprint matching task was significantly 
related to their fingerprint matching accuracy after nine months of fingerprint training, 
r(10) = .68, p = .032, but not after 12 months, r(11) = .60, p = .051. Early performance 
on the fingerprint visual search task by itself was not significantly correlated with trainees’ 
performance on the same task after three, r(12) = .49, p = .103, six, r(12) = .50, p = .
095, or nine months experience with matching prints, r(10) = .63, p = .053, but it was 
after 12 months, r(11) = .67, p = .024. 
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Figure 5.3. The top row of scatterplots (a) represents the mean percent correct scores for 
each trainee (represented individually by the light turquoise diamonds) in Trainee Group A 
on the fingerprint index (average of percent correct scores collapsed across the four 
fingerprint tasks) with no experience matching prints along the x-axes, and their percent 
correct scores on the fingerprint index with three, six, nine, and 12 months experience 
along the y-axes. The middle row (b) represents those same trainees’ combined percent 
correct score on the fingerprint search and fingerprint matching task with three, six, nine, 
and 12 months experience (y-axes) as a function of their performance on the same 
combined measure with no experience matching prints (x-axes). Finally, the bottom row (c) 
depicts their combined percent correct scores on the speeded fingerprint matching and 
person matching task (y-axes) as a function of their performance on the same combined 
measure with no experience matching prints (x-axes). 
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3 
M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
6 
M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
9 
M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
12
 M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
3 
M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
6 
M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
9 
M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
12
 M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
3 
M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
 6
 M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
9 
M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
12
 M
on
th
s 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e
No Experience No Experience No Experience No Experience
No Experience No Experience No Experience No Experience
No Experience No Experience No Experience No Experience
Correlations Between Early Performance on the Fingerprint Index (!-axes) and Later Performance on the Fingerprint Index ("-axes)
Correlations Between Early (!-axes) and Later Performance ("-axes) on the Fingerprint Search and Fingerprint Matching Tasks Combined
Correlations Between Early (!-axes) and Later Performance ("-axes) on the Speeded Fingerprint Matching and Person Matching Tasks Combined
Trainee Group A
a
b
c
 94
 For the speeded and person matching tasks, early individual differences became less 
predictive of performance as trainees gained experience (see Figure 5.3c for scatterplots of 
these results). Collapsing over the two measures, the performance of Trainee Group A at 
the beginning of their training significantly predicted their performance on the same 
combined measure three months later, r(12) = .61, p = .035, but not six, r(12) = .44, p = .
152, nine, r(10) = .49, p = .151, or 12 months later, r(11) = .15, p = .660. A similar 
pattern emerged when we examined individual differences in performance for each of these 
tasks separately. Trainees’ accuracy with discriminating briefly presented prints when they 
had no experience in fingerprints whatsoever, was significantly related to their performance 
on the same task after they had accumulated three months experience with matching 
fingerprints, r(12) = .59, p = .045, but it was not related with their performance after six, 
r(12) = .37, p = .232, nine, r(10) = .60, p = .068, or twelve months, r(11) = .39, p = .
238. The accuracy with discriminating people at the beginning of their training was not 
significantly related to their ability to discriminate people after three, r(12) = .33, p = .
355, six, r(12) = .37, p = .298, nine, r(10) = .17, p = .643, or twelve months of working 
in fingerprints, r(11) = -.04, p = .912. 
5.6 Discussion 
Few studies have examined the development of perceptual expertise longitudinally. The 
purpose of this study was to glean a richer understanding of how people develop perceptual 
expertise over time, and to gauge whether early individual differences predict performance 
as people gain experience in the context of fingerprint identification. We tested 24 
fingerprint trainees on four measures of expertise—a visual search, speeded matching, 
person matching, and fingerprint matching task—every three months over the course of a 
year as they accumulated experience with matching fingerprints. We gauged their 
performance by collapsing across their percent correct on all four tasks. One clear result 
was that domain-specific experience facilitated perceptual expertise. With experience 
matching prints, trainees displayed a significant improvement in their ability to: identify 
categorical outliers (e.g., locating a loop fingerprint pattern in an array of whorls), 
discriminate briefly presented prints, discriminate family resemblances among a person’s 
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prints, and discriminate prints when no time constraints were imposed on them. The vast 
majority of learning also occurred within three months of working in that domain. This 
result is consummate with prior work suggesting that expertise is facilitated by deliberate 
practice (Charness et al., 2005; Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson et al., 1993; Ericsson, 2014), and 
with exemplar models that posit a greater reliance on a process of retrieving similar 
information from memory with experience (Brooks, 1978; Logan, 1988; Medin & Schaffer, 
1978).  
 Perhaps most interesting is the result that the trainees’ indexed performance on the 
suite of fingerprint tasks at the beginning of their training was significantly related to their 
overall performance three, six, nine, and 12 months later. That is, their individual 
differences remained stable, regardless of each trainee’s experience with matching prints. 
This result suggests that some variation in perceptual expertise is dependent on pre-existing 
differences between individuals (McNamara, Hambrick, & Oswald, 2014). When we split 
the index into analytic tasks that allowed the use of slow, effortful, or verbalisable 
strategies, and non-analytic tasks that implied fast, intuitive processing, we found that early 
performance predicted later performance on the former but not the latter. In other words, 
trainees’ accuracy with identifying fingerprint patterns and with discriminating fingerprints 
without any time constraints at the beginning of their training was significantly related to 
their performance averaged across these tasks as they accumulated experience. In contrast, 
early individual differences in discriminating briefly presented prints and in discriminating 
family resemblances among a person’s prints, were not significantly related to performance 
averaged across these same tasks after a period of practice.  
 This pattern of results can be reconciled with a dual-process account of individual 
differences (Ackerman, 1987). From this perspective, inconsistent task demands—such as 
discriminating novel pairs of prints or detecting a switch between targets and distractors 
when searching for categorical outliers (i.e., switching from loop to whorl trials on the 
fingerprint search task)—encourage the use of controlled processes that are constrained by 
general resource limitations. It is difficult to adopt a controlled, analytic process of 
comparing features, however, with a deadline of 400 milliseconds, as in the speeded 
matching task (Thompson & Tangen, 2014), or when the features are difficult to articulate, 
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as in the person matching task (Brooks & Hannah, 2006). Performance on these tasks are 
less likely to be constrained by pre-existing differences. Our findings do not suggest that 
trainees are adopting either a controlled or an automatic process, it is likely that they are 
making use of both to a different extent between tasks, and at different points in time. We 
note that trainees’ performance on the fingerprint matching and search tasks separately was 
not always significantly related with their later performance. Our findings do provide an 
example, however, of the sorts of conditions where performance is likely to depend—to 
some extent—on pre-existing differences or general resource limitations. In practice, these 
might be the particularly novel, counterintuitive, or noisy cases where there are few 
pressures to make a decision quickly. 
 In the present experiment, we forwent a degree of control to test trainees in their 
natural setting as they developed perceptual expertise: we tested fingerprint trainees’ 
performance across a range domain-specific tasks on five separate occasions over the course 
of a year. An advantage of this multiple samples longitudinal approach is that it is less 
susceptible to fluctuations due to independent error factors (e.g., once off performances on 
the day; Eva et al., 2004), allowing us to test the stability of individual differences across 
time and tasks. As we have shown, individual differences in fingerprint expertise were 
much more stable when we computed the average performance of each individual across 
tasks, compared to tracking their performance on each task separately. More longitudinal 
experiments, like the one we report here, are needed to further understand the specific 
aspects of experience that are most useful for developing perceptual expertise in applied 
visual domains, and to isolate the specific task demands that are dependent on pre-existing 
abilities. 
5.7 Supplemental Material: Additional Analyses of the 
Effect of Experience 
5.7.1 Visual Search 
Trainees showed a greater improvement in their ability to identity categorical outliers in 
arrays of fingerprints compared to arrays of inverted faces. On the fingerprint task: Trainee 
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Group A correctly selecting the odd fingerprint pattern 60.6% (SD = 23.2%) of the time 
with no experience matching prints,  85.8% (SD = 11.5%) of the time after three months, 
87.3% (SD = 11.6%) of the time after six months, 86.8% (SD = 9.6%) of the time after 
nine months, and 88% (SD =  11.9%) of the time after 12 months experience with 
matching prints. On the inverted face task: Trainee Group A correctly selected the face 
targets 66.7% (SD = 17.5%) of the time with no experience, 74.6% (SD = 18.6%) of the 
time after three months, 71.5% (SD = 21.9%) of the time after six months, 74.8% (SD = 
17.1%) of the time after nine months, and 73.2% (SD = 21.6%) of the time after 12 
months experience with matching prints. The mean percent correct for Trainee Group B on 
the fingerprint task was comparable to Trainee Group A at three months (85.6% correct; SD 
= 8.7%), six months (89.3% correct; SD = 7.7%), nine months (93.8% correct; SD = 
5.3%), and 12 months (94.8%; SD = 6.8%). On the inverted face task, Trainee Group B 
was more accurate than Trainee Group A at three months (76.0% correct; SD = 15.1%), six 
months (83.0% correct; SD = 5.5%), nine months (84.3% correct; SD = 10.5%), and 12 
months (84.0% correct; SD = 8.8%). See the top two panels to the right in Figure 5.2, for 
an illustration of each individual trainee’s percent correct scores on the fingerprint and 
inverted face search task over time (the light and dark turquoise lines indicate the average 
percent correct for Trainee Group A and Trainee Group B).  
 A one-way within-subjects analysis of variance using the percent correct scores for 
Trainee Group A on the fingerprint search task over the 12 months revealed a significant 
effect of Experience, F(1, 9) = 20.53, p =.001, η²G = .70. Follow up comparisons revealed a 
significant improvement in the percent correct scores for Trainee Group A three months 
after starting in fingerprints, t(11) = 4.32, p = .001, d = 1.44, but no further 
improvements between three and six months, t(11) = .67, p = .518, three and nine 
months, t(9) = 1.06, p = .318, or three and 12 months, t(9) = 1.46, p = .178. On the 
inverted face task, there was no discernible effect of Experience overall, F(1, 9) = .39, p = .
548. Follow up comparisons also revealed no significant improvement with three, t(11) = 
2.04 p = .066, six, t(11) = 1.36, p = .200, nine, t(9) = .99, p = .351, or 12 months 
experience working in fingerprints, t(9) = .66, p = .527. 
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 We ran the same analyses between-subjects using the percent correct data for 
Trainee Group A at zero months, and the percent correct data for Trainee Group B at three, 
six, nine, and 12 months. On the fingerprint task, there was a significant effect of 
Experience on trainees’ accuracy in detecting categorical outliers, F(1, 52) = 33.71, p <.
001, η²G = .39. Further analyses showed a significant difference between Trainee Group A 
with no experience and Trainee Group B with three months experience matching prints, 
t(46) = 3.49, p = .004, d = 1.49. Trainee Group B showed no significant improvement 
from three to six months, t(44) = 10.4, p = .313, a significant increase in their percent 
correct from three to nine months, t(44) = 2.70, p = .015 d = 1.17, and no significant 
improvement from nine to 12 months, t(42) = .37, p = .719. On the inverted face task, 
there was also a significant effect of Experience with data from Trainee Group B, F(1, 52) = 
13.10, p <.001, η²G = .20. Follow up comparisons showed no significant difference between 
Trainee Group A with no experience and Trainee Group B with three months experience 
matching prints, t(46) = 1.40, p = .175, however the difference between groups from zero 
to six months experience was significant, t(44) = 3.06, p = .009, d = 1.27. There were no 
further significant improvements from six months onwards on the inverted face task. 
5.7.2 Speeded Matching 
The percent correct scores on the fingerprint and inverted face speeded matching task are 
depicted in the middle two panels to the right in Figure 5.2. When matching prints 
presented very briefly, the percent correct scores for Trainee Group A improved from zero 
(64.8% correct; SD = 7.4%) to three months (68.4% correct; SD = 5.1%), but plateaued at 
six, (67.1% correct; SD = 7.2%), nine (70.1% correct; SD = 4.5%), and 12 months (69.7% 
correct; SD = 7.0%). When matching inverted face identities presented very briefly, Trainee 
Group A showed no stable pattern of improvement: averaging 57.3% correct (SD = 9.9%) 
at the beginning, 58.4% correct (SD = 6.8%) after three months working in fingerprints, 
59.2% correct (SD = 8.2%), after six months, 55.9% correct (SD = 20.8%) after nine 
months, and 63.2% correct (SD = 7.1%) after 12 months. Trainee Group B followed a 
similar pattern: on the fingerprint task, they scored on average 66.8% correct (SD = 5.9%) 
with three months in fingerprints, 65.9% correct (SD = 5.9%) with six months, 70.2% 
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correct (SD = 6.7%) with nine months, and 68.1% correct (SD = 3.7%) with 12 months. 
On the inverted face task, Trainee Group B averaged 53.7% correct (SD = 7.5%) after three 
months experience with matching prints, 57.7% correct (SD = 7.4%) after six months, 
61.2% correct (SD = 7.6%) after nine months, and 56.0% correct (SD = 7.3%) after 12 
months. 
 For ease of comparison across tasks, we have reported descriptive statistics based on 
the trainees’ percent correct data above. For the purposes of analysis, we computed the 
average discrimination ability (Aʹ) of trainees on the speeded fingerprint and inverted face 
matching tasks at each level of experience (Donaldson, 1992). This performance measure 
allows us to isolate the improvements for each trainee’s accuracy independent of their 
response threshold (e.g., tendency to same “match” or “no match”). The mean Aʹ for 
Trainee Group A on the fingerprint task was .72 with no experience, .77 with three months 
experience, .75 with six months experience, .79 with nine months experience, and .78 with 
12 months experience. We found a significant overall effect of Experience on Trainee Group 
A’s ability to discriminate fingerprints presented very briefly, F(1, 9) = 27.31, p =.024, η²G 
= .45. Follow up comparisons showed no significant improvement with three, t(11) = 2.09, 
p = .059, or six months experience in fingerprints, t(11) = 1.15, p = .276, but their 
discrimination of briefly presented prints did significantly improve after nine months, t(9) 
= 2.42, p = .039, d = 1.02. This improvement also remained stable after 12 months 
experience with matching prints, t(9) = 2.38, p = .0413, d = .77. In contrast, Trainee 
Group A showed no significant improvement in their ability to discriminate briefly 
presented inverted faces as they gained experience with matching prints, F(1, 9) = 3.26, p 
=.104 (their mean Aʹ on the inverted face task was .61 with no experience, .63 after three 
months, .65 after six months, .67 after nine months, and .70 after 12 months). Follow up 
comparisons revealed no discernible difference in their discrimination of inverted faces 
after three, t(11) = 1.31, p = .217, six, t(11) = 1.22, p = .248, nine, t(9) = .83, p = .430, 
or 12 months experience with matching fingerprints, t(9) = 2.05, p = .071.  
 We ran the same analyses substituting the Aʹ scores for Trainee Group A with Trainee 
Group B’s at three (Mean Aʹ for prints= .75; Mean Aʹ for inverted faces= .75), six (Mean Aʹ 
= .74; Mean Aʹ for inverted faces= .75), nine (Mean Aʹ = .79; Mean Aʹ for inverted faces= .
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75), and 12 months (Mean Aʹ = .76; Mean Aʹ for inverted faces= .75). A between-subjects 
one-way analysis of variance revealed a small but significant effect of Experience on their 
ability to discriminate briefly presented prints, F(1, 52) = 4.37, p =.042, η²G = .08. Follow 
up comparisons revealed no significant difference between Trainee Group A with no 
experience and Trainee Group B with three months experience, t(46) = .97, p = .346, or 
six months experience, t(44) = .74, p = .469, there was a significant difference between 
Trainee Group A with no experience and Trainee Group B with nine months experience, 
t(44) = 2.13, p = .047, d = .94, but no further significant improvement from nine to 12 
months, t(42) = 1.07, p = .301. On the inverted face task, we observed no overall effect of 
Experience, F(1, 52) = .85, p =.362, and no significant difference in discriminating 
inverted faces between Trainee Group A with no experience, and Trainee Group B at three 
months, t(46) = .89, p = .384, six months, t(44) = .37, p = .714, nine months, t(44) = 
1.45, p = .163, 12 months, t(44) = .18, p = .861. 
5.7.3 Person Matching 
The percent correct scores for trainees in the person matching task are represented in the 
bottom panel to the right of the fingerprint index in Figure 5.2. As can be seen in Figure 
5.2, Trainee Group A showed an improvement in their ability to discriminate people as they 
gained experience with matching fingerprints, plateauing after three months: correctly 
discriminating people 65.1% (SD = 11.4%; Aʹ = .71) of the time with no experience, 
72.2% (SD = 9.4%; Aʹ = .80) of the time with three months experience, 71.8% (SD = 
6.6%; Aʹ = .80) of the time after six months, 72.2% (SD =  11.4%; Aʹ = .79) of the time 
after nine months, and 72.7% (SD =  6.5%; Aʹ = .81) of the time after 12 months of 
working in fingerprints. Trainee Group B showed no improvement in their ability to 
discriminate people past one to three months either: correctly discriminating people 75.6% 
(SD =  9.2%; Aʹ = .83) of the time with three experience, 75.8% (SD =  7.5%; Aʹ = .83) of 
the time with six months experience, 75.2% (SD =  7.8%; Aʹ = .83) of the time after nine 
months, and 79.0% (SD =  6.1%; Aʹ = .86) of the time after 12 months experience with 
fingerprints. 
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 A within-subjects one-way analysis of variance using the Aʹ scores from Trainee 
Group A revealed no significant overall effect of Experience, F(1, 9) = 1.670, p =.228. 
However, we ran the analysis between-subjects including data from the two trainees who 
were unavailable, and there was a significant effect of Experience on trainees’ ability to 
discriminate people, F(1, 52) = 4.04, p =.049, η²G = .07. Follow up comparisons revealed a 
significant improvement in Trainee Group A’s accuracy on the person matching task with 
three months experience matching prints, t(11) = 2.32, p = .041, d = .80, but no further 
improvements from three to six months, t(11) = .29, p = .780, through nine, t(9) = 1.11, 
p = .297, and 12 months, t(9) = .43, p = .675. A between-subjects analyses using the Aʹ 
scores from Trainee Group B, also showed a significant effect of Experience, F(1, 52) = 
10.85, p =.002, η²G = .17. Further analyses showed a significant improvement in person 
matching accuracy when comparing Trainee Group A with no experience with Trainee 
Group B at three months, t(46) = 2.34, p = .030, d = .80, but no further significant 
improvements when comparing trainees with three and six, t(44) = .18, p = .856, three 
and nine, t(44) = .01, p = .993, or three and 12 months experience with matching prints, 
t(44) = 1.13, p = .273. 
5.7.4 Fingerprint Matching 
The percent correct scores on the fingerprint matching task is depicted in the bottom 
rightmost panel in Figure 5.2. As with the other measures, trainees’ fingerprint matching 
ability improved as they gained experience. On average, Trainee Group A was correct 
75.2% (SD = 15.7%; Aʹ = .80) of the time with no experience matching prints, 87.7% (SD 
= 9.1%; Aʹ = .92) of the time with three months experience, 88.4% (SD = 9.5%; Aʹ = .92) 
of the time after six months, 89.2% (SD = 8.9%; Aʹ = .92) of the time after nine months, 
and 90.9% (SD = 8.6%; Aʹ = .93) of the time after 12 months of working in fingerprints. 
On average, Trainee Group B was correct 88.4% of the time with three months experience 
(SD = 7.0%; Aʹ = .92), 91.7% of the time after six months (SD = 6.9%; Aʹ = .94), 94.7% 
of the time after nine months (SD = 3.8%; Aʹ = .96), and 95.7% (SD = 2.9%; Aʹ = .96), of 
the time after 12 months experience working in fingerprints. 
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 Within-subjects analyses of trainees’ Aʹ scores revealed a significant overall effect of 
Experience on fingerprint matching accuracy for Trainee Group A, F(1, 9) = 9.77, p =.012, 
η²G = .52, and a significant improvement in their accuracy from none to three months 
experience, t(11) = 2.96, p = .013, d = 1.10. There were no further improvements in their 
accuracy from three to six months, t(11) = .06, p = .953, three to nine months, t(9) = .
314, p = .761, or three to 12 months experience with matching prints, t(9) = 1.27, p = .
236. Between-subject analyses including the Aʹ scores of Trainee Group B also showed a 
significant effect of Experience on fingerprint matching accuracy, F(1, 52) = 4.04, <.001, 
η²G = .30.  There was a significant increase in accuracy between Trainee Group A with no 
experience and Trainee Group B with three months experience, t(46) = 2.71, p = .018, d = 
1.14. There was no significant difference in Trainee Group B’s fingerprint matching 
accuracy between three and six months, t(44) = .981, p = .339, but there was a significant 
increase in their accuracy between three and nine months, t(44) = 2.70, p = .015, d = .76. 
There was no significant improvement from nine to 12 months, t(42) = .206, p = .839. 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Chapter 6 
General Discussion 
6.1 Preface 
I began my PhD candidature buried in literature on the science of learning (see the 
Appendix for an experiment based on this review). I end my PhD candidature with a 
program of research on the cognitive processes that underlie novel object recognition. 
Throughout, I’ve grappled with the puzzle of how forensic examiners learn to distinguish 
images of objects—such as a strange finger or individual—without any specific, within-
object experience to draw on like other domains of perceptual expertise. It is tempting to 
think that matching unfamiliar images presented side-by-side involves an explicit and 
deliberative perceptual process, with little reference to memory. This intuition is echoed in 
the way forensic examiners explain their judgments in court, often noting specific features 
of correspondence when presenting evidence to the jury (formal codes of conduct even 
explicitly encourage experts to set out “the reasons for their opinion” in their reports; 
Federal Court of Australia, 2013, Practice Note CM7). This intuition is echoed in training 
manuals and practice guidelines that advocate a careful, analytic process of describing and 
comparing particular features before arriving at a conclusion (FISWG, 2012; SWGFAST, 
2012). This intuition also espouses a naïve realist view of the world (Segall, Campbell, & 
Herskovitz, 1966).  
 Human perception doesn’t work like a video camera, we don’t perceive the world as 
a literal representation, and the world doesn’t always appear the same way to everyone— 
though we often think it does (Pronin, Lin & Ross, 2002). We grossly underestimate how 
our prior experiences shape our interpretation of what is actually out there, and forensic 
examiners are no exception. In this thesis, I have evaluated exemplar theory as an 
explanation for novel object matching expertise in the context of fingerprint identification. 
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As can be seen in Figure 6.1, I probe whether fingerprint matching judgments are guided by 
a memory for similar prior instances (Chapter 2); I push the flexibility of fingerprint 
examiners expertise across changes in the level of specificity, paradigm, and stimulus class 
(Chapter 3 and 4); and I examine the factors that predict fingerprint matching expertise, 
indexing the performance of trainees across four established fingerprint tasks every three 
months for a year (Chapter 5). I will speak to each overarching research question in turn, 
and then offer some closing remarks on the thesis as a whole. Finally, a manuscript based 
on the results of my earlier work—Training Perceptual Experts: Feedback, Labels, and 
Contrasts—is included as an Appendix. 
 
Figure 6.1. Schematic representation of the thesis moving from left to right through each of 
the main chapters, organised by research question. 
6.2 Does Novel Object Expertise Rely on Memory? 
In short, yes. In Chapter 2, I examined whether fingerprint discrimination judgments are 
influenced by specific prior instances. In a series of experiments, I manipulated the 
similarity of the context (e.g., details about the crime), and the similarity of the fingerprints 
to previous cases and tested whether this similarity to old contexts and prints sways 
discrimination ability independent of response bias. Contextual case information did affect 
discrimination ability when it was similar to a prior case (i.e., if a previous similar case was 
associated with a “match,” then people were more likely to also rate the current case as a 
“match,” even though it was not). When we stripped away all contextual information, 
accuracy was also significantly affected by the similarity of the fingerprints to prior cases. I 
discussed these findings with reference to concerns that cognitive bias is partly responsible 
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for wrongful convictions (Garrett & Neufeld; 2009; Kassin et al., 2013). I suggest that a 
reliance on similarity to prior cases cannot be “controlled” and that the errors that 
sometimes arise from this process may be a small price to pay for genuine human expertise. 
 It is clear from these experiments that previously encountered information, similar to 
the case at hand, leaks over into current decision-making—even when matching images 
presented side-by-side. It could be argued that these effects are a result of undergraduates 
explicitly recollecting prior cases. Accounts of recognition memory, however, posit that 
explicit recollection affords more control over the influence of prior information, because it 
is easier to pinpoint specific details (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). Discrimination judgments were 
affected by the similarity of the context, even though the prints were completely different 
between the two cases. If participants were explicitly recollecting details about the prior 
prints in these experiments, they would be less likely to respond in a similar manner, as the 
differences would be more apparent. We chose to use similar (but not identical) contexts 
for this reason. It also seems unlikely that undergraduates were explicitly remembering 
specific prior cases over the entirety of the experiments, especially given evidence that 
fingerprint experts and novices have poor explicit memory for prints (Thompson & Tangen, 
2014). Instead, I argue that discrimination judgments are likely guided by a “feeling of 
knowing” or sense of fluency—an implicit familiarity-based memory retrieval process 
(Brooks, 1978; Young, Brooks, & Norman, 2011). The experience of familiarity is difficult 
to pin down to an exact source, affording less control over the influence of the context and 
the specific information contained within (or across) prior episodes (Kelley & Jacoby, 
1996).  
 Fingerprint matching judgments rely on memory. This insight fundamentally 
changed the way I conceptualised fingerprint identification, and image matching more 
generally. An implicit memory retrieval process is at odds with the careful, deliberative, and 
analytic feature matching process described by examiners, and advocated in guidelines and 
formal codes of conduct (Federal Court of Australia, 2013, Practice Note CM7; FISWG, 
2012; SWGFAST, 2012). Our findings can be reconciled, however, by considering image 
matching as an object recognition or visual categorisation task. Fingerprint identification 
involves comparing two prints side-by-side that are either two different instances of the 
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same finger (e.g., two instances of Jones’s right thumb), or instances of two different fingers 
(e.g., an instance of Jones’s right thumb and an instance from another finger altogether). 
The object or category in each case, is a particular finger, and—like matching images 
spaced in time—the observer has to resolve ambiguity arising from within-object versus 
between-object variation. We rely on our memories of particular bird species to help 
distinguish one species from another (Tanaka, Curran & Sheinberg, 2005), and we likely 
rely on a similar process to distinguish images of apples versus peaches as depicted in 
Figure 6.2. Other work in dermatology, shows that clinicians rely on similarity to specific 
previous cases to help classify a current set of symptoms (Brooks, Norman, & Allen, 1991). 
However, in these examples, there is an opportunity to accumulate experience with the 
specific object or category in question. I suspect it is difficult to imagine how fingerprint 
discrimination judgments can rely on memory when each new case is a new object, and the 
only specific instances at your disposal are in front of you—matching fingerprints is a novel 
object recognition task. 
 The effects of familiarity observed in Chapter 2 imply a role for memory in novel 
object recognition more broadly, however, we did not test experts. We also built in 
similarity either by altering old case reports (in the context manipulation) or by pairing an 
old print with a new print from a different source (in the print manipulation). These 
experiments don’t rule out the possibility that effects of familiarity decay or disappear 
altogether with expertise, and when similarity is not artificially built in. In Chapters 3 and 
4, I test whether fingerprint experts rely on their prior experience with prints by probing 
the “flexibility” of their expertise. I pushed them outside of their usual level of specificity, 
outside of their usual matching task, and presented prints for 400 milliseconds at a time. I 
compared their performance to novices in each of these novel task arrangements.  
 I showed that fingerprint experts can generalise their finger discrimination expertise 
to people more broadly despite displaying lower levels of confidence than novices. In other 
words, experts were more accurate than novices at recognising prints from Jones’s right 
thumb and prints from Jones’s right index finger as instances of the same “Jones” category 
(see Figure 6.2 for a depiction of prints at this level of specificity). I also showed that 
fingerprint experts are more accurate than novices at identifying fingerprint (but not 
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inverted face) outliers in a search paradigm, and they are more accurate than novices at 
discriminating prints (but not inverted faces identities) at a glance. In Chapter 5, I present 
further evidence that fingerprint trainees develop expertise on these same fingerprint tasks 
as they accumulate experience with prints, but show minimal improvement with inverted 
faces. Each of these findings are consistent with exemplar models that emphasise a greater 
reliance on stored information in memory with expertise (Brooks, 1978; Logan, 1988; 
Medin & Schaffer, 1978). The cumulative evidence from these experiments suggests that 
examiners’ ability to classify and distinguish prints is driven by their memories for how 
prints tend to vary: across fingers, individuals, contexts, and time. It is also clear that 
experts are not explicitly aware of this process, or the precise information they are relying 
on when making their judgements. 
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“Apples” “Apples” “Peaches”
“Purple finch” “Purple finch” “House finch”
“Jones” “Jones” “Smith”
“Apples”
“Purple finch”
“Jones”
Figure 6.2. Levels of specificity. These image categories depict fruit, finches, and 
individuals, but they could also be carved up at a finer level: instances of apples, purple 
finches, and fingers. The visual structure that is important for discrimination will likely 
change across these levels of specificity. 
6.3 How Flexible is Novel Object Expertise? 
Prior work suggests that experts are poor at adapting to novel task demands within their 
domain (see Lewandowsky & Thomas, 2009 for a review). Expert bridge players are 
disrupted more by arbitrary rule changes than novice players (Sternberg & Frensch, 1992), 
and expert chess players’ ability to detect an optimal solution from a chess board 
configuration is disrupted when another less optimal solution is present which has 
commonly been the optimal solution in previous cases (Bilalić, McLeod & Gobet, 2008). 
Various demonstrations of colour, motion, and face aftereffects (see Thompson & Burr, 2009 
for some examples) also illustrate how prior experience can have a marked effect on the 
way we see and interpret new information.  
 Counter to these prior demonstrations, in Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis, I provide 
evidence of expertise that is flexible to some rather distinct changes in task demands. 
Fingerprint experts demonstrated a superior ability to discriminate prints at a completely 
novel level of specificity (i.e., discriminating people versus fingers), classify fingerprint 
categories in a completely novel visual search paradigm, and discriminate prints at a 
glance. I argue that these effects of expertise indicate that experts are able to flexibly 
reinterpret their existing representations of a multidimensional “print-space”, depending on 
the demands of the task (Nosofsky, 1986, 1987). Experts likely rely on different visual 
regularities for discriminating people (e.g., Jones and Smith in Figure 6.2) versus fingers, for 
example, but there is still some general overlap across levels of specificity. “Ridge thickness” 
might be particularly diagnostic for discriminating people, but only somewhat diagnostic 
for discriminating fingers. And the important information for classifying loops and whorls 
likely soaks up some portion of the variance between individuals and fingers as well (in 
Figure 6.2., each one of Jones’s prints is a different pattern type: a whorl, arch, and a loop). 
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This explanation extends to the finding that fingerprint experts show no advantage with 
inverted faces on the same set of tasks. The more the stimulus varies from prior instances, 
the less useful those instances are for recognition—distinguishing inverted faces, bird 
species, or fruit, are likely to depend on completely different dimensions that are largely 
irrelevant to prints. From this perspective, the extent to which expertise generalises to novel 
instances and objects depends on the amount of overlap between old and new information.  
 This notion of flexibility, as I use it here, refers to the elasticity of prior knowledge: 
the extent to which we can reinterpret and restructure information stored in memory in 
order to adapt to changing task demands, or “the readiness with which the person’s concept 
system changes selectively in response to appropriate environmental stimuli” (Scott, 1962). 
Psychologists have used general measures of cognitive flexibility—such as the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (WCST)—to examine the development of abstract reasoning in children 
(Chelune & Baer, 1986). In the WCST, children match cards with objects that vary in shape, 
colour, and quantity to previous cards, and are told whether they have matched each card 
correctly or not. Unbeknownst to the children, the correct dimension for matching (i.e., 
shape, colour, or quantity) changes throughout the task, and the degree to which they are 
able to switch between dimensions is regarded as a measure of general cognitive flexibility. 
Other work with adults suggests that cognitive flexibility depends on the amount or 
complexity of prior knowledge (Scott, 1962). The downward “entry level shift” with 
expertise in visual categorisation (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Johnson & Mervis, 1997; 
Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn, 1984; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991) could be regarded as evidence 
for this proposition. Expert birders are able to discriminate bird species (like the purple and 
house finches in Figure 6.2) as quickly and as accurately as bird families (e.g., finches and 
owls; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). Novices, however, are typically faster to recognise basic level 
categories—such as “birds”, “dogs”, or “cats”—compared to more subordinate or finer level 
categories (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976).  
 The entry level shift is viewed as a hallmark of perceptual expertise, and 
understanding how this shift occurs has been the focus of much prior work. Tanaka et al. 
(2005), for example, demonstrated that experience explicitly classifying birds by species, 
versus classifying the same birds by family, results in better discrimination of bird species. 
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Wong, Palmeri & Gauthier (2009) also demonstrated that experience naming and 
identifying individual fictitious beasts, versus classes of beasts, results in better sequential 
matching of individual beasts—and vice versa (class-level training results in better 
sequential matching of beasts by class). These studies illustrate how specific types of 
training produce specific types of expertise: species-level training leads to species-level 
expertise, and family-level training leads to family-level expertise.  
 I show that training at one level of specificity leads to better generalisation at an 
entirely new level altogether. Fingerprint experts are better than novices at identifying 
mismatching prints that are from the same person (i.e., recognising Jones’s right index and 
thumb print as instances of Jones, versus Smith or some other individual). This result is 
surprising because fingerprint examiners typically discriminate prints at the more 
subordinate level of the finger (i.e., recognising multiple instances of Jones’s right thumb, 
versus a print from another finger) suggesting their expertise can be flexible to upward 
shifts in the level of specificity. Another important point of difference between prior work 
and the work presented in this thesis, is that I compare the performance of experts to 
absolute novices. This design aspect allowed me to benchmark the elasticity of expertise 
across changes in the level of specificity and task. It remains to be seen whether our 
findings extend beyond the domain of fingerprints. I think it would be useful to test 
whether bird species expertise stretches to bird families, or whether expertise with 
individual Ziggerins or Greebles translates to better class discrimination compared to 
novices. Likewise, experience classifying objects by family or class might result in better 
recognition at finer levels of specificity as well, compared to novices. Based on the results of 
Chapter 3, I suspect that classification experience does result in better recognition, provided 
there are some overlapping visual regularities between each level.  
 Also of interest, is whether experts further afield display flexibility in their abilities. 
Does experience classifying wine by varietal—Pinot Gris, Riesling, Pinot Noir, or Grenache
—aid in the classification of region? Does experience detecting tasting notes—“oak”, 
“grass”, or “crunchy green apple”—aid in the classification of varietals? Experts’ wine 
descriptors covary to a greater extent with wine varietals than novices’ descriptors 
(Solomon, 1997), which indicates a degree of conceptual change with experience. Very 
 
little is known about the nature of wine expertise, however, let alone experts’ ability to 
navigate levels of specificity. It seems more difficult to think of situations in sport and music 
that require experts to reinterpret their prior knowledge. Perhaps this is because these 
experts rely on the integration of multiple processes. Musical expertise, for instance, 
consists of a broad set of sub-skills: sight-reading, recall, cognitive and motor control 
(Crump et al., 2011; Lehman, & Ericsson, 1996). “Flexibility” in these domains might 
instead be marked by an ability to reintegrate these component processes in response to 
changing task demands—an experienced guitar player might pick up the banjo, sitar, or 
harp more easily than a novice musician by reintegrating their prior knowledge of musical 
structure with novel finger positions. 
 I plan to run a series of experiments along these lines to further probe the flexibility 
of expertise across domains. How far does an instance (or set of instances) allow us stretch 
before performance starts to resemble that of a novice? What are the conditions for flexible 
expertise? As a starting point, I’ve provided evidence that prior knowledge can be flexible, 
but is subject to abrupt limits when pushed too far outside of a familiar domain. 
Understanding more about how people make use of prior knowledge under changing task 
demands will help to inform general theories of expertise 
6.4 What Predicts Novel Object Expertise? 
The general consensus in the broader expertise literature is that deliberate practice can 
account for much of the variation between experts and non-experts (Charness et al., 2005; 
Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993; Ericsson, 2014). Indeed, 
deliberate domain-specific practice has been shown to facilitate perceptual expertise in bird 
watching (Tanaka et al., 2005), and in unfamiliar face matching (White, Kemp, Jenkins & 
Burton, 2013). I show that domain-specific practice also leads to expert performance in 
fingerprint matching. I tested 24 fingerprint trainees on four measures of expertise—a 
visual search, speeded matching, person matching, and fingerprint matching task—every 
three months over the course of a year as they accumulated experience with matching 
fingerprints. Collapsing across their percent correct scores on all four tasks, I found that 
trainees’ accuracy significantly improved, with the majority of learning occurring within the 
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first three months of working in the domain. I also found this same pattern of results when 
comparing the performance of trainees with no experience matching fingerprints and 
trainees with one to three months experience matching fingerprints—the trainees with 
more experience were significantly more accurate and the more experienced group showed 
little evidence of learning after this initial round of testing. It is clear from these findings 
that it is possible to develop perceptual expertise with domain-specific experience in a 
natural setting, and that the vast majority of learning happens early.   
 A more counterintuitive result was that trainees’ early indexed performance was 
significantly related to their indexed performance every time they completed the tasks, 
suggesting that there are also differences between individuals that remain stable 
irrespective of their experience in the domain. When matching briefly presented prints or 
when matching family resemblances among a person’s prints (e.g., identifying Jones’s 
thumb, index, middle, ring, and little fingerprints as instances of Jones), however, early 
individual differences were diluted with experience. I interpret these results as evidence 
that key aspects of perceptual expertise, such as non-analytic processing, are primarily 
driven by domain-specific experience. Nevertheless, early individual differences do seem to 
capture some variation in later performance when deliberative, analytic processes are 
implied (e.g., when matching highly similar and novel fingerprints without time constraints 
or responding to inconsistent task demands).  
 Few studies had examined the development of expertise longitudinally, and we knew 
little about the role of pre-existing abilities in perceptual expertise. This experiment 
provides a rich source of information about how people develop perceptual expertise over 
time, in a natural setting. Further work is needed, however, to isolate precisely what task 
constraints allow pre-existing differences to flourish, and under what conditions early 
differences are not particularly diagnostic of later expertise.  
6.5 Closing Remarks 
This thesis was about determining the cognitive mechanisms driving expertise with novel 
objects—such as a strange finger or individual in forensic settings. I grounded my 
investigation in exemplar, dual-process, and individual differences theories, and drew on 
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the general object recognition, visual categorisation, and skill acquisition literatures. I have 
accumulated evidence about the influence of specific, and general prior instances on 
people’s fingerprint discrimination judgments, the flexibility of fingerprint examiners’ 
expertise, and the role of experience versus general visual skill in shaping their expertise.  
 In contrast to a naïve realist take on image matching, I find that people’s fingerprint 
discrimination judgments are very much guided by their specific set of prior experiences. I 
provide evidence that fingerprint discrimination judgments are influenced by the similarity 
of the context and image-level information to specific prior cases. I show that fingerprint 
experts are able to traverse levels of specificity in distinguishing prints while maintaining an 
accuracy advantage, despite lower levels of confidence than novices. Fingerprint experts are 
also able to maintain an advantage with prints across very different visual search, and 
speeded matching paradigms, but perform no better than a novice when faced with visual 
information bearing no resemblance to learned dimensions—they are not inverted face 
experts. I also show how fingerprint expertise emerges over time with domain-specific 
experience, and provide evidence that it is possible to predict some more analytic aspects of 
performance from early individual differences. Taken together, these findings indicate that 
expertise with novel objects is facilitated by domain-specific experience and driven by a 
process of referencing information stored in memory. Of greater interest, and relevance to 
general theories of perceptual expertise, is that these findings illustrate a flexibility in how 
information across prior instances can be retrieved to aid decision-making in the task at 
hand. The experiments in Chapter 3 and 4 in particular, show that fingerprint examiners 
are able to reinterpret their prior representations of “print-space” in order to navigate 
completely novel levels of specificity and task environments.  
 Previous studies on perceptual expertise have a high degree of experimental control, 
manipulating undergraduates’ experience with artificial stimuli that have a limited number 
of defined dimensions (e.g., Greebles, Ziggerins, YUFOs, gabor patches). Other studies have 
used natural stimuli, which people are generally familiar with (e.g., faces, birds, paintings, 
dogs, and cars). Major insights about the nature of object recognition and visual 
categorisation have stemmed directly from this prior work (see Richler & Palmeri, 2014, 
and Tarr & Cheng, 2003 for reviews). In this thesis, I’ve opened the floodgates to much of 
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the natural variability and ambiguity that accompanies recognition problems in the wild. I 
have also been able to benchmark expert performance against genuine novice controls—
most people have no prior experience with prints. In doing so, I’ve attempted to inform 
general theories of perceptual expertise as well as address applied problems in forensic 
science.  
 Knowing that image matching judgments are influenced by a memory for similar 
contexts (as well as similar prior images) tells us that no amount of “controlling” for 
contextual information will remove the threat of bias in forensic science. Our reliance on 
prior experience can sometimes lead us astray in unusual or ambiguous situations, but it is 
also the mechanism that allows a fingerprint expert to distinguish highly similar prints. 
Knowing that experts lack insight into their own decision-making process suggests that 
showing their work or articulating their judgement for a jury is problematic. Knowing that 
fingerprint expertise is specific to learned dimensions tells us that they are not relying 
predominately on a general visual skill. Their expertise will likely decline dramatically 
when straying too far afield. Finally, knowing that variation in expert performance can be 
predicted on certain tasks by early individual differences tells us that some people might be 
better suited to working in applied visual domains than others. Future research on 
individual differences, and the kinds of experiences that facilitate cognitive flexibility (and 
perceptual expertise more generally) will help to inform training and recruitment programs 
across applied visual domains. 
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Appendix 
Training Perceptual Experts: Feedback, 
Labels, and Contrasts 
A1.1 Preface 
This appendix consists of a manuscript that has been submitted for publication and is 
currently under peer-review. The full reference to the article: 
Searston, R. A., & Tangen, J. M. (under review). Training perceptual experts: Feedback, 
labels, and contrasts. Manuscript under review. [manuscript submitted to the Journal of 
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition] 
This manuscript includes an experiment I ran in the early stages of my PhD, but I think it 
fits best at the end of this thesis. I was putting the cart before the horse, attempting to 
understand how to acquire perceptual expertise more quickly, before understanding what 
makes an expert, an expert. I’ve appended the manuscript instead of including it in the 
main text because I think it forms the basis for a new, separate line of research that follows 
directly from the work that I’ve presented in this thesis. For instance, now that we know 
perceptual expertise can be flexible to some changes in task demands, we can design 
experiments that probe the kinds of experiences that lead to such flexibility. It is impossible 
for passport officials to sample every face, so what is the best subsample to aid their 
recognition of new individuals? Likewise, what is the best subsample of mammograms for 
radiologists to experience in order to improve their diagnostic accuracy? Is it better to 
sample a range of instances from a range of objects and categories within a particular class? 
Or, is it better to spend your efforts collecting a narrow set of instances from a specific set 
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of objects or categories? I suspect the optimal balance between breadth and depth will vary 
depending on the demands of the task, but one might promote generalisation and cognitive 
flexibility more than the other. These same questions apply for forensics, wine tasting, bird 
watching, music, and other expert domains. 
 In the following training experiment, I focussed less on what instances learners 
encounter and more on ways to exploit the same set of instances. I draw on research in 
education, adapting three training protocols that I suspected might generalise well to 
learning in fingerprints. At the time, few studies had explored effective ways to learn in 
applied visual domains (work in medical education being the exception). I compared the 
effects of practice with immediate corrective feedback (feedback training), generating labels 
for features of matching and mismatching fingerprints (labels training or elaborative 
interrogation), and contrasting matching and mismatching fingerprints (contrast training or 
simultaneous interleaving). I measured the effect of these protocols against a baseline of 
regular practice discriminating prints. All three protocols—feedback, labels, and contrasts—
resulted in greater discrimination ability and a smaller liberal response bias (i.e., they said 
“match” less often) on a test compared to baseline training. These findings are directly 
applicable to training perceptual expertise, and take a first step towards addressing calls for 
improved, empirically validated, and standardised training programs for forensic examiners 
(Campbell, 2011; National Research Council, 2009; NIST, 2012). 
A1.2 Abstract 
Are strategies for learning in education effective for learning in applied visual domains, 
such as fingerprint identification? We compare the effect of practice with immediate 
corrective feedback (feedback training), generating labels for features of matching and 
mismatching fingerprints (labels training), and contrasting matching and mismatching 
fingerprints (contrast training). We benchmark these strategies against a baseline of regular 
practice discriminating fingerprints. We found that all three training protocols—feedback, 
labels, and contrasts—resulted in a significantly greater ability to discriminate new pairs of 
prints (independent of response bias) than the baseline training protocol. We also found 
that feedback and labels training produced significantly lower rates of bias (i.e., learners in 
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these groups were less likely to overcall matches) compared to baseline training. Our 
results demonstrate three different ways to boost expertise with matching prints, and have 
direct application to training perceptual expertise. 
A1.3 Introduction 
There is a growing literature aimed at understanding the study behaviours and 
metacognitive abilities (and illusions) of learners (Bjork et al., 2013; Dunlosky & Lipko, 
2007)—as well as a surge of research aimed at pinpointing the best and most generalisable 
ways to practice (Bjork et al., 2013; Hattie, 2009; Dunlosky et al., 2013). Several robust 
learning strategies—typically referred to as desirable difficulties—have been identified, 
which result in superior performance during transfer and after a delay (e.g., interleaving, 
retrieval practice, elaborative interrogation; Bjork & Bjork, 2011; Schmidt & Bjork, 1992). 
Other work has focused on the role of feedback (Butler et al., 2008; Hattie & Timperley, 
2007; Pashler et al., 2005). Virtually all of these studies, however, have relied on stimuli 
geared towards education in schools or material intended to be memorised (e.g., English-
Swahili word pairs). Here, we extend these learning strategies to the applied visual domain 
of fingerprint identification. 
 Fingerprint examiners typically refer to their expertise as being based on “training 
and experience” with matching and mismatching fingerprints (Busey & Parada, 2010); they 
spend their days determining whether a fingerprint collected at a crime scene belongs to 
the same or different finger as a candidate print. Their years of training and experience has 
been the benchmark for courts to accept fingerprint evidence. Remarkably, this benchmark 
has existed with very little pressure to empirically demonstrate the quality and effectiveness 
of current training programs to produce genuine expertise (Tangen, Thompson & McCarthy, 
2011). Several prominent scientific bodies have now encouraged the development of 
research programs on human observer performance in forensic examinations (Campbell, 
2011; National Research Council, 2009; NIST, 2012). In particular, these reports highlight a 
need to establish improved, empirically validated, and standardised training programs for 
forensic examiners. We test the effect of three learning strategies for developing fingerprint 
expertise, comparing them to “individuation training” (i.e., practice with matching prints; 
 137
Bukach, Cottle, Ubiwa & Miller, 2012; Tanaka, Curran & Sheinberg, 2005; Wong, Palmeri & 
Gauthier, 2009). 
A1.3.1 Feedback 
Immediate feedback is often prescribed, alongside deliberate practice, as an effective 
training tool for developing expertise (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer, 1993; Ericsson & 
Lehman, 1996). In the education and learning literatures, however, the role of immediate 
feedback is less clear (Hattie & Timperley, 2007). Some researchers have found learning 
interventions to be more helpful when feedback is gradually reduced during practice (Wulf 
& Schmidt, 1989), when learners have a choice to skip feedback in favour of more retrieval 
practice (Hays, Kornell & Bjork, 2010), and when immediate feedback is provided only 
after responding incorrectly (Pashler, Cepeda, Wixted & Rohrer, 2005; Karpicke & Roediger, 
2007, 2008), responding correctly with little confidence (Butler, Karpicke & Roediger, 
2008), or responding correctly with a delay (Kulhavy & Anderson, 1972; Smith & Kimbell, 
2010; but see Metcalfe, Kornell, & Finn, 2009). Immediate feedback has also been shown to 
have an undesirable effect on learners’ metacognitive judgments (Kornell & Rhodes, 2013). 
These studies show that the effect of feedback varies substantially across conditions, and 
few studies have examined its use for developing visual expertise in applied settings. One 
study has shown that corrective feedback (versus no feedback) results in better face 
matching performance (White, Kemp, Kemp, Jenkins & Burton, 2013). We extend this work 
by comparing the effect of feedback training to two other training protocols as a tool for 
learning to distinguish fingerprints. 
A1.3.2 Labels 
Learners in many applied domains typically begin by consulting guides, textbooks, and 
standards that provide annotated prototypical examples of to-be-learned categories. 
Medical students study lists of clinical features that are typical of various diseases 
(Kulatunga-Moruzi, Brooks & Norman, 2004), the latest guidelines for forensic face 
recognition promote a careful and deliberative process of describing and comparing the 
features of a face (eyes, ears, etc.; FISWG, 2012), and fingerprint examiners are 
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encouraged to identify and articulate the features of a print early on in training (e.g., ridge 
events, creases, and scars; SWGFAST, 2012).  
 Generating informational features or verbal descriptors like “polygonal shaped 
papule” in dermatology, “detached earlobes” in face recognition, or “ridge ending” in 
fingerprints, likely directs learning of the particular instantiations of a category (Brooks & 
Hannah, 2006). Indeed, feature lists and verbal descriptors have been shown to improve 
the diagnostic acumen of novices in medicine (Brooks, LeBlanc & Norman, 2000; Norman, 
Brooks, Regehr, Marriott & Shali, 1996). Providing the correct diagnosis provokes novices 
to identify more features (Brooks et al., 2000), and their performance improves when they 
list features after they have made a diagnosis (Norman, Brooks, Colle & Hatala, 2000). 
Similarly, in education, prompting learners to generate an explanation for an answer or 
stated fact—a process referred to as elaborative interrogation—results in better cued-recall 
performance than reading a pre-generated explanation (Pressley, McDaniel, Turnure, Wood 
& Ahmad, 1987; see Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, Nathan & Willingham, 2013 for a review). 
We devised a labels training procedure to extend these manipulations to fingerprints: 
learners view pairs of fingerprints labeled as a “Match” or a “No Match” (equivalent to a 
correct diagnosis in medicine or a stated fact in education), and ask participants to generate 
their own labels or descriptors that best characterise the similarities or differences between 
the prints. 
A1.3.3 Contrasts 
Another strategy found to be effective for learning visual categories in particular (e.g., 
learning to recognise the style of an artist) is interleaved practice. This strategy involves 
presenting exemplars (e.g., paintings by Cézanne) in a sequence that is intermixed with 
exemplars of other categories (e.g., paintings by Matisse or Monet; Hatala, Brooks & 
Norman, 2003; Kornell & Bjork, 2008; Zulkiply & Burt, 2012). Interleaving is effective for 
learning even when the different categories are presented simultaneously (Kang & Pashler, 
2012; Walheim, Dunlosky & Jacoby, 2011), suggesting that such learning effects are not 
explained by spacing exemplars in time. Interleaving is thought to aid generalisation by 
promoting attention to the differences between categories (Kornell & Bjork, 2008; Kornell, 
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Castel, Eich & Bjork, 2010), and by decreasing the fluency of processing (Bjork, Dunlosky & 
Kornell, 2013). Conversely, presenting two exemplars of the same category, either back to 
back or simultaneously (i.e., massing or blocking), is thought to draw attention to the 
commonalities among members of a category. Consistent with this view, other work has 
demonstrated the benefits of interleaved practice to be most pronounced for homogenous 
categories (Carvahlo & Goldstone, 2014).  
 In fingerprints, novices tend to overcall matches when the mismatching pairs are 
highly similar (Tangen et al, 2011), and such cases are increasingly common in practice due 
to the use of computer algorithms to help narrow down the list of candidate prints (Dror & 
Mnookin, 2010). Increasing the saliency of between-finger differences through a process 
similar to interleaving should therefore be particularly beneficial for learning to distinguish 
highly similar distractor prints. We devised a contrast training protocol that allows learners 
to compare a fingerprint alongside a different matching print and a mismatching print at 
the same time. In other words, learners can contrast within-finger variance with between-
finger variance simultaneously. Our goal here is to help learners distinguish between the 
visual information that is due to differences within the same print (i.e., distortion, slippage, 
pressure, etc.), and the visual information that is due to differences between the fingerprint 
impressions from different fingers. 
A1.4 Method 
A1.4.1 Participants 
The participants were 100 undergraduate psychology students from The University of 
Queensland with no prior experience viewing fingerprints. Course credit was provided in 
exchange for participation. Each participant was randomly allocated to one of four training 
conditions: individuation training (17 female; Mean Age = 20.1), individuation training 
with feedback (13 female; Mean Age = 20.8), labels training (12 female; Mean Age = 
19.8), or contrast training (17 female; Mean Age = 19.3). There were 25 participants in 
each condition. 
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A1.4.2 Stimuli 
The fingerprint set used in this experiment consisted of 100 fingerprint trios. Each trio 
consisted of an exemplar fingerprint, a fingerprint left by the same finger on a separate 
occasion (for match trials), and a highly similar distractor print returned from a search of 
the Australian National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (for mismatch trials; 
see Tangen et al., 2011 for details). The fingerprints were cropped to 512 × 512 pixels with 
the impressions isolated in the centre on the image. Some of the fingerprints were fully 
rolled and others were slaps, where the finger is pressed down and not rolled from one side 
to the other, introducing greater variation between instances of the same finger. 
For each participant, 50 fingerprint trios were randomly allocated to the training 
phase of the experiment and the remaining 50 to the test phase. From the pool of 50 
training trios, a random 25 were paired with the impression from the same finger 
(generating the matching pairs), and the remaining 25 with the highly similar impression 
from another individual (generating mismatching pairs). This same method was used to 
generate matching and mismatching pairs for the test. Each exemplar print had a chance to 
be paired with its match or its distractor, and to appear during training or test, which also 
varied for each participant so that any differences observed between training groups are 
unlikely to be due to low level image characteristics. 
  
Figure A1. A sample trio consisting of an exemplar, a matching, and a mismatching 
impression. 
Exemplar MismatchMatch
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A1.4.3 Procedure 
The experiment was displayed on 23 inch iMac computers with headphones. Learners in all 
four training groups first read an information sheet and listened to an instructional video 
about the nature of the training before completing one of the four training sessions. In each 
of the instructional videos, learners were shown an example of a matching and 
mismatching fingerprint pair, and were shown what their respective training environments 
looked like. All learners were instructed that they would be tested on their ability to 
discriminate fingerprints later in the experiment before completing the training phase. After 
completing the training phase, learners watched another instructional video before 
completing the test. The test involved judging 50 novel pairs of fingerprints as belonging to 
the same finger or different fingers and responses were indicated on the same 12-point 
confidence rating scale used during training. None of the prints were presented previously 
and no feedback was provided during the test. Progression through the test was self-paced, 
such that participants only advanced to the next case when after providing a rating and 
clicking “OK”. 
A1.4.4 Individuation Training (Baseline) 
Baseline learners viewed 50 pairs of fingerprints (half matching and half mismatching), one 
after the other, and were instructed to judge whether the two impressions in each case 
belonged to the same finger or whether they belonged to two different fingers (see Figure A.
1 for an example of matching and mismatching fingerprints). The fingerprints were the 
only source of information and they remained on the screen until learners provided a rating 
and moved on to the next case. As with each of the training conditions, the sequence of 
matching and mismatching trials was random for each participant. Learners used a 12-
point, forced choice confidence rating scale which appeared below the fingerprints in each 
case. This scale is the same used in previous experiments (e.g., Tangen et al., 2011; 
Searston et al., 2015) and ranges from 1 (sure different) to 12 (sure same). Ratings of 1 to 6 
indicated a “no match” decision (i.e., the learner thought the two prints belong to two 
different fingers) and ratings 7 to 12 indicated a “match” decision (i.e., the learner thought 
the two prints belong to the same finger). Forcing one of two decisions allowed us to 
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examine changes in learners discrimination ability or accuracy independent of changes in 
their decision strategy or response bias (Green & Swets, 1996). 
A1.4.5 Feedback Training 
Feedback learners judged 50 pairs of fingerprints (half matching and half mismatching) as 
either belonging to the same finger or two different fingers using the same 12-point rating 
scale as the baseline training group. In addition, they received trial by trial corrective 
feedback on their decisions. Immediately after providing a rating in each case, the 
fingerprints were removed and they were presented with the word “Correct” in bold green 
font in the middle of the screen for correct decisions (i.e., correctly calling or rejecting a 
match) or the word “Incorrect” in bold red font for incorrect decisions (i.e., falsely calling 
or missing a match). The feedback remained on the screen for a further three-seconds 
before participants advanced to the next case. 
A1.4.6 Labels Training 
Learners in the labels training group viewed 50 pairs of fingerprints, one after the other 
(half matching half mismatching), but they did not explicitly engage in individuation 
training. Instead, these learners were provided with the correct responses as labels above 
each pair of fingerprints. On matching trials, the word “Match” appeared in bold font above 
the prints, and on mismatching trials, “No Match” appeared in the same font and location. 
In each case, learners were instructed to list the similarities and dissimilarities between the 
two prints in a text box below them. Learners could not advance to the next trial if the text 
box was empty. 
A1.4.7 Contrast Training 
Learners in the contrast training group viewed 50 sets of four fingerprint on the screen, one 
after the other. In each case, the same exemplar fingerprint appeared twice on the screen: 
once alongside a different fingerprint left by the same finger (i.e., matching pair), and 
again alongside a highly similar fingerprint from another individual (i.e., mismatching 
pair). Learners were instructed to compare and contrast the two pairs before judging each 
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pair individually as a match or a mismatch without feedback and were not able to advance 
to the next trial until providing a judgment about both pairs (a 12-point rating scale was 
located on the right of each pair in each case). Whether the matching pair appeared at the 
top or the bottom of the screen was randomised on each trial and for each participant. 
A1.5 Results 
Learners who engaged in individuation training with feedback made the most correct 
decisions on the transfer test (83.23%), followed by learners in the labels training group 
(79.46%), learners in the contrast training group (76.79%), and learners in the baseline 
group (i.e., individuation training without feedback; 67.00%). To examine differences in 
accuracy independent of response strategy (i.e., tending to say “match” or “no match” more 
regardless of the correct response), we  computed  the  average  discrimination  ability  (Aʹ)  and 
response bias (BʺD ) separately for learners in all four training groups (see Donaldson, 1992 on 
the use of Aʹ  and  BʺD  as  nonparametric  measures  of  performance).  Again, learners in the 
individuation with feedback training group were the most accurate on the test (Mean Aʹ = .
89) followed by learners in the labels training group (Mean  Aʹ  =  .86), learners in the 
contrast training group (Mean Aʹ = .84) and learners in the baseline training group (Mean Aʹ 
= .75). Interestingly, Learners in the individuation with feedback group (Mean BʺD = 0.00), 
labels group (Mean BʺD = .13), and contrast training group (Mean BʺD = -.18), also displayed 
less bias on the test than learners in the baseline group (Mean  BʺD = -.53). Learners in the 
baseline training group tended to say “match” more than any other group regardless of 
whether the fingerprints actually matched or not. 
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Figure A2. Depicts the mean test accuracy (Aʹ; a) and response bias (BʺD; b) for each 
training group, as well as their mean percent correct for matching (c) and mismatching 
trials (d). The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.  
A1.5.1 Signal Detection Analyses 
We first subjected learners Aʹ scores and BʺD  scores on the transfer test to two separate one-
way, between-subjects analyses of variance. These analyses showed a significant main effect 
of Training Type (baseline, feedback, labels or contrast) on accuracy, F(3, 96) = 7.10, MSE 
= 0.01, p < .001,  ηG² = .18, and response bias, F(3, 96) = 8.85, MSE = 0.23, p < .001, 
ηG² = .22. Tukey’s pairwise comparisons using learners Aʹ scores further revealed that, 
compared to the baseline group, the feedback, t(48) = 4.34, p < .001, d = 1.05, labels, 
t(48) = 3.50, p = .004, d = .84 and contrast training, t(48) = 2.90, p = .023, d = .70, 
groups were all significantly more accurate on the transfer test. Planned comparisons of 
learners’ BʺD  scores also revealed that learners in the feedback, t(48) = 3.90, p = .001, d = 
1.12, and labels group, t(48) = 4.85, p < .001, d = 1.54, were significantly less (liberally) 
biased than those in the baseline training group. The difference between the BʺD  scores in 
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the baseline group and contrast training group was not significant, t(48) = 2.60, p = .052, 
d = .68. None of the comparisons between the feedback, labels, and contrast training 
groups were significant. 
A1.5.2 Percent Correct Analyses 
We also examined differences in learners’ percent correct scores for matching and 
mismatching cases by conducting a Training Type (baseline,  feedback,  labels  or  contrast) × 
Trial Type (match or mismatch) mixed analysis of variance. We found a significant main effect 
of Training Type, F(3, 96) = 9.07, MSE = 0.03, p < .001,  ηG² = .12, Trial Type, F(3, 96) = 
13.03, MSE = 0.03, p < .001,  ηG² = .06, as well as a significant interaction between the two, 
F(3, 96) = 12.39, MSE = 0.03, p < .001,  ηG² = .16. To investigate this interaction further, we 
conducted comparisons between each of the training groups for matching and mismatching 
trials. For matching trials, there was no significant difference in percent correct on the test 
between the baseline learners and feedback learners, t(48) =  .35, p  =  .985, between the 
baseline learners and labels learners, t(48) =  1.59, p  =  .392, or between the baseline 
learners and contrast learners, t(48) =  .85, p  =  .830. For mismatching trials on the other 
hand, there was a significant different between the baseline training group and the 
feedback training group, t(48) =  6.01, p  <  .001, d  =  1.50, between the baseline training 
group and the labels training group, t(48) =  6.04, p  <  .001, d  =  1.65, and between the 
baseline and contrast training groups, t(48) =  4.40, p  <  .001, d  =  1.04. None  of  the 
comparison between the feedback, labels, and contrast training groups were significant.
A1.6 Discussion 
Despite a reliance on training and experience as an index of expertise in courts, few peer-
reviewed studies have examined whether certain training protocols are more effective than 
others in producing genuine perceptual expertise in forensic domains. Here, we produce 
such data, drawing on well established learning strategies used in education and medicine. 
We have shown that corrective feedback is a powerful tool for learning to discriminate 
between highly similar fingerprints, resulting in significantly greater accuracy and lower 
rates of bias on a test of transfer than individuation training alone. We have also shown two 
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other equally effective ways to boost fingerprint discrimination performance: generating 
labels for similar and dissimilar features between prints (labels training), and contrasting 
matching and mismatching image-pairs (contrast training). Learners in the labels and 
contrast training groups also produced lower rates of bias on the test compared to a 
baseline group, but this reduction was only significant for those in the labels condition, who 
produced a slightly conservative response bias (i.e., tending to overcall mismatches) on the 
test compared to the liberal bias (i.e., tending to overcall matches) displayed by baseline 
and contrast learners. The benefits of feedback, labels, and contrast training were isolated to 
mismatching trials, which were selected for their high similarity. 
The result of learners showing above baseline discrimination ability (independent of 
response bias) across the three training groups, suggests the effects we observed for 
mismatching trials were partly due to an increase in sensitivity to information that is 
diagnostic of highly similar, but mismatching prints. This finding is consistent with previous 
work demonstrating that fingerprint experts with years of experience perform particularly 
well compared to novices at identifying highly similar distractors (Tangen et al., 2011; 
Thompson, Tangen & McCarthy, 2013). The reduced bias observed for the feedback and 
labels training groups suggests that these two protocols also helped to calibrate learners’ 
decision strategy. It is possible that the added information of “Correct”/“Incorrect” in the 
feedback training protocol and “Match”/“No Match” in the labels training protocol enabled 
learners to tune their response bias so as to reflect the underlying base rates of matching 
and mismatching pairs. This interpretation is in line with previous work showing that 
recognition memory false alarm rates are dependent on base rate information when 
feedback is provided (Estes & Maddox, 1995), or when base rate information is provided in 
advance (Ratcliff, Shen & Gronlund, 1992). 
Our present design doesn’t allow us to determine whether the greater sensitivity 
displayed by learners in the labels training group was due to the “Match”/“No Match” 
information, generating descriptors for similar and dissimilar features, or a combination of 
the two. One way to test this would be to include a condition where learners rate the prints 
as matching or mismatching without feedback before listing similarities and dissimilarities. 
Prior work in education certainly suggests the process of describing why something is true
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—such as describing why two fingerprints belong to the same finger—is more helpful for 
learning than passively gathering truthful information (Pressley et al., 1987; see Dunloskly 
et al., 2013). Our labels training protocol was based on this elaborative interrogation 
technique and it is likely that generating similar and dissimilar features acted as a desirable 
difficulty, encouraging learners to attend closely to particular instantiations of generic 
features that are diagnostic of a correct response (Brooks & Hannah, 2006). 
One other caveat concerns the contrast training protocol. We chose to equate the 
number of training trials rather than the number of images, meaning that the increased 
sensitivity observed for contrast learners may be due to their exposure to a greater number 
of prints during training. It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the source of the 
contrast learning effect we observed with fingerprints without further research that equates 
the number of exemplars. However, previous work has shown that viewing images of 
different bird species in pairs versus singles aids classification of new birds, even with the 
same number of exemplars across conditions (Walheim et al., 2011). It is possible that the 
simultaneous presentation of matching and mismatching prints contributed to the greater 
sensitivity we observed by highlighting differences between matching and a highly similar 
distractor prints. This explanation is consummate with discrimination accounts of spacing 
effects in category learning (Kornell & Bjork, 2008; Kornell et al., 2010). 
A1.6.1 Practical Applications 
The purpose of the present study was to broadly compare different strategies for training 
novices in an applied visual domain to accurately classify members of a category. As a 
starting point, we examined variants of three strategies that have been shown to be 
effective in education and medicine: corrective feedback, generating lists of features, and 
contrasting category exemplars. We also set a high bar for these learning strategies by 
comparing them to individuation training (Bukach et al., 2012; Tanaka et al., 2005; Wong 
et al., 2009). Individuation training, by itself, has all of the hallmarks of a desirable 
difficulty: identifying and discriminating exemplars of a category or object (e.g., a finger) 
encourages retrieval of similar prior instances (Searston et al., 2015), and this process of 
retrieving information from memory is more effortful for a novice who has fewer prior 
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instances to draw on. Such effortful retrieval has a well-documented positive effect on 
learning in education (Bjork et al., 2013; Karpicke & Roediger, 2007, 2008). Our feedback, 
labels, and contrast training protocols all surpassed this formidable benchmark, and show 
promise as training tools in applied visual domains. Further work is needed, however, to 
clarify the specific mechanisms underlying the learning effects we observed, as well as their 
generality to other areas of perceptual expertise. 
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